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Poor Finances: 
Assets and Low-Income Households 
 
INTRODUCTION TO THE SERIES 
Economic security throughout the life course is intrinsically linked to both income and asset 
ownership. The majority of current social policies focus primarily on income supports and social 
services. However, building assets can also help individuals, families, and communities expand 
their economic horizons. 
America has a longstanding history of promoting ownership, as reflected in existing 
policies to promote home and business ownership, investment, and saving. New opportunities for 
people to save and become asset owners will likely increase the number of individuals and 
families able to build assets and improve the economic security of all Americans. Greater 
inclusivity and accessibility of traditional approaches to expanding ownership may make it easier 
for lower and middle income families to save. Still, while theory and evidence suggest that 
improved asset-based policies may promote development of low-income individuals and 
families, and perhaps communities and society as a whole, research in this area of asset 
development is in its infancy. There is still much to learn. 
Poor Finances: Assets and Low-Income Households is a series of reports on poverty, 
asset building, and social policy. The purpose of the series is to assess the nascent state of 
knowledge and policy development and to synthesize recent progress in these areas. Specifically, 
the reports in the series will:  
• evaluate what is known regarding the measures, distributions, determinants, and effects 
of asset holding; 
• develop a portrait of the assets of low-income households; 
• develop conceptual frameworks for viewing assets and liabilities; 
• assess the strengths and weaknesses of data sources on assets and liabilities; 
• chart directions for future research; 
• examine the effects of means-tested program policies on asset building; and 
• inform subsequent discussions of public policy. 
While the focus of this series of reports is on asset accumulation and asset-based policies 
for low-income individuals and families, the conceptual frameworks developed are not limited to 
low-income populations. This broad approach is an effective way to identify the overall critical 
issues that relate to asset holding for all populations. Where appropriate, however, various 
reports point out when the framework specifically applies to low-income, minority, and single 
parent households. This distinction is important because these subgroups are particularly 
vulnerable to low asset accumulation. The definition of low-income used in the series of reports 
is necessarily imprecise. The reports reflect a broad literature synthesis and definitions of low-
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income are not uniform across studies, surveys, or public programs. However, low-income can 
be broadly thought of as affecting households in the bottom income quintiles.  
This report in the series, “Determinants of Asset Building,” provides a policy-oriented 
conceptual framework that has the potential to explain saving and asset accumulation across the 
entire population and to account for the low levels of saving and asset accumulation in the low-
income population. The report also reviews empirical evidence that supports or challenges this 
framework.  
Why Assets Are Important 
In describing why assets are important, it is useful to begin by distinguishing income from assets. 
Incomes are flows of resources. They are what people receive as a return on their labor or use of 
their capital, or as a public program transfer. Most income is spent on current consumption. 
Assets are stocks of resources. They are what people accumulate and hold over time. Assets 
provide for future consumption and are a source of security against contingencies. As 
investments, they also generate returns that generally increase aggregate lifetime consumption 
and improve a household’s well-being over an extended time horizon.  
The dimensions of poverty, and its relative distribution among different social classes, are 
significantly different when approached from an assets perspective, as opposed to an income 
perspective. Those with a low stock of resources to draw on in times of need are asset poor. This 
asset poverty may leave them vulnerable to unexpected economic events and unable to take 
advantage of the broad opportunities offered by a prosperous society. Many studies have found 
that the rate of asset poverty exceeds the poverty rate as calculated by the traditional measure, 
which is based on an income standard. Many U.S. households have little financial cushion to 
sustain them in the event of a job loss, illness, or other income shortfall. Also, social and 
economic development of these households may be limited by a lack of investment in education, 
homes, businesses, or other assets. To the extent that low resource holdings limit the potential for 
social and economic development, understanding how those with limited assets can build up 
their asset base is likely to be an important policy issue.  
Income and Assets in Public Policy 
Outside of education, traditional social programs that assist low-income populations have 
focused mainly on income and social services that fulfill basic consumption needs, which have 
been essential to the well-being of families and children. An asset-based approach could 
complement this traditional approach and could shift the focus to the long-term development of 
individuals, families, and communities. This focus provides a broader picture of the dynamics of 
poverty among the low-income population. 
Asset-based policy has many potential meanings. These include policies to promote the 
accumulation and preservation of financial wealth, tangible property, human capital, social 
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capital, political participation and influence, cultural capital, and natural resources. While all of 
these meanings have value, building financial wealth and tangible nonfinancial assets for the 
purpose of household social and economic development is the focus of this series of reports.  
The United States and many other countries already have large asset-based policies. In 
many cases, these operate through the tax and employer-based systems, so that public transfers 
occur via tax benefits (e.g., home mortgage interest deduction; tax breaks for contributions to a 
variety of retirement accounts; tax-preferred education accounts and College Savings Plans; 
benefits for other emerging policies, such as Medical Savings Accounts). These asset-based 
policies have grown rapidly in recent years and today represent a significant proportion of 
overall federal expenditures and tax subsidies. 
Asset Policy for Low-Income Households 
Low-income individuals and families frequently do not participate in existing asset-based 
mechanisms. The reasons may be threefold. First, this population is less likely to own homes, 
investments, or retirement accounts, where most asset-based policies are targeted. Second, with 
little or no federal income tax liability, the low-income have little or no tax incentives, or other 
incentives, for asset accumulation. Third, asset limits in means-tested transfer policies have the 
potential to discourage saving by the low-income population. In many respects, this population 
does not have access to the same structures and incentives for asset accumulation. The potential 
of asset building to promote long-term development of low-income households motivates this 
series of reports. Poor Finances: Assets and Low-Income Households attempts to serve as a 
central resource that provides a comprehensive assessment and critique of the current and 
emerging knowledge base regarding asset building for low-income individuals and families. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Although research on the determinants of saving and asset accumulation is extensive, it remains 
inadequate for policy purposes. Most theories of saving point to individual characteristics to 
explain low levels of wealth. Relatively few studies offer research that could inform policy for 
increasing wealth. This report examines the following question: What factors determine financial 
asset building? More specifically, this report: 
• summarizes existing theories of saving and asset accumulation; 
• presents a conceptual framework for the determinants of asset building; and 
• reviews empirical evidence that supports or challenges this framework, and suggests 
directions for future research. 
Theories of the Determinants of Saving and Asset Accumulation 
Existing theories of the determinants of saving and asset accumulation may be classified into 
three categories: (1) neoclassical economic, (2) psychological and sociological, and (3) 
behavioral economic. Neoclassical economic models assume that individuals are rational beings 
who respond in predictable ways to changes in incentives. Many economic models also assume 
that individuals have perfect knowledge and access to perfect markets. Early models put primary 
emphasis on income and age (or stage in the life cycle) as predictors of saving and asset 
accumulation. More recent models have emphasized the desire to leave a bequest, the desire for 
precautionary savings, and, most recently, the effects of public policy on precautionary saving. 
The most recent models are an important advance because they are more explicitly policy-
oriented and because they suggest a possible policy pathway for increasing wealth. 
Psychological and sociological theories consider additional determinants of saving, 
including personality characteristics, aspirations, expectations, and peer and family influences. 
Although these factors may help explain low levels of wealth in the low-income population, they 
offer few clear policy recommendations for increasing wealth. 
The behavioral economic theory of saving is rooted in neoclassical economic theory but 
rejects the assumption that people are rational and all-knowing. Behavioral theorists have 
identified a number of common human characteristics that shape financial behavior, including 
lack of self-control, limited cognitive abilities, inertia, the tendency to interpret default options as 
“advice,” and the tendency to use mental accounting techniques. The number of empirical 
studies examining behavioral propositions is growing rapidly, and most of these studies provide 
support for behavioral theory. Behavioral theory has sometimes stopped, however, with this 
emphasis on individual deficiencies. To inform policy, theory could move beyond this focus on 
individuals to emphasize institutions that can encourage saving and asset accumulation by 
accounting for, and perhaps even taking advantage of, individual tendencies. These institutions 
are the focus of the conceptual framework described below. 
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Conceptual Framework for the Determinants of Asset Building 
The conceptual framework offered in this report flows from an emerging institutional theory of 
saving and asset accumulation. In this framework, both individual and institutional constructs 
affect saving and investment, which in turn lead to asset accumulation (see Exhibit ES-1). The 
framework also acknowledges inter-household sources of asset accumulation through inter vivos 
transfers and inheritances, but these are not the focus. 
This conceptual framework includes individual constructs: economic resources and 
needs, informal support for saving, financial knowledge, and psychological variables, such as 
future orientation and saving-related attitudes. These individual constructs (and probably others 
not yet identified) are relevant because individual choices can affect asset accumulation and 
because knowledge of individuals can lead to the design of institutions that more effectively 
encourage saving and asset accumulation. However, this framework places less emphasis on 
individuals than do the major economic, psychological, and behavioral perspectives on saving. 
The framework emphasizes institutional constructs that shape saving behavior and 
outcomes. The term institutions refers to purposefully-created policies, programs, products, and 
services that shape opportunities, constraints, and consequences. From an institutional 
perspective, saving and asset accumulation are in large part the result of structured mechanisms. 
For the non-poor, these mechanisms include deductions for home mortgage interest and property 
taxes, exclusions for employment-sponsored pension contributions and earnings, tax deferments 
for Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) and Keogh Plans, and employer contributions and tax 
deferments for employee pension plans. Low- and moderate-income households, with little 
existing savings, do not have the same access or receive the same incentives from institutions 
that promote and subsidize asset accumulation (Howard 1997; Seidman 2001; Sherraden 1991).  
The aspects of institutions designed to promote saving and asset accumulation may be 
organized according to seven constructs: (1) access, (2) information, (3) incentives, (4) 
facilitation, (5) expectations, (6) restrictions, and (7) security. Each of the constructs has direct 
policy relevance. Access refers to eligibility and practicality. Information includes both general 
financial information and information that is specific to a particular financial product or program. 
Incentives include subsidies and rates of return. Facilitation refers to any form of assistance in 
saving, especially making saving “automatic.” Expectations are implicit or explicit suggestions 
about desirable saving, investment, or asset accumulation. Restrictions are rules that restrict 
access to or use of assets. And security is freedom from unreasonable risk in saving and asset 
holding. Each of these constructs is expected to shape saving and investment action and, as a 
result, to affect asset accumulation.  
In the “real world,” these constructs tend to exist in “bundles” rather than in isolation. 
These bundles, supported through public policy, tend to be delivered through employment 
settings and settings and through the tax system. A 401(k) plan with an employer match, for 
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Exhibit ES- 1. Determinants of Saving and Investment Action and Asset Accumulation 
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example, provides several institutional supports for saving, especially incentives, facilitation, 
restrictions, and information. For the most part, those who have jobs with benefits, those who are 
homeowners, and those who are “investors” have access to these bundles of institutional 
supports. Low-income households benefit much less from these bundles than others. There are 
some asset-building policies and programs targeted specifically to low-income households, but 
these initiatives are small and, overall, provide much less support for saving and asset 
accumulation than the programs that largely benefit middle- and upper-income households. 
Empirical Evidence on Determinants of Asset Building 
Effects of Individual Constructs on Saving and Investment Action 
There have been few direct tests of the hypotheses proposed here regarding individual constructs. 
This may indicate that the most important individual constructs have not been identified, or it 
may indicate that the suggested propositions are not tested because they are perceived to be 
truisms. The latter is more likely the case at least for the propositions that (1) economic resources 
and needs and (2) financial knowledge affect saving and asset accumulation. The clearest 
empirical evidence related to these individual-level propositions shows that the average 
 ES-3
American has very low financial literacy, that retirement and precautionary saving motives are 
the most common motives, and that saving is difficult when economic resources are limited. This 
evidence is descriptive and may only indirectly relate to the propositions offered here. There is 
some very limited evidence that informal support affects saving and asset building. 
Effects of Institutional Constructs on Saving and Investment Action  
The most-researched institutional construct is incentives. There is some evidence that matches 
increase participation in saving programs, and even more evidence that matches increase 
contributions to these programs. Evidence is mixed regarding the effect of matches on net saving 
(across all saving vehicles); contributions to incentivized saving programs are probably a mix of 
new savings and shifted assets. With regard to saving disincentives, evidence suggests that 
income transfer programs such as Temporary Assistance for Needy Families and Supplemental 
Security Income may reduce asset accumulation by low-income households. Recent studies 
examining increases in asset limits associated with welfare reform have some inconsistent 
results, so it is not yet clear whether loosening asset restrictions will increase saving by low-
income households. (For example see McKernan, Ratcliffe, and Nam 2007.) 
The importance of access is suggested by the fact that those who are not offered a 
retirement savings program in the workplace tend to have very little retirement savings, but 
beyond this, the construct of access has not been well specified and investigated. There is a fair 
amount of evidence on financial education (one method of providing financial information). A 
number of studies suggest that financial education improves financial outcomes, but many of 
these studies are vulnerable to selection bias and social desirability bias. A growing body of 
evidence, including the results of two rigorous studies, supports the hypothesis that facilitation 
shapes saving action. With regard to restrictions, it is clear that some people choose restrictions 
and believe restrictions help them protect their savings. Low participation rates in IRAs, 401(k)s, 
and 529 college savings plans seems to suggest, however, that many are not comfortable with 
restrictions, at least as currently structured. Evidence regarding expectations is limited and 
mixed. In the United States, there is very little direct evidence related to security, though security 
is known to be an important factor in less developed countries. 
Suggestions for Future Research  
The summary of empirical evidence provided in this report reveals a number of gaps in 
knowledge. Of special interest are gaps that limit ability to design programs and policies that 
facilitate saving and asset building in low-income households. Some research questions that may 
provide additional policy-relevant knowledge include the following: 
• Under what conditions is homeownership a good asset-building strategy for low-income 
households? What are effective strategies for helping potential homeowners make wise 
choices about ownership?  
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• Does health insurance coverage facilitate saving and asset building for low-income 
households? 
• Does financial education change financial knowledge, attitudes, and behaviors in ways 
that lead to increased saving and asset accumulation in low-income households? Does 
well-targeted financial information that is delivered automatically to individuals produce 
these outcomes? 
• What match structure (i.e., match rate and match cap) maximizes participation in 
incentivized saving programs? What match structure maximizes contributions? What 
match structure maximizes net saving (across all saving vehicles)? Do these findings vary 
by income or education level?  
• Does relaxing the asset limits in income transfer programs lead to increased saving and 
asset holding? 
• Under what circumstances do people want restrictions? Under what circumstances do 
they want liquidity? Do these patterns vary by income or education? 
Some of the most promising avenues for future research would require new policy 
interventions, not just new or improved data sources. New interventions would be indicated in at 
least two scenarios: where there is no existing initiative with the institutional characteristic, or 
bundle of characteristics, of interest; and where researchers want to examine rigorously how 
actual behavior responds to varying institutional characteristics, and no existing program has 
systematically varying institutional characteristics.  
An important line of experimental or quasi-experimental research would involve match 
structure. This research focus is promising because existing studies suggest that people (across 
the income spectrum) respond to financial incentives, but these studies do not identify “optimal” 
match structures. Like questions about match structure, questions about the demand for 
restrictions and liquidity would be best answered with an experiment or quasi-experiment 
designed around a new intervention. Questions about financial education and financial 
information could be answered with new interventions, or research plans might be carefully 
designed around existing interventions. In lieu of interventions with impact assessments, some 
insights could be gained from carefully constructed survey questions that ask individuals how 
they feel about, and whether they would save in, saving products with different restrictions.  
In short, data requirements to answer research questions identified here vary substantially, 
but some of these research pursuits would require a large investment. For the purpose of 
designing programs and policies that facilitate asset building in low-income households, there is 
a particular imperative for research using low-income samples.  
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Conclusions 
The assumption of this work is that better theory can build knowledge that will inform and 
improve policy. From this perspective, institutional features can be purposefully created and put 
in place by public policy. This is not a social scientific perspective that seeks only to understand 
social forces and behaviors, but rather it is an applied agenda that seeks to inform policy design 
and implementation. While a fully developed and integrated institutional theory of saving and 
assets does not yet exist, the identification of institutional constructs and related empirical 
evidence informs policy development and also lays the groundwork for future research.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Although research on the determinants of saving and asset accumulation is extensive, it remains 
inadequate for public policy purposes. Most existing theories of saving point to individual 
characteristics to explain low levels of wealth. Relatively few studies offer research that could 
inform policy for increasing wealth. This report examines the following question: What factors 
determine financial asset building? In particular, the report presents a conceptual framework for 
the determinants of saving and asset accumulation.  
The goal is to develop a framework that explains saving and asset accumulation in ways 
that can inform policy decisions. Thus, the emphasis is both narrow and broad. It is narrow 
because of the focus on decisions and outcomes related to assets, not decisions and outcomes 
related to consumption, income, participation in means-tested programs, and liabilities. A 
broader conceptualization of the economic life of low-income households might also be useful, 
but is beyond the scope of this report. At the same time, the emphasis is broad because the report 
seeks to develop a framework that explains saving and asset accumulation across the entire 
population, while accounting for low levels of saving and wealth in the low-income population. 
The goal is not to develop theory that applies only to the poor because this theory would not 
support broad knowledge development and would not connect with larger bodies of work on 
saving and asset accumulation. That said, the report does give specific attention to three 
disadvantaged populations—low-income households, minority households, and single-mother 
households. 
The emphasis on assets does not imply that income- and consumption-oriented strategies 
are undesirable. Economic constraints are very real and probably go a long way toward 
explaining low saving rates and limited asset accumulation in low-income households. The 
optimal decision for some very low-income households may be not to save, because saving 
would require harmful reductions in consumption. Thus, programs and policies that increase 
incomes and provide important supports, especially health insurance, are critical for the 
economic well-being of families. Both income generation and asset building are essential in the 
economic lives of everyone, rich and poor alike. The series to which this report belongs focuses 
on assets because policymakers (and others) have generally undervalued the role of assets in the 
economic well-being of low-income families (see Sherraden 1991) and because much more 
could be done to support the asset-building efforts of low-income families through public policy.  
This report is organized as follows: Section II summarizes existing theories of saving and 
asset accumulation and discusses strengths and limitations, with an emphasis on ability to 
explain asset building in low-income households. Section III presents the conceptual framework. 
When applicable, this section considers how the hypothesized relationships might differ 
substantially for low-income, minority, and/or single-mother households. Because the aim is to 
develop a conceptual framework that will be of use to policymakers, this section also presents 
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additional conceptual points related to public policy. Section IV reviews empirical evidence that 
supports or challenges the proposed framework, noting where findings seem to differ for low-
income, minority, and single-mother households. The report concludes in Section V with a 
summary of strengths and weakness of existing empirical evidence and possible directions for 
future research.  
II. THEORIES OF THE DETERMINANTS OF ASSET BUILDING 
This section summarizes and assesses existing concepts and theoretical models of the 
determinants of saving and asset accumulation. These “theories,” which are at various stages of 
development, may be classified into three categories: (1) neoclassical economic; (2) 
psychological and sociological; and (3) behavioral economic. Exhibits 1, 2, and 3 summarize 
these perspectives, emphasizing their abilities to explain low saving and asset accumulation in 
low-income households. The last column of each exhibit summarizes explanations for low 
saving and asset accumulation implied by each perspective. A fourth theoretical category 
emphasizes institutional determinants of saving and asset accumulation (see Exhibit 4), and is the 
approach adopted and developed here. This section describes this emerging theory in the context 
of the conceptual model presented below.  
A. Neoclassical Economic Theory 
Neoclassical economic theory assumes that individuals are rational beings who respond in 
predictable ways to changes in incentives. From this perspective, there are two broad 
determinants of individual behavior: opportunities (or constraints) and individual preferences 
(Pollak 1998). Preferences are generally assumed to be stable and exogenous (e.g., unaffected by 
opportunities and constraints). Many economic models also assume that individuals have perfect 
knowledge and access to perfect markets. Individual utility (i.e., happiness or satisfaction) is 
usually assumed to be a function of consumption, and economic models often treat savings as a 
residual, those resources that remain after consumption decisions are made. 
The starting points for much neoclassical economic research on saving and asset 
accumulation have been the life cycle hypothesis (LCH) (Ando and Modigliani 1963; Modigliani 
and Ando 1957; Modigliani and Brumberg 1954) and the permanent income hypothesis (PIH) 
(Friedman 1957). Both of these theories assume that individuals and households are concerned 
about long-term consumption opportunities and therefore explain saving and consumption in 
terms of expected future income. These models assume that saving is a way to “smooth” 
consumption in the face of income fluctuations. Since consumption is determined by anticipated 
lifetime resources (rather than only current resources), saving over short periods of time (e.g., a 
year) is expected to reflect departures of current income from average lifetime resources. In other 
words, according to these theories, when current income falls below average expected lifetime 
income, saving decreases, and individuals and households may even borrow to finance  
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Exhibit 1. Summary of Neoclassical Economic Theory Related to Saving and Asset 
Accumulation 
Common Assumptions Key Constructs Explanations for Low Saving  
and Asset Accumulation 
• Preferences for saving 
and spending are stable  
• Individuals are forward-
thinking; they consider 
lifetime economic 
resources and needs when 
making consumption 
decisions 
• Individuals have rational 
expectations regarding 
lifetime economic 
resources and needs 
• Individuals want to avoid 
large fluctuations in 
consumption; saving, 
dissaving, and borrowing 
allow individuals to 
“smooth” consumption 
• Individuals have perfect 
information about saving 
options 
• Individuals have access 
to perfect credit, saving, 
and insurance markets 
• Income 
• Consumption 
• Age / stage in 
life cycle 
• Incentives / 
disincentives 
• Expectations 
• Motives for 
saving 
• Preferences 
• Households with low incomes have 
limited resources left over after 
subsistence requirements are met 
• Young households have negative 
saving rates because current income is 
lower than expected lifetime income 
• Asset limits of means-tested transfer 
programs discourage saving by 
increasing the cost of asset 
accumulation 
• Public transfer programs, insurance, 
and access to credit may discourage 
saving and asset accumulation by 
reducing the need for assets 
• Incentives for saving may not increase 
net saving for two reasons: (1) 
individuals may finance deposits by 
withdrawing money from existing 
assets; and (2) saving incentives 
decrease the amount of saving needed 
to finance a given level of future 
consumption 
• Limited saving and asset accumulation 
is rational for individuals who do not 
expect to live long and who do not seek 
to leave a bequest 
• Some individuals strongly discount 
future consumption, relative to current 
consumption 
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consumption. When current income exceeds average expected lifetime resources, individuals and 
households save (or repay debt). 
As its name suggests, the life cycle hypothesis posits that consumption and saving reflect 
an individual’s stage in the life cycle, which is generally proxied by age. Since retirement, for 
most people, is the most substantial and enduring “income fluctuation,” this model emphasizes 
saving for retirement as a primary motivation for deferred consumption. Young households are 
expected to have negative saving since they typically have relatively low earnings and incur debt 
for education, home purchase, and other expenses. In the middle period of the life cycle, saving 
is expected to be positive because individuals pay their debts and begin to save for retirement. 
Upon retirement, households are expected to dissave (i.e., spend money previously saved). Thus, 
differences in consumption and saving among households are believed to be partly the product of 
age differences, and the pattern of saving and dissaving creates an inverted U-shaped pattern 
across age categories and/or over time (Ando and Modigliani 1963; Modigliani and Ando 1957; 
Modigliani and Brumberg 1954). 
In recent years, economists have extended the LCH and PIH. Some models consider the 
desire to leave a bequest (e.g., Hurd and Mundaca 1989; Menchik and David 1983). “Buffer-
stock” models (e.g., Carroll 1997; Carroll and Samwick 1997; Deaton 1991) emphasize a 
precautionary motive for saving, particularly for younger households and for households facing 
greater income uncertainty. These households are expected to accumulate small stocks of assets 
(buffer stocks) to smooth consumption in the face of short-term income fluctuations and liquidity 
constraints. The pattern of asset accumulation predicted by buffer-stock models is very different 
than the inverted U-shape predicted by the LCH: Wealth is expected to remain fairly constant 
(assuming that households have accumulated and can maintain their optimal buffer stocks) until 
about age 50 when households begin saving for retirement (see Carroll and Samwick 1997, 
Figure 3). Other models, sometimes called “augmented” life cycle models, have attempted to 
incorporate the effects of public policy on precautionary saving motives (see Hubbard, Skinner, 
and Zeldes 1994; 1995, discussed in more detail below in Sections III.D and IV.D, under 
“Incentives”).  
B. Psychological and Sociological Theory 
Psychological and sociological theories of saving consider additional determinants of saving and 
asset accumulation, including personality characteristics, motives, aspirations, expectations, and 
peer and family influences. Some of the propositions emphasize the effects of relatively stable 
personality characteristics on asset building. Other psychological and sociological propositions 
assume that saving-related preferences and aspirations are not fixed and in fact seek to explain 
how motives, aspirations, and expectations are shaped. The propositions that emphasize 
relatively stable personality characteristics typically come from psychology. For example, 
psychologists have examined the effects of “thrift,” “conscientiousness,” “emotional stability,” 
“autonomy,” “extraversion,” “agreeableness,” “inflexibility,” and “toughmindedness” on saving 
 4
Exhibit 2. Summary of Psychological and Sociological Theory Related to Saving and Asset 
Accumulation 
Key Assumptions Key Constructs Explanations for Low Saving  
and Asset Accumulation 
• Economic behavior (e.g., 
an individual’s response to 
a saving opportunity) is 
shaped by psychological 
variables such as 
personality characteristics, 
motives, aspirations, and 
expectations  
• Economic decisions may 
be influenced by social 
network members 
 
• Personality 
characteristics 
• Social and 
cultural norms 
related to 
saving and 
consumption 
• Personal norms 
related to 
saving and 
consumption 
• Saving motives 
and goals 
• Expectations of 
success 
• Social network 
supports and 
demands 
• Personality characteristics may cause 
individuals to choose immediate 
gratification over future gratification 
• Social norms (e.g., conspicuous 
consumption) may encourage spending 
• Individuals may strive to maintain past 
consumption levels even when income 
falls 
• Individuals may not have salient saving 
motives 
• Individuals may not attempt to save or 
accumulate assets because they expect 
to fail 
• Social networks may discourage saving 
and asset accumulation by making 
demands on financial resources 
 
(e.g., Nyhus and Webley 2001; Wärneryd 1996). The propositions that seek to explain how 
motives, aspirations, expectations, and even preferences are shaped come from both sociology 
and psychology. Some scholars have emphasized social norms, suggesting that the norm of 
“conspicuous consumption” leads people to over-spend (and thus to under-save). Some 
researchers consider the effects of families and peers. For example, Stack (1974) suggests that 
demands from social network members for money or other material assistance can sabotage 
efforts to save. And, the literature on financial socialization (e.g., Chiteji and Stafford 1999; 
Cohen 1994) suggests that social network members can strongly influence an individual’s 
consumption patterns, saving-related beliefs, and aspirations and expectations for saving. For 
example, a child who knows that her family spends carefully and saves regularly, who overhears 
and perhaps participates in conversations about stock performance, and who is encouraged to 
have her own savings account is expected to be more financially sophisticated and more inclined 
to save as an adult than an individual raised in a family that does not save and does not make use 
of a variety of financial products.  
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Other researchers have emphasized the effects of individual experiences. For example, 
Duesenberry (1949) wrote about personal norms, suggesting that individuals may strive to 
maintain past consumption levels even when income falls. Economic psychologists (e.g., 
Furnham 1985; Katona 1975) have proposed that past savings experiences (good and bad) shape 
individuals’ beliefs about their abilities to save in the future.  
C. Behavioral Economic Theory1
The emerging behavioral theory of saving attempts to explain how people actually behave with 
regard to financial matters. Unlike neoclassical economic theory, these models do not assume 
that people are rational and all-knowing. As the title of an article by Thaler (2000) suggests, 
behavioral theory attempts to explain (and make assumptions that are consistent with) the 
behavior of “Homo sapiens” not “Homo economicus.” Behavioral theorists also assume that 
financial planning has significant nonfinancial costs.2
Behavioral theorists have identified a number of common human characteristics that 
shape financial behavior, including lack of self-control (people tend to place too much weight on 
current consumption relative to future consumption); limited cognitive abilities (for example, 
people do not always learn from their mistakes, and people tend to become overwhelmed by too 
many choices); inertia (people tend to continue doing what they are currently doing); the 
tendency to interpret default options as “advice”;3 and the tendency to use mental accounting 
techniques.4 Often, according to behavioral theory, these tendencies lead individuals to behave in 
ways that are inconsistent with their own priorities or inconsistent with maximizing long-term 
consumption. For example, the lack of self-control often causes people to over-spend and under-
save, even when they are saving for a specific, much-desired goal. Also, limited intellectual 
capabilities and inertia lead people to postpone making financial decisions. 
If people are aware of these tendencies, they may try to compensate for them. For 
example, people may attempt to control their spending by imposing “precommitment 
constraints,” such as arranging for direct deposit to saving and investment vehicles. Even if 
people are naïve about their limitations, saving and investment programs may facilitate saving by 
                                                 
1 One of the earliest behavioral economists, and still one of the most active, is Richard Thaler. This summary draws 
heavily from his writings (e.g., Mullainathan and Thaler 2000; Thaler 1994, 1999; Thaler 2000; Thaler and Shefrin 
1981). Some of the other key references on behavioral theory are Bernheim (1997); Choi, Laibson, Madrian and 
Metrick (2002); Choi, Laibson and Madrian (2004); Lusardi (2002); and Madrian and Shea (2000).  
2 As Schreiner and Sherraden (2007) state, “financial decisions are especially difficult because they involve the 
future, uncertainty, and math.” 
3 For example, a worker signing up for a 401(k) investment option may assume that the default option is the best 
choice for him; otherwise, this choice would not have been defined as the default. 
4 The use of mental accounting means, in part, that people think about funds differently, depending on their source. 
For example, regular wage and salary income may be defined as funds for consumption, while irregular income, 
such as money from a temporary job or from a tax refund may be defined as savings or “treat” money. 
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Exhibit 3. Summary of Behavioral Economic Theory Related to Saving and Asset 
Accumulation 
Key Assumptions Key Constructs Explanations for Low Saving  
and Asset Accumulation 
• Individuals have imperfect 
knowledge about financial 
matters 
• Financial planning has 
mental costs 
• Individuals tend to be 
impatient, placing too 
much weight on present 
experiences 
• Individuals tend to take 
the easiest course of action 
(e.g., prefer the status quo) 
• Individuals tend to 
become overwhelmed by 
too many choices 
• Wealth is not completely 
fungible; individuals tend 
to use mental accounting 
techniques 
• Financial 
knowledge 
• Self-control 
• Precommitment 
constraints 
• Mental and 
physical 
accounting 
• Inertia 
• Rules-of-thumb 
• Individuals postpone financial decisions 
due to lack of knowledge or perceived 
incompetence 
• Even when they want to save, 
individuals have trouble resisting 
spending temptations 
• Individuals are naïve about their own 
short-sightedness and so do not impose 
precommitment constraints 
 
 
deliberately attempting to compensate for these common human characteristics. In fact, 
behavioral theorists have begun to propose some programmatic reforms and innovations such as 
simplified investment options and automatic enrollment in 401(k) plans.5 These program reforms 
are institutional arrangements that will require an institutional theory for knowledge building that 
can inform policy and program design. 
D. Strengths and Weaknesses of the Existing Theoretical Work 
In their current stages of development, none of the existing theories provides a suitable 
explanation for saving and asset accumulation in low-income households. Neoclassical economic 
models tend to be specified clearly and tested rigorously, and there is an extensive body of 
                                                 
5 Programs that enroll people automatically are sometimes called “opt-out” programs because eligible individuals 
are enrolled in the program unless they take the initiative to opt out. 
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scholarly work. But these models tend to make unrealistic assumptions, such as the assumptions 
that individuals have near-perfect knowledge and are forward-thinking and rational. In reality, 
the decisions required to optimize consumption (and other financial goals) over the life course 
are “extraordinarily complex” (Bernheim and Scholz 1993, 87), and empirical studies suggest 
that the majority of Americans lack the financial sophistication and information to make even 
basic economic calculations (Bernheim 1994). Since low-income individuals may also have 
limited financial sophistication, they may have trouble making optimal long-term decisions 
regarding saving and consumption. Neoclassical models also assume that saving-related 
preferences are fixed. The lack of discussion about origins of preferences suggests that 
preferences are the product of stable personality characteristics. Thus, neoclassical economic 
models may implicitly “blame” individuals for low rates of saving and asset accumulation, and 
they may offer no policy pathway for improvement. 
Psychological propositions that emphasize personality characteristics also “blame” 
individuals and have little to offer in the way of policy implications. Some of the propositions 
offered by psychologists and sociologists attend to the origins of preferences and aspirations and 
so are less likely to imply that individuals are solely responsible for limited asset accumulation. 
Relatively few of these propositions have been tested, however. 
Behavioral theory is an important advance. This theory is rooted in neoclassical 
economic theory and tends to have the theoretical rigor of neoclassical models, but it makes 
more realistic assumptions about individuals (see Exhibit 3). These assumptions (which partly 
flow from systematic observation of individuals) might be thought of as psychological variables. 
Thus, behavioral theory complements and advances psychological as well as economic theories 
of saving.  
The number of empirical studies examining behavioral propositions is growing rapidly. 
Although these studies largely examine the behavior of middle- and upper-income individuals 
who are eligible for retirement plans, most of these studies provide support for behavioral theory. 
The section on empirical evidence below provides a summary and assessment of several of these 
studies. Although behavioral theory appears to describe most individuals quite accurately, it 
sometimes emphasizes individual deficiencies. Theory could move beyond this focus on 
individuals to emphasize institutions that can encourage saving and asset accumulation by 
accounting for, and perhaps even taking advantage of, individual tendencies. The behavioral 
literature seems to be moving in this direction, and a merging of behavioral and institutional 
theory seems likely in the future.  
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III. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE DETERMINANTS OF ASSET BUILDING 
A. Introduction 
This section develops a conceptual framework to explain saving and asset accumulation in a way 
that can inform public policy. The framework is based on an institutional theory presented 
below, wherein both institutional and individual constructs affect saving and investment, which 
in turn lead to asset accumulation. Interhousehold sources of asset accumulation through inter 
vivos transfers and inheritances are also acknowledged but are not the focus of this discussion.  
First, individual constructs,6 including economic resources and needs, informal social 
support, financial literacy, and psychological variables, such as future orientation and saving-
related attitudes are discussed. Next, institutional constructs, that is, characteristics of saving-
related programs and policies that can shape saving-related behavior are discussed. The aim of 
this section is to offer a set of propositions with direct relevance to asset-building policy. The 
framework places less emphasis on individuals than the theories of saving and asset 
accumulation described above. However, individual constructs are relevant because individual 
choices can affect asset accumulation. In addition, knowledge of individuals can lead to the 
design of institutions that more effectively encourage saving and asset accumulation. 
This emphasis on institutions warrants a careful explanation. In neoclassical economic 
theory, rational and omniscient individuals have preferences and then make decisions in the 
context of constraints. Behavioral economics modifies this theory by assuming that individuals 
are not usually all-knowing and rational and that preferences are not fixed. Essentially, 
behavioral economists are specifying new aspects of the individual for study. In this section, a 
similar approach to the other “half” of neoclassical theory is presented. This approach attempts 
to specify the vague area that individuals interact with, known as “constraints,” thus providing a 
richer, more detailed description of factors that individuals face when making choices.  
In economic reasoning, individual preferences (neoclassical view) or cognitions and 
emotions (behavioral view) determine action. But it can work the other way around. Sometimes 
an institution will change the action of an individual, and then she changes her “preferences.” 
For example, participation in a 401(k) plan may result in asset accumulation that can change a 
participant’s time horizon and assessment of future possibilities. This is the opposite of standard 
economic understanding, which is that future orientation leads to saving. Both views are 
probably correct to some extent, that is, forward-looking cognition causes saving, and savings 
cause forward-looking cognition, a virtuous circle (Sherraden 1991; Yadama and Sherraden 
1996).  
                                                 
6 In reality, many financial decisions and outcomes might be better measured at the household or family level. For 
simplicity, however, we frame this discussion around individual constructs.  
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The institutional theory presented here and behavioral economics can be viewed as 
different sides of the same coin. Institutions exist and, to some extent, act on their own, and 
people also respond to them with their saving behaviors. In extreme cases, the saving action is 
completely due to institutions, or completely due to individual characteristics, but most often it is 
due to the interplay between these. Thus, individual-level theory and institutional theory are not 
mutually exclusive, but indeed are complementary. In saving theory and research, however, more 
emphasis has been placed on individual variables than on institutional variables.  
So what does the institutional theory presented here say about saving and asset 
accumulation? This theoretical perspective places primary emphasis on purposeful institutional 
arrangements that structure and support asset accumulation (see Exhibit 4). The discussion here 
builds on an emerging body of work at the Center for Social Development at Washington 
University in St. Louis. The focus on the role of institutions in saving by the poor was initiated 
by Sherraden (1991); detailed in Beverly and Sherraden (1999) and Schreiner et al. (2001); and 
extended in Schreiner and Sherraden (2007), Sherraden, Schreiner, and Beverly (2003), and 
Sherraden and Barr (2005).  
The term institutions refers to purposefully-created policies, programs, products, and 
services that shape opportunities, constraints, and consequences. In the social sciences, the term 
is often used much more broadly, but the focus here is narrowly on conditions that are put in 
place on purpose, as in a public policy. Institutions affect world views—and thus actions—
because they shape constraints and consequences and expose people to knowledge of 
opportunities and choices. For example, laws against theft matter not only because people weigh 
the benefits and costs of theft but also because people—due to limited time, effort, knowledge, 
and cognition—often skip the benefit-cost calculus completely and instead assume from the mere 
existence of the law that the net benefits of theft are negative (Schreiner and Sherraden 2007). 
From an institutional perspective, saving and asset accumulations are in large part the 
result of structured mechanisms involving “explicit connections, rules, incentives, and subsidies” 
(Sherraden 1991, 116). For the non-poor, these mechanisms include deductions for home 
mortgage interest and property taxes, exclusions for employment-sponsored pension 
contributions and earnings, tax deferments for Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) and 
Keogh Plans, and employer contributions and tax deferments for employee pension plans. Low- 
and moderate-income households, with little existing savings, do not have the same access or 
receive the same incentives from institutions that promote and subsidize asset accumulation 
(Howard 1997; Seidman 2001; Sherraden 1991). For example, the poor are less likely to own 
homes, and when they do own homes, they receive little or no subsidy because they have low or 
zero marginal tax rates and the tax benefits are not refundable. 
Some of the institutions that influence saving include formal laws and regulations, 
financial enterprises, and financial products. From a neoclassical economic perspective, these  
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Exhibit 4. Summary of Institutional Theory Related to Saving and Asset Accumulation 
Key Assumptions Key Constructs Explanations for Low Saving  
and Asset Accumulation 
• Institutions shape saving 
preferences, saving action, 
investment choices, and 
saving/asset outcomes 
 
• Access 
• Information 
• Incentives 
• Facilitation 
• Expectations 
• Restrictions 
• Security 
• Certain subpopulations (e.g., low-
income and minority households) have 
limited access to institutional supports 
for saving and asset accumulation 
• Certain subpopulations (e.g., current and 
potential recipients of public welfare 
programs with asset limits) face saving 
disincentives 
 
institutions reduce the cost of saving. A behavioral economic perspective (e.g., Thaler 2000) 
would emphasize, in particular, that these institutions reduce the need for cognitive processing 
and self-control on the part of individuals. For example, when firms automatically deposit a 
portion of income into a retirement account unless the employee opts out, institutions may 
reduce transaction costs to close to zero and eliminate the need for cognitive processing. In this 
case, the institution is doing all of the “choosing” and “acting,” and the individual is essentially 
passive.  
The major propositions of the conceptual framework are illustrated in Exhibit 5 and 
discussed in detail in the following subsections. Many of these propositions appear to be 
common sense, but it is useful to state them because a theory must be well-specified to be 
evaluated and tested. And, as the section on empirical evidence shows, some hypotheses that 
seem common sense have rarely been tested or have less empirical support than one might 
assume. 
B. Effects of Saving and Investment Action on Asset Accumulation 
Saving action and investment action appear to affect asset accumulation. Saving action refers to 
“decisions” and “behaviors”7 that influence the amount of money or other resources held aside 
as savings (i.e., not consumed). Saving action includes deposit frequency and deposit amounts. It 
also includes variables related to dissaving, such as withdrawal frequency and withdrawal 
amounts, because asset accumulation occurs only when individuals “protect” their savings 
                                                 
7As shown below, this conceptual framework suggests that institutional factors have an important influence on 
saving and investment action. When institutional factors are very influential, the words “decisions” and “behaviors” 
may exaggerate the degree of individual choice involved. 
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Exhibit 5. Determinants of Saving and Investment Action and Asset Accumulation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Institutional Constructs 
Access 
Information 
Incentives 
Facilitation 
Expectations 
Restrictions 
Security 
Individual Constructs 
Economic resources and needs 
Social networks 
Financial literacy 
Psychological variables 
Saving and Investment 
Action 
Deposit frequency 
Deposit amounts 
Withdrawal frequency 
Withdrawal amounts 
Portfolio composition 
Asset 
Accumulation 
Liquid savings 
Retirement savings 
Net financial worth 
Home equity 
Net worth 
Intergenerational 
and Interhousehold 
Transfers 
 
 
(Beverly, Moore, and Schreiner 2003). Investment action refers to “decisions” and “behaviors” 
that influence where savings are kept, that is, portfolio composition. Portfolios may include 
informal saving vehicles (e.g., cash kept at home and savings held by a trusted family member), 
as well as formal vehicles. Measures of portfolio composition might include dichotomous 
variables indicating whether or not a household owns various assets (or has money stored in 
various informal ways) and percentage of total assets held in each of these.  
The conceptual framework presented here focuses on simple measures of asset 
accumulation, such as net worth, net financial worth, and levels of liquid savings, home equity, 
and retirement savings.8 The link between saving and investment action and asset accumulation 
is described in the following simple propositions: (1) deposit patterns affect asset accumulation, 
(2) withdrawal patterns affect asset accumulation, and (3) portfolio composition affects asset 
accumulation. The first two propositions are essentially truisms. The third proposition refers, of 
course, to the fact that some assets have greater returns than others. This proposition is stated 
                                                 
8 However, we also expect the propositions suggested here to hold when researchers examine measures of asset 
accumulation that evaluate the adequacy of asset holdings (by using a measure of “asset poverty,” for example). 
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very broadly and has nearly universal acceptance in this form. A more specific and 
“controversial” subquestion—whether homeownership increases the asset levels of low-income 
households—is the focus here. This question is particularly relevant because home equity tends 
to be the primary asset for low-income households with assets and because—despite the fact that 
homeownership is key component of “the American Dream”—there are reasons that low-
income, minority, and single-mother households might receive below-average, and even 
negative, rates of return on housing. 
Rates of return on housing are strongly influenced by location and timing of purchase and 
sale. The supply of and demand for housing vary dramatically by neighborhood, and these affect 
prices. In addition, real estate markets tend to be cyclical, and rates of return are strongly 
influenced by whether home prices were inflated at the time of purchase and sale. Because 
residential neighborhoods are highly segregated by race and class, location is a particularly 
salient variable for the subgroups of interest. Put simply, the homes that low-income families can 
afford to purchase tend to be in “less desirable” neighborhoods. As a result of racial and ethnic 
segregation, minorities tend to have access to even fewer neighborhoods. This spatial 
concentration may weaken housing markets in these areas, resulting in lower returns (Gyourko, 
Linneman, and Wachter 1999). Stuart (2003) extends this argument, claiming that current 
mortgage practices tend to concentrate people with poor credit in particular neighborhoods. 
Weakened housing markets lead to lower returns and limited opportunities to sell if families 
experience financial trouble. As a result, he argues, families are more vulnerable to default and 
foreclosure.  
Stuart’s (2003) emphasis on mortgage default calls attention to issues of timing. 
Presumably, low-income households are more likely than others to experience financial crises 
that create pressure for them to sell their homes. In these cases, households cannot consider 
whether market conditions are favorable for sellers in their neighborhoods. Low-income 
households may therefore be more likely to sell at a loss. A final factor that may reduce rates of 
return for low-income households is difficulty maintaining homes. When financial strains make 
it hard for families to make repairs, returns to housing are likely to be much lower.  
C. Effects of Individual Constructs on Saving and Investment Action 
This section explores several individual constructs expected to shape saving and investment 
action: economic resources and needs, informal social support, financial literacy, and 
psychological variables. 
Economic Resources and Needs 
As noted in the introduction to this report, economic resources and needs appear to be important 
predictors of saving and investment action. By definition, low-income individuals have limited 
financial in-flows, so they have less “extra” money to save. It is also difficult for low-income 
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individuals to finance saving by reducing consumption because reductions in consumption are 
more costly when consumption is near subsistence level. At the most fundamental level, 
therefore, low income is a persistent obstacle to saving.  
Some specific expenses, however, such as medical expenses, vehicle expenses, and debt 
payments, probably depress saving in many low-income households. Of course there are other 
large expenses, such as rent or mortgage payments and, for families with children, child care 
expenses. And because people move money around within their household budgets, it is 
probably impossible to say with certainty that a specific expense reduces saving. These three 
expense categories are the focus here because there is evidence that some low-income families 
believe these specific expenses create financial hardship and make it difficult to save or maintain 
assets. As noted in Section IV, however, there is little quantitative research directly linking these 
specific expenses to saving outcomes. 
The first expense category that may be an obstacle to saving is medical expenses, which 
are heavily influenced by health insurance coverage. Families without health insurance may 
incur large health expenses, especially when a family member has a chronic condition or 
experiences a serious acute illness or injury. Even those who have insurance may have large 
medical expenses if their insurance premiums are not subsidized by an employer or by federal 
and state governments. Thus, lack of access to subsidized health insurance is probably a barrier 
to saving and asset holding, although there appears to be little empirical literature on this topic.  
Descriptive studies do show that the number of uninsured Americans is rising, that 
medical expenses are growing and are burdensome for many families, and that low-income and 
minority families are especially at risk. For example, Census data reveal that almost 16 percent 
of Americans were uninsured in 2005 and that this percentage has been rising (DeNavas-Walt et 
al 2006). More than 24 percent of low-income individuals (people with incomes below $25,000), 
almost 20 percent of African Americans, and almost 33 percent of Hispanics were uninsured in 
2005.9 According to the Kaiser Family Foundation and Health Research and Educational Trust’s 
Survey of Employer-Sponsored Health Benefits (2004), health insurance premiums rose almost 
five times faster (59 percent growth rate) than average earnings (12 percent growth rate) between 
2000 and 2004. Merlis, Gould, and Mahato (2006) found that 23 percent of families had high 
health care costs (including insurance premiums, deductibles, co-payments, and other direct costs 
not covered by insurance) relative to their income over the period of 2001-02.10  
                                                 
9 Most low-income children are eligible for public health insurance, through Medicaid and the State Children’s 
Health Insurance Program, but few low-income adults are. 
10 “High costs relative to income” is defined as more than ten percent of income generally, and five to ten percent of 
income for families below 200 percent of the federal poverty line. 
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A second potential obstacle to saving is expenses incurred when vehicles break down 
(i.e., expenses for car repair and purchase). Empirical evidence regarding the magnitude of these 
expenses is difficult to find, but it is common knowledge that low-income families tend to drive 
older, more problem-prone vehicles. Expenses related to vehicle breakdown are probably 
smaller, over the course of a year, than the other expenses discussed here, but they are mentioned 
fairly frequently in qualitative studies of low-income families (see below), perhaps because they 
are irregular and somewhat unpredictable and because families do not budget for them. 
The third financial obstacle to saving is partly related to these other two—monthly debt 
payments, including payments for credit card debt and medical debt. One indicator of 
problematic debt burden is having total debt payments greater than 40 percent of income. 
According to data from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), 27 percent of families in the 
lowest quintile of annual income met this criterion in 2001. This was 2.5 times higher than the 
figure for all U.S. families (11 percent) (Aizcorbe, Kennickell, and Moore 2003). Another 
indicator of debt repayment problems is making late debt payments. Data from the 2001 SCF 
show that 13 percent of debtors in the lowest income quintile were sixty or more days late with at 
least one loan payment in the previous year, a slight increase from 1998. In the overall U.S. 
population, seven percent of families were late in making debt payments (Aizcorbe, Kennickell, 
and Moore 2003). These findings suggest that many low-income households are over-burdened 
with debt. It may be in a household’s best interest to pay down debt before attempting to 
accumulate savings, and reducing debt increases net worth, but debt obligations can nonetheless 
depress saving, including deposits to incentivized accounts. 
As Sherraden, McBride, et al. (2005) have noted, households accrue debt in a variety of 
ways. Some are in debt because of unwise financial decisions, but many accumulate debt 
gradually because their incomes never quite cover necessary expenses. Others become burdened 
by debt due to crises, such as health problems, divorce, or job loss. One study of about 1,800 
people who filed for personal bankruptcy in 2001 finds that almost half of the bankruptcies may 
have been due to medical causes (Himmelstein, Warren, Thorne, and Woolhandler 2005).11
On average, minority and single-mother households have substantially lower incomes 
than white households (DeNavas-Walt et al 2006), so, all else equal, they are particularly likely 
to have trouble saving due to limited economic resources. There are additional economic barriers 
for single-mother households (regardless of race or ethnicity). A large number of single-mother 
households do not receive child support; even when they do, they may still struggle to cover 
                                                 
11 Predatory lending practices (e.g., payday loans, refund anticipation loans, car title loans, and high-fee credit cards) 
are important to mention here. Predatory lending “traps” some low-income households who would otherwise be 
debt-free and makes it more difficult for many others to manage and reduce debt. As noted in the introduction, this 
report focuses on saving and investment, but it would also be useful to consider liabilities or, more broadly, the 
common portfolios of households. 
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basic expenses. By definition, these households have children, and if mothers are employed, the 
family may have to pay for child care. One study examines the burden of child care expenses for 
employed mothers with children under age 14. The ratio of weekly child care expenses to 
monthly household income was 10 percent for never-married mothers and 12 percent for ever-
married mothers, compared to 6 percent for currently-married mothers (U.S. Census Bureau 
1999). Another Census Bureau report (U.S. Census Bureau 2004) shows that single-mother 
families are less likely than married-couple families to have health insurance, even though they 
tend to have poorer physical and mental health (Altman and Taylor 2004). Therefore, single 
mothers may have higher medical expenses, relative to income, than others. Other studies show 
that single-parent households are more likely than married-couple households to experience 
material hardship (e.g., Lerman 2002). 
Informal Social Support 
The second individual construct identified here is informal support from social network 
members. Section III.E “Intergenerational and Interhousehold Transfers” discusses transfers of 
money, such as assistance with a down payment on a home. Here, the focus is on less-tangible 
support, that is, the degree to which social network members encourage or hinder efforts to save 
and maintain assets. It is likely that informal social support affects saving action. For example, 
encouragement, positive reinforcement, and reminders to save are likely to send the message that 
saving is desirable and to make saving easier. Social network members may discourage saving 
by sending the message that “extra” income should be shared with others. This second 
hypothesis flows from a ground-breaking ethnographic study by Stack (1974), showing that 
frequent demands from social network members make it difficult for blacks to accumulate assets. 
For cultural reasons, the pressure to share savings with others may be stronger for black families 
than for white families.12 The pressure may also be stronger for low-income families of any race, 
who are more likely than middle- and upper-income families to have social network members 
who are struggling to meet basic expenses. 
Financial Literacy 
The third individual construct is financial literacy, including both knowledge and skills. 
Financial literacy likely affects saving and investment action. It seems common sense that people 
will save more and make better investment decisions when they know how much money is 
needed to achieve a certain goal, understand compound interest, know how to create a budget, 
are familiar with saving strategies, understand the trade-off between risk and return, recognize 
predatory lending practices, and so forth. In fact, the belief that financial literacy affects saving 
and investment is the fundamental premise of financial education initiatives. The relationship 
may be weaker than many would assume, however. Financial knowledge may have fairly strong 
                                                 
12 Existing studies have focused on black-white differences. Additional research is needed to study other racial and 
ethnic minorities.  
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effects on intended behavior, but intentions often do not directly translate into action. The 
direction of causality is also ambiguous. Following recommended financial practices may lead to 
increased financial literacy, rather than the reverse. For example, accumulating wealth may 
motivate people to obtain financial knowledge so that they can better manage their assets 
(Kotlikoff and Bernheim 2001). Finally, a third variable, such as motivation or future orientation, 
might influence both financial literacy and financial behavior. 
Psychological Variables 
Economists and others have long assumed that personality characteristics and attitudinal 
variables affect saving and asset accumulation. This report hypothesizes that three psychological 
variables—future orientation, motives for saving, and perceived ability to save—affect saving 
and investment action. It is not that these are the only important psychological variables or even 
the most important ones, but these hypotheses help to illustrate how psychology might affect 
asset building. Economists, economic psychologists, and other psychologists have done some 
important theoretical and empirical work in this area, and there is room for more. 
Future Orientation  
Future orientation is defined here as a willingness to invest in one’s future, even when one must 
postpone pleasure. In different disciplines, future orientation goes by many names. Neoclassical 
economists have referred to the “rate of time preference.” This is defined as the ratio of the 
utility of a current dollar and the utility of a dollar delayed one year. People with a high rate of 
time preference are “impatient”; they require a large compensation to postpone a reward. More 
recently, behavioral economists have discussed “self control.”  
As noted above, the rapidly growing literature in behavioral economics assumes and/or 
suggests that many if not most people have trouble postponing pleasant experiences. One 
implication, of course, is that people have trouble saving because saving requires them to 
postpone consumption, and numerous theoretical articles have suggested that self-control 
problems lead to under-saving (e.g., Laibson 1997; O'Donoghue and Rabin 1999; Strotz 1956). 
Consistent with this literature, this report presents the hypothesis that future orientation shapes 
saving action, that is, that “patient” people deposit more and withdraw less.13
                                                 
13 For centuries, some have argued that poor people and other “out-groups” (such as racial and ethnic minorities) 
live for the present and cannot or choose not to postpone pleasure (see, for example, the discussion in Katz 1990). In 
response, some have argued that low-income people and minorities have below-average life expectancies and thus 
fewer incentives to save. Others claim that minorities have learned through negative experiences that rewards do not 
often arrive as promised and therefore have fewer incentives to postpone pleasure. Thus, there has been much 
speculation (but little research) on the determinants of future orientation. When people discuss future orientation, 
time preference, and perhaps to a lesser extent, self-control, we suspect they are thinking of fairly stable personality 
characteristics. The opinion of the authors is that some people are consistently patient or impatient, regardless of the 
opportunities and constraints they face. For most people, however, we believe that willingness to postpone pleasure 
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Motives for Saving  
The notion of saving motives encompasses two phenomena: how important saving is to an 
individual and the goal or purpose of savings.14 This report offers the hypothesis that those with 
salient and specific saving motives are more likely to save. Neoclassical economists typically 
emphasize four motives for saving: (1) maintaining consumption during retirement; (2) preparing 
for income shocks and other emergencies (precautionary saving); (3) transferring wealth to 
future generations (bequest motive); and (4) purchasing “big ticket” items such as consumer 
durables, education, or a vacation (target saving). The first three are expected to influence long-
term saving, and the fourth to affect short- to medium-term saving and dissaving (Sturm 1983).  
Perceived Ability to Save  
In addition to future orientation and motives for saving, aspirations and expectations of success 
are likely to affect saving action.15 This report predicts that those who expect saving attempts to 
be successful are more likely to save (e.g., more likely to deposit, more likely to enroll in saving 
programs, and so forth). Conversely, those who expect their saving attempts to be “unsuccessful” 
are less likely to save. 
In part, individual saving-related aspirations and expectations are likely to be determined 
by past experiences, including past asset-accumulation experiences. According to aspirations 
theory (Lewin, Dembo, Festinger, and Sears 1944), an individual’s aspirations are raised 
(lowered) according to her success (failure) in achieving them. Applying this proposition to 
economic behavior, Katona (1975) suggests that an individual who makes progress toward a 
savings goal is more likely to raise that goal. Conversely, those whose saving attempts are 
unsuccessful are likely to lower their saving aspirations. If these propositions are true, then there 
is a potential virtuous circle (people who save and accumulate assets become more confident in 
their saving ability and so save more) and a potential vicious circle (people who fail in their 
attempts to save lose confidence in their ability to save and so are less likely to try to save in the 
future). If low-income families have had limited success with saving in the past, these 
propositions suggest that they may not even attempt to save money. At the very least, they are 
likely to set lower savings goals. The experiences of social network members may also be 
important. If an individual has rarely seen someone else achieve a savings goal, she may not 
believe that she can be successful. Conversely, if she has seen others save successfully, she is 
probably more likely to believe that saving is feasible. 
                                                                                                                                                             
is substantially influenced by external factors, especially institutional factors, such as information, incentives, 
expectations, and so on.  
14 The first phenomenon is probably related to future orientation. To the extent, however, that future orientation is a 
stable personality characteristic for some people, we are thinking of motives as attitudes that are potentially more 
transitory, that is, as perceptions, beliefs, and opinions that are more likely to be altered by experiences.  
15 Again, perceived ability to save is probably closely related to future orientation and motives for saving. It is 
plausible that perceived ability affects the other two variables and vice versa. 
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D. Effects of Institutional Constructs on Saving and Investment Action 
Seven institutional constructs are the heart of the conceptual framework offered here. These 
constructs appear to be important aspects of institutions designed to promote saving and asset 
accumulation. This particular formulation of an institutional framework is created with an eye 
toward application, that is, each of the constructs has direct policy relevance. The constructs are: 
(1) access; (2) information; (3) incentives; (4) facilitation; (5) expectations; (6) restrictions; and 
(7) security. These seven constructs have emerged from research on individual development 
accounts (IDAs).16 As Exhibit 5 shows, the focus is on effects of these constructs on saving and 
investment action. In other words, it is suggested that the effects of institutional constructs on 
asset accumulation are largely indirect, through saving and investment action. There are 
important exceptions. For example, incentives and security almost certainly have strong direct 
effects on asset accumulation, perhaps moderating the relationship between portfolio choices and 
asset accumulation.17 These relationships should be specified and examined in light of empirical 
evidence. To keep the framework simple, however, the focus here is on the effects of 
institutional constructs on saving and investment action.  
Access 
This report hypothesizes that access affects saving and investment action. Access refers to 
eligibility and practicality. As discussed below, many U.S. households are not “eligible” for 
programs and policies that encourage asset building—for example, a large portion of the 
population does not have access to a pension plan in the workplace—and eligibility varies 
substantially by race and class. Regarding practicality, distance is a major barrier to financial 
services and other markets in rural areas. Even though markets may exist at a distance, 
transaction costs in reaching them can make them unavailable. In these circumstances, it is not 
fully informative to interpret saving and asset accumulation outcomes as resulting solely from 
individual characteristics and choices; some people have greater access than others. 
Information 
This report posits that financial information shapes saving and investment action. This 
information may be general (e.g., basic information about the need for retirement savings, about 
the trade-off between risk and return, or about the advantages and disadvantages of different 
                                                 
16 IDAs are matched savings accounts for low-income people (see http://gwbweb.wustl.edu/csd/asset/idas.htm). The 
first four of the constructs—access, information, incentives, and facilitation—were identified by Sherraden and 
appeared in Beverly and Sherraden (1999). Expectations later emerged from qualitative research on IDAs 
(Sherraden, Moore, and Hong 2000). In Sherraden, Schreiner, and Beverly (2003), we added limits, which we now 
call restrictions. Security is emerging in IDA qualitative research (Sherraden, Williams, et al. 2003) and has been 
emphasized in saving programs in developing countries (Rutherford 2000; Schreiner and Morduch 2002).  
17 Two types of incentives, subsidies and rates of return, clearly affect how an individual’s saving deposits grow (or 
do not) over time. At least one type of security, protection from investment risk, also affects how assets grow over 
time. These constructs are described below. 
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types of products); it may also be specific to a particular financial product or program. For 
example, to participate successfully in a traditional IRA, a person must know that an IRA is 
available and that she is eligible. She must also know how to choose an appropriate investment, 
how to make contributions, how to receive the tax deduction, and, later, how to make 
withdrawals. Some individuals (probably those who are more educated and more comfortable 
with financial matters) will seek out this type of information, but many will not obtain 
information unless it is delivered to them in an accessible format.  
Incentives 
This report proposes that incentives and disincentives shape saving and investment action. 
Incentives come in at least three forms: nonfinancial rewards, subsidies, and rates of return. 
Nonfinancial rewards may include peer relationships, status, or opportunities to learn. The report 
focuses on financial incentives because it appears that, overall, financial incentives tend to be 
more important than nonfinancial incentives.18
Subsidies are direct or indirect “payments” to those who save in particular saving plans or 
hold particular kinds of wealth. Often these subsidies directly increase wealth, as in the case of 
matching contributions for deposits into 401(k)s and IDAs (unless people save less in other 
forms to offset these subsidies). Other times, these subsidies are not deposited into saving 
vehicles, so recipients may choose whether or not to save them. For example, tax benefits 
associated with homeownership and IRA contributions reduce tax liability but do not directly 
increase home equity or IRA savings. Schreiner and Sherraden (2007) argue that matches in 
IDAs may encourage saving by low-income people for at least three reasons. First, of course, 
matches increase the reward to saving and may help compensate for the sacrifice required to 
defer consumption. Second, matches may motivate people to save by translating a given level of 
saving into a stock of wealth that is large enough to use for a major asset, such as a house or a 
college education. Third, the match may be the program feature that catches a participant’s eye 
and motivates him to enroll in the first place. The first characteristic of matches may be 
somewhat less relevant to high-income people than to low-income people because deferring 
consumption is less painful for those with higher levels of consumption. The second 
characteristic might also be less relevant to high-income people19 and/or to those considering 
contributions to 401(k)s, for example, rather than IDAs. 
Rates of return are also incentives. The fact that investors seek the highest possible rate of 
return for a given level of risk provides some evidence that financial incentives shape financial 
decisions. To consider this proposition more carefully, however, one must ask whether 
                                                 
18 Saving is a financial activity more than a social activity, and focusing on financial incentives connects this 
thinking directly with the existing knowledge on saving that can best inform policy. 
19 High-income savers may have less trouble accumulating “meaningful” amounts of wealth in the absence of 
matches.  
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incentives affect: (1) participation in a particular saving plan or program, (2) levels of 
contribution to the plan or program, (3) and overall (net) saving. The effect of financial 
incentives on net saving is the subject of much debate. According to economic theory, an 
increase in the rate of return will not necessarily increase saving for two reasons. First, changes 
in the rate of return on savings may simply result in the “reshuffling” of the form of assets, with 
no new saving. Second, for net savers, an increase in the after-tax rate of return has two 
contradictory effects. Individuals may choose to save more because the price of current 
consumption increases relative to the price of future consumption (the substitution effect). On the 
other hand, with higher rates of return, individuals can save less and still enjoy the same amount 
of future consumption (the “fixed-goal effect,” according to Schreiner and Sherraden 2007).  
Common disincentives for saving are unattractive or even negative rates of return, often 
due to inflation, high fees, and/or investment risk. Reasons that low-income, minority, and 
single-mother households might receive lower rates of return on owner-occupied housing have 
been mentioned earlier. Other types of disincentives reduce the need for or even the desirability 
of assets. Means-tested income transfer programs, such as Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families (TANF), Food Stamps, and Supplemental Security Income, are expected to create 
saving disincentives for two reasons: (1) they provide a certain level of income at the time of 
economic emergencies; and (2) they have restrictive asset means tests (Hubbard, Skinner, and 
Zeldes 1995; Ziliak 2003). The first phenomenon is often called the “consumption-floor effect.” 
Because income transfer programs guarantee a minimum level of income (to some), they create 
consumption floors. These consumption floors are expected to reduce the precautionary saving 
motive (the perceived need to save in preparation for sudden economic losses) and are therefore 
expected to lower saving rates in general. Asset means tests are expected to discourage the 
accumulation of financial assets because households must spend down or keep their financial 
assets below asset limits in order to be eligible for transfer benefits. Presumably, asset means 
tests affect those who are likely to participate in these programs as well as those who are 
currently receiving benefits (Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes 1995; Neumark and Powers 1998). 20 
These disincentives, then, are relevant to low-income households (by definition the only 
households eligible for these programs) and to minority and single-mother households (because 
they are more likely than non-Hispanic whites and married couples to participate in these 
programs). 
Facilitation 
This report posits that facilitation shapes saving and investment action. Facilitation refers to any 
form of assistance in saving, especially making saving “automatic.” Common examples are 
                                                 
20 The role that asset limits play in shaping asset accumulation is examined empirically by McKernan, Ratcliffe, and 
Nam (2007).in another Poor Finances report, “The Effects of Welfare and IDA Program Rules on the Asset 
Holdings of Low-Income Families,” available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/07/PoorFinances/assets/index.htm  
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automatic payroll deduction and automatic transfers into saving products. Usually, people must 
arrange for automatic transfers, but after signing up, they no longer have to make conscious 
decisions to save. In agreement with other research (Beverly, Moore, and Schreiner 2003; Maital 
and Maital 1994; Shefrin and Thaler 1988), this report posits that these “precommitment 
constraints” increase deposits because funds for saving are never “in hand” and are therefore 
much less likely to trigger spending temptations.  
Another type of facilitation involves automatic enrollment into a savings plan. For 
example, employees in a particular firm might be automatically enrolled in the company’s 401(k) 
plan, with a default investment option, unless they actively opt out or choose a different 
investment option. (These plans are often called “opt-out” plans.) Automatic enrollment is likely 
to shape saving and investment action because, as behavioral theory suggests, people often 
postpone financial decisions and remain with the status quo. 
A third and perhaps surprising source of facilitation is the federal income tax system. 
Many households—especially low- and moderate-income households—receive sizeable federal 
tax refunds.21 Building on the notion of mental accounting, Thaler and others have argued that 
people are more likely to save “irregular” income than regular wage and salary income, 
especially when the irregular in-flows are large (see Shefrin and Thaler 1992; Thaler 1990). This 
proposition implies that people are more likely to save out of tax refunds than out of wage and 
salary income, especially when refunds are large. Thus, by providing sizeable refunds to many 
households (through the Earned Income Tax Credit and Child Tax Credit, for example), the 
income tax system may shape saving action. 
Expectations 
Expectations are implicit or explicit suggestions about desired saving, investment, or asset 
accumulation. They are embodied in institutional features such as match caps (amount of money 
that earns matching deposits), saving targets, and social pressure of peers and staff of saving 
programs. For example, the fact that up to $4,000 in contributions to a traditional IRA is tax 
deductible may set up an expectation that individuals save $4,000 a year for retirement. This 
report hypothesizes that people respond to these implicit and explicit expectations, that 
expectations shape saving and investment action. 
Restrictions 
Restrictions are prohibitions, rules that restrict access to or use of assets. Most subsidized saving 
policies have restrictions. For example, money in 529 college savings plans must be used for 
college education, and 401(k) savings are not available until retirement.22 This report 
                                                 
21 Many households receive state income tax refunds, too, but these tend to be much smaller than federal refunds. 
22 Very often, money in restricted accounts may be used for other purposes, but financial penalties are imposed. 
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hypothesizes that restrictions shape saving action, specifically by helping people resist 
temptations to spend savings. This hypothesis is consistent with a growing literature in 
behavioral economics about self-control problems and the tendency to over-spend (e.g., Laibson 
1997; Thaler and Shefrin 1981; Thaler 1994). In addition, the fact that people deposit money in 
simple restricted accounts (such as “Christmas club” accounts) that do not provide higher interest 
rates than basic savings accounts suggests that some people believe restrictions help them 
accumulate savings.  
Of course, for every individual who makes use of a restricted account, there may be 
others who desire liquidity. In this case, there is a need for a variety of saving products. If no 
unrestricted accounts are available, then restrictions might actually decrease saving because 
some people will choose not to put any money in restricted accounts. 
Security 
Security refers to freedom from unreasonable risk in saving and asset holding. All households 
need a safe place to put their money. Therefore, it seems probable that security shapes saving and 
investment action, specifically that people are more likely to deposit, less likely to withdraw, and 
more likely to have a diverse portfolio when they can participate in a variety of secure saving 
policies, programs, and products. Security can be considered at two levels: micro and macro. 
Micro security refers to protection from risks of lost assets for a particular household and in the 
shorter-term. Macro security refers to protection from risks for the political economy as a whole 
and in the longer-term. 
Micro security includes both risk of property loss and investment risk. Property loss risk 
refers to threats of misplacement, theft, and destruction (e.g., through catastrophes such as fire or 
flood). For most middle- and upper-income savers in the United States, security from property-
loss risk of savings is taken for granted with deposits into a financial institution. Not everyone in 
the world has ready access to and trust in such institutions, however. Where such access and trust 
cannot be taken for granted, (lack of) security may be the dominant institutional construct in 
explaining saving action and savings outcomes.  
At the micro level, a second type of risk is investment risk. The topic of investment risk 
is well-developed in microeconomics, usually in relation to rates of return. It is commonly 
understood that, in competitive markets, riskier investment options, over time, can offer higher 
rates of return. Therefore, some degree of investment risk is desirable for asset accumulation 
over the long term, and “security” from this risk can have negative consequences.  
Discussion of security would not be complete without also mentioning macro risks to 
which all asset accumulations are vulnerable. Macro risks have to do with the competence and 
integrity of the political system, integrity of the financial markets, and management of the macro 
economy. Whenever assets accumulate, as in a defined contribution retirement plan, these assets 
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may be subject to depletion through mismanagement or corruption. Fortunately, the United 
States has exceptionally strong, efficient, and transparent financial markets, so macro risks in 
financial markets are relatively limited. Fiscal and monetary policies greatly affect investment 
returns. Indeed, inflation risk is often the single greatest threat to long-term asset accumulation.  
E. Effects of Intergenerational and Interhousehold Transfers on Investment Action and 
Asset Accumulation 
In addition to individual and institutional constructs, the conceptual framework proposed in this 
report suggests that intergenerational and interhousehold transfers shape asset building. In 
particular, this report posits that interhousehold transfers affect investment action (the mix of 
assets held) and asset accumulation. Transfers take a variety of forms. They may involve living 
people (inter vivos transfers), or they may occur at death (bequests). They may consist of money, 
material assistance, or time. Transfers may be consumed or saved. Transfers that are saved 
increase the recipient’s wealth. Even transfers that are consumed can indirectly facilitate asset 
accumulation. For example, parental assistance with educational expenses can allow a young 
adult to graduate from college with little or no debt. The absence of debt in turn makes it easier 
for the graduate to save and makes her more attractive to mortgage lenders (Shapiro 2004).  
One common phenomenon is for parents or other family members to give money to 
young adults for a down payment on a first home. This down-payment assistance may make 
homeownership possible for some families. In all likelihood, it reduces the recipient’s monthly 
mortgage payment—by reducing the mortgage amount and perhaps by eliminating private 
mortgage insurance—and so frees up money for saving (Shapiro 2004). And when down-
payment assistance allows families to purchase homes in neighborhoods that they otherwise 
could not afford, it can improve their neighborhood environments, their social standing, and their 
children’s educational opportunities. Shapiro argues that these transfers can have lasting effects: 
“These head-start assets set up different starting lines, establish different rules for success, fix 
different rewards for accomplishments, and ultimately perpetuate inequality” (p. 3). As discussed 
below, low-income families are less likely to receive substantial down-payment assistance. 
Another phenomenon is worth mentioning here: The availability of financial help from 
others may reduce saving for some individuals. For example, individuals who believe that family 
members will provide money in the event of job loss might be less motivated to accumulate 
precautionary savings. And those who expect a large bequest or substantial down-payment 
assistance may save less for retirement or homeownership. On the whole, it seems likely that 
bequests and inter vivos transfers increase the wealth of recipients, but more empirical evidence 
on this topic is needed. 
F. How Public Policy Shapes Saving- and Asset-Related Institutional Constructs 
The goal of this report is to develop a conceptual framework of relevance for public policy. 
Therefore, this section describes how public policy currently shapes institutional constructs, 
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illustrating how institutional supports for saving tend to be delivered in “bundles.” This section 
also describes existing federal asset-related programs and policies that are targeted to low-
income households. 23
Bundles of Institutional Constructs 
Applied social theory and research is complicated by many “real world” factors, one of which is 
“bundling” of multiple constructs within a single policy, program, or other intervention. Seldom 
does an intervention represent a single theoretical construct. In asset-based policies, for example, 
the constructs discussed above—access, information, incentives, facilitation, expectations, 
restrictions, security—and perhaps others, rarely appear alone, but instead are usually bundled 
together in some form.  
The challenges for researchers are to (1) identify the constructs that may be present; (2) 
develop measures for each of them; (3) assess each construct in an applied setting; and (4) 
employ analytical procedures to sort out which constructs may be causing the outcome(s) of 
interest. In quantitative research, a typical approach would be to use multiple regression, 
controlling for many individual and program characteristics, to assess which factors predict an 
outcome—such that the results are statistically significant and effect sizes are large enough to 
matter for program or policy purposes. 
An analytical step beyond this would be to test for interaction effects among constructs of 
interest. It could be, for example, that information and expectations both independently predict a 
savings outcome, but have even greater predictive power when they occur together. Or it could 
be that incentives are not predictive in and of themselves, but the interaction of incentives with 
access has a strong effect. Testing interactions is one pathway for beginning to understand 
effectiveness of various bundles of constructs that may be represented in a policy or program. 
It seems likely that bundles of constructs for saving action tend to come in common 
forms. For example, there may be a form that provides mostly security in a “rainy day” fund 
(e.g., a passbook savings account in the private sector). Other forms may have strong elements of 
incentives, facilitation, expectations, and restrictions designed for long-term asset accumulation 
(e.g., a 401(k) retirement savings plan). Thus, some bundles may be better for particular 
purposes. If inclusive (universal and progressive) asset accumulation is the goal, structured 
saving plans that represent large bundles of key constructs are likely to be the most effective 
policy package (Clancy and Sherraden 2003; Clancy, Orszag, and Sherraden 2004; Sherraden 
                                                 
23 In this section, we focus largely on public policies that are explicitly designed to encourage asset building. We do 
not discuss social insurance programs, such as Social Security, unemployment insurance, and disability insurance, 
although these programs almost certainly have important effects on asset holding. Social insurance programs protect 
assets by providing cash assistance when income declines due to age, unemployment, or injury, for example. These 
programs might also offset private saving, however, because people who know they are eligible for social insurance 
benefits may be less motivated to save on their own for emergencies and retirement. 
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2005). Current examples of savings plans—all of which are created by public policy—include 
401(k) plans in the private sector, 403(b) plans in the non-profit sector, the Thrift Savings Plan 
for federal employees, and 529 plans. 
Currently, asset-building bundles tend to be delivered through employment settings and 
through the tax system. Federal expenditures on the initiatives that provide these bundles of 
supports are large (see Exhibit 6). For the most part, those who have jobs with benefits, those 
who are homeowners, and those who are investors have access to these bundles. The next three 
subsections present the major bundles of institutional supports and show that low-income, 
minority, and single-mother households have less access to these bundles than others. 
Bundles of Institutional Supports Provided through Employment.  
The primary institutional supports delivered through employment settings come through 
retirement benefits, both defined benefit (DB) and defined contribution (DC) plans. These 
retirement plans support asset building in several ways. Perhaps most importantly, they provide 
incentives for asset accumulation. Employer matches directly increase wealth (unless recipients 
offset these matches by saving less in other forms). When employer contributions require a 
corresponding employee contribution, they also create potential incentives for saving. The 
federal government provides an additional subsidy and incentive by deducting employee 
contributions from income (in income tax calculations).  
These retirement plans also provide facilitation. When participation is mandatory, 
deciding to save and acting on this decision require no mental effort. Even when participation is 
voluntary, the use of automatic transfers allows individuals to precommit, and this greatly 
reduces the mental effort required to save. The automatic-enrollment or “opt-out” plans 
described above provide even greater facilitation, by automatically enrolling individuals in 
voluntary plans unless they elect otherwise. 
Employer-sponsored retirement accounts are almost always restricted. In many DB plans, 
funds are not available until workers reach a certain age. In most DC plans, there are substantial 
penalties for early withdrawals. Although a sizeable proportion of families do withdraw funds 
before retirement, especially when changing jobs,24 on the whole, these restrictions probably 
help protect retirement savings. Employees who have access to employer-sponsored retirement 
plans often have access to financial education as well, especially if they work for medium-size or 
large firms. These educational initiatives—often newsletters or optional group seminars—
attempt to motivate and inform employees. 
                                                 
24 Engelhardt (2002) estimates that less than 43 percent of pre-retirement lump-sum distributions from DC plans are 
rolled over to an IRA, transferred to another employer, or converted to an annuity.  
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Exhibit 6. Value of Select Asset-Building Tax Expenditures, Fiscal Year 2006 
Housing (In Millions of Dollars) 
Deductibility of Mortgage Interest on Owner-Occupied Housing 76,030 
Deductibility of Property Tax 14,830 
Capital Gains Exclusion on Home Sales 36,270 
Exclusion of Net Imputed Rental Income on Owner-Occupied 
Housing 
29,720 
 Subtotal Housing 156,850 
Investment  
Reduced Tax Rate for Some Capital Gains 28,370 
Exclusion of Small Corporation Stock from Capital Gains 250 
Step-up Basis of Capital Gains at Death 28,760 
Carryover Basis of Capital Gains on Gifts 290 
Exclusion of Interest on Life Insurance Savings 24,070 
 Subtotal Investment 81,740 
Retirement  
Net Exclusion of Pension Contributions: Employer Plans 51,050 
Net Exclusion of Pension Contributions: 401(k) Plans 48,140 
Net Exclusion of Pension Contributions: IRAs 7,310 
Net Exclusion of Pension Contributions: Saver’s Credit 1,170 
Net Exclusion of Pension Contributions: Keogh Plans 9,980 
 Subtotal Retirement 117,650 
Source: Office of Management and Budget 2005b, Table 19.1 
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Subsidies, facilitation, restriction, and education all send the message that saving and 
asset accumulation are desirable. The terms of matching contributions may also set up specific 
expectations for saving. If a worker receives the maximum employer contribution when she 
contributes five percent of her earnings to a 401(k) plan, for example, then the plan may create 
an expectation that employees save five percent of earnings. Similarly, the terms of automatic-
enrollment plans may communicate specific expectations about saving for retirement.  
Low-income individuals are less likely than middle- and upper-income individuals to 
have access to these benefits. For example, the first row of Exhibit 7 shows that the percent of 
full-time private workers employed at firms that sponsor pension plans increases substantially 
with earnings.25 Minorities and women also tend to have less access to employer-sponsored 
pension plans than non-Hispanic whites and men. For example, in 1999, 47 percent of white, 
non-Hispanic private-sector workers were covered by these plans; the comparable figures for 
black non-Hispanic and Hispanic workers were 41 percent and 27 percent, respectively. Forty-
seven percent of male workers were covered, compared to 40 percent of female workers (U.S. 
Department of Labor Employee Benefits Security Administration n.d.). 
When low-earning workers do have access to pension plans, they are less likely to 
participate (Exhibit 7).26 Limited ability to save is almost certainly one important reason for 
lower participation rates. And, when low-income households are able to save, they may choose 
to save for more immediate goals than retirement (and may thus prefer less-restricted saving 
vehicles). Institutional variables probably also play a role. The tax-favored treatment of pension 
contributions is worth less to households in lower tax brackets than households in higher tax 
brackets, and worth nothing at all to households with no income tax liability.27 As Gale, Iwry, 
and Orszag (2004, 2) have written, 
The tax system in general provides little incentive for participation 
in tax-preferred saving plans to households who most need to save 
more for retirement and who, if they contribute, are most likely to 
use the accounts to raise net saving. By contrast, the tax code 
provides its strongest incentives to those who are generally already 
better prepared for retirement, and who are more likely to use tax-
deferred vehicles as a shelter than as an opportunity to increase 
overall saving.  
 
                                                 
25 Similarly, data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ National Compensation Survey (U.S. Department of Labor 
2004) show that white collar workers are more likely than blue collar workers and, especially, service workers to be 
eligible for retirement benefits. Full-time workers are much more likely than part-time workers to be eligible. 
26 Joulfaian and Richardson (2001) provide additional statistics on participation in tax-deferred savings programs. 
27 For example, a $1,000 deduction from income is worth $330 to someone in the 33 percent tax bracket, $150 to 
someone in the 15 percent tax bracket, and nothing at all to someone who has no income tax liability. 
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Exhibit 7. Pension Access and Participation for Full-time, Private Sector Workers, by 
Annual Earnings, 2000 
 Less than 
$20,000 
$20,000 - 
$40,000 
$40,000 - 
$60,000 
More than 
$60,000 
Percent of Workers Employed at Firms that 
Sponsor Pension Plans 
42 65 78 80 
Percent of Eligible Workers Who Participated 
in Pension 
68 85 92 94 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau Current Population Survey, cited in Purcell (2001) 
Note: Sample includes full-time, year-round, private sector, non-agricultural workers age 25 to 64. 
 
Bundles of Institutional Supports Provided through Homeownership  
Homeownership also comes with a bundle of institutional supports. In this case, facilitation and 
restriction are probably most important. When an individual takes out a mortgage to purchase a 
home, she has a contractual obligation to make monthly payments, and the portion of each 
payment that goes to principal directly increases her wealth. Since most people will go to great 
lengths to avoid mortgage default, little or no mental energy or extra effort is required to “save” 
monthly in the form of home equity. Also because people will go to great lengths to avoid 
default and because the transaction costs of selling a home are very high, home equity is quite 
illiquid. These “restrictions” help protect home equity.28  
In addition to facilitation and restrictions, there are incentives and subsidies for 
homeownership. Interest payments on home mortgages and state and local property taxes for 
owner-occupied homes may be deducted from income (if deductions are itemized). These tax 
benefits reduce the cost of homeownership (and/or send the message that homeownership is 
“good”) and so may encourage people to purchase homes.29 This is important because home 
equity is the primary asset for many people. In some time periods in some locations, home values 
have appreciated dramatically. These high rates of return directly increase wealth, and the 
possibility of “passive” asset accumulation may serve as an additional incentive for saving in the 
form of home equity. The exclusion of capital gains on the sales of principle residences from 
federal income tax also provides an incentive and subsidy for homeownership.30  
                                                 
28 At the same time, interest-only and negative-amortization mortgages allow homeowners to not engage in this 
“easy” saving, and home equity loans and second mortgages reduce home equity.  
29 Glaeser and Shapiro (2002) argue that the home mortgage interest deduction does not increase homeownership 
because it disproportionately benefits those who would own homes even in the absence of the deduction. 
30 Excluded gains were limited to $250,000 for individuals and $500,000 for married couples in the 2004 tax year. 
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Although owner-occupied housing is the primary asset for many low-income, minority, 
and single-mother households, these groups have less access to homeownership and receive 
fewer benefits from ownership than others do. The two primary prerequisites for homeownership 
are assets (to make a down payment) and evidence of “credit worthiness” (to qualify for a 
mortgage). For a conventional loan, mortgage lenders typically require a down payment equal to 
10 to 20 percent of the purchase price.31 Some evidence suggests that first-time home buyers are 
having a harder time financing down payments. Using data from surveys of first-time home 
buyers in 18 major U.S. cities, Mayer and Engelhardt (1996) find that, between 1985 and 1993, 
the average number of years that households had saved for down payments increased while the 
average down payment as a percent of purchase price decreased. In addition, the percent of down 
payment coming from personal savings (rather than gifts or loans, for example) decreased.  
A first-time home buyer typically has two main sources for her down payment: her own 
personal savings and/or transfers from others. Mayer and Engelhardt (1996) find that 21 percent 
of first-time buyers received gifts for down payments in the late 1980s and early 1990s. For 
recipients, this assistance was substantial: The average gift equaled 51 percent of the total down 
payment. Using 1996 PSID data, Shapiro (2004) reports that 54 percent of white and 88 percent 
of black first-time home buyers said that their down payments came entirely from their own 
savings. These figures suggest that a substantial proportion of white buyers (and a smaller 
proportion of black buyers) receive down-payment assistance. These figures may underestimate 
the importance of transfers because an individual’s savings may have come from earlier gifts or 
bequests. 
In addition to down payments, a potential home buyer must demonstrate the ability to 
repay her mortgage, and evidence suggests that low-income, minority, and single-mother 
households have limited access to mainstream credit.32 Lenders’ assessment of “credit 
worthiness” depends upon level of income, stability of income, savings, and credit history 
(Belsky and Calder 2004). By definition, low-income households do not fare as well as others on 
the first criterion. In addition, many low-income, minority, and single-mother households have 
fairly volatile incomes because they work seasonally, because they have experienced 
unemployment, and/or because some or all of their earnings come from informal employment. 
                                                 
31 Borrowers who take out conventional mortgages with less than a 20-percent down payment usually must purchase 
private mortgage insurance. Government-sponsored mortgage programs, such as those affiliated with the Federal 
Housing Administration, provide mortgages to eligible households with down payments of only two to three percent 
(Mayer and Engelhardt 1996).  
32 Many low-income individuals qualify for credit from subprime lenders, but these loans tend to have higher 
interest rates and higher penalties for default (Belsky and Calder 2004). Immergluck and Wiles (1999), and others 
after them, have described a “dual mortgage market,” in which mainstream lenders serve higher-income white 
neighborhoods and subprime lenders serve lower-income and minority communities. 
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And, as documented in another report in the Poor Finances series, these households are less 
likely to have savings.33  
Credit history provides additional insight to lenders about an applicant’s credit 
worthiness. Those who have been identified as “credit risks” are unlikely to qualify for 
mainstream credit. Some of the factors that lead to this label are having a debt-to-income ratio 
above a certain threshold, a history of missed payments, or a history of personal bankruptcy. 
Low-income individuals are more likely than others to be identified as credit risks. Other 
households may be unable to demonstrate credit worthiness because they have little or no 
documented credit history. Those without bank accounts and credit cards are particularly likely 
to have this problem (Belsky and Calder 2004). Low-income and minority households are less 
likely than others to have bank accounts and credit cards (see Aizcorbe, Kennickell, and Moore 
2003; Hogarth, Anguelov, and Lee 2005). Single-mother households are slightly less likely than 
others to have bank accounts and credit cards (Hogarth and Lee 2000).34 Racial discrimination 
may serve as an additional barrier to homeownership for minority households. Using PSID data, 
Charles and Hurst (2002) find that blacks are twice as likely as whites to have applications for 
home mortgages rejected, even when they control for wealth and proxies for credit history.  
This report has already argued that homeownership may be a risky investment for low-
income, minority, and single-mother households. In addition, low-income households benefit 
less than others from homeownership because the subsidies for homeownership are delivered 
through the tax system. To benefit from the deductions for mortgage interest payments and state 
and local property taxes, a household must itemize deductions. According to 1998 data from the 
SCF, only 13 percent of homeowners in the bottom forty percent of the income distribution 
itemized (Glaeser and Shapiro 2002). In addition, these deductions are not refundable, so 
households benefit only if they owe taxes. Families that owe taxes but are in the lowest tax 
brackets benefit less than families in higher tax brackets. Finally, the homes owned by low-
income households are likely to be modestly priced, and deductions for mortgage interest 
payments and property taxes are more valuable for expensive homes (or large mortgages) than 
for modestly-priced homes (or small mortgages). 
Empirical evidence confirms that these deductions disproportionately benefit higher-
income families. According to the Joint Committee on Taxation (2003), in 2003, more than half 
of the benefits of the mortgage interest deduction accrued to households with annual incomes of 
                                                 
33 See “The Balance Sheets of Low-Income Households: What We Know about Their Assets and Liabilities,” 
Carasso and McKernan, 2007, available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/07/PoorFinances/balance/index.htm 
34 Making matters even more complicated for these households is the fact that it is difficult for an individual with 
poor credit to open a savings or checking account (Belsky and Calder 2004). Thus, it can be difficult for an 
individual to recover from past credit problems. Hogarth, Anguelov, and Lee (2005) examine barriers to basic 
account ownership in detail. 
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Exhibit 8. Distribution of Mortgage Interest Deduction Benefit, by Income Class (2003) 
 Annual Income 
Amount  
(in millions) 
Amount  
(as percent of total) 
Average benefit 
for recipients 
Below $10,000 $10 0.02 $125 
$10,000 to $20,000 $226 0.38 $246 
$20,000 to $30,000 $898 1.52 $473 
$30,000 to $50,000 $4,600 7.80 $751 
$50,000 to $75,000 $9,829 16.66 $1,088 
$75,000 to $100,000  $11,091 18.80 $1,647 
$100,000 to $200,000 $18,818 31.90 $2,870 
$200,000 and over  $13,512 22.91 $6,305 
Total  $58,984 100.00 $1,761 
Source: Joint Committee on Taxation 2003.  
 
$100,000 or more (Exhibit 8). Less than ten percent of the benefits accrued to households with 
incomes below $50,000, and less than two percent accrued to households with incomes below 
$30,000. Among recipients, the average benefit for households with incomes between $10,000 
and $20,000 was about $250; the average for households with incomes between $100,000 and 
$200,000 was over $2,500. Results from the simulation cited by Woo, Schweke, and Buchholz 
(2004) predict that, in 2006, the bottom 60 percent of taxpayers by income will receive less than 
five percent of the combined benefits from the mortgage interest and property tax deductions. 
The top one percent of tax payers by income is expected to receive almost 11 percent of the 
combined benefits.  
Bundles of Institutional Supports Provided through Other Types of Saving and Investment  
Finally, a bundle of institutional supports is available to “investors,” that is, to those who hold 
specific, fairly sophisticated saving and investment vehicles. Of particular interest here are 
individual retirement accounts, such as traditional IRAs, Roth IRAs, and Keogh plans.  
The most important institutional supports provided by these programs are incentives, 
restrictions, and expectations. Incentives are provided through the tax system. For example, 
contributions to traditional IRAs are deductible (although withdrawals are taxable). 
Contributions to Roth IRAs are not deductible, but earnings and allowed withdrawals are not 
taxed.  
 32
Traditional IRAs and Keogh plans are restricted. For example, withdrawals taken from a 
traditional IRA before age 59½ are subject to a 10-percent penalty unless used for higher 
education or first-time home purchase or unless the account-holder becomes disabled. The 
maximum deductible contributions for these individual retirement programs may also set up 
expectations for saving. Unlike employer-sponsored retirement plans, participation in individual 
retirement plans must be initiated and structured by individuals. Thus, accessing these 
institutional supports requires effort and financial sophistication, as well as wealth. 
Low-income households are eligible for traditional and Roth IRAs, but the participation 
rate is extremely low. According to estimates by Burman et al. (2004, Table 6), in 2004, only 0.2 
percent of tax units in the lowest income quintile contributed to a traditional IRA, and only 0.3 
percent contributed to a Roth IRA. The comparable figures for all tax units were 2.7 percent and 
2.8 percent. Low-income filers were also much less likely than high-income filers to contribute 
the maximum amounts.35 Financial constraints and the desire to save for shorter-term goals 
almost certainly limit participation by low-income households. Again, however, it is important to 
note that tax benefits are worth less to households in lower tax brackets. Because the ability to 
make deductible contributions phases out at higher income limits, low- and moderate-income 
households receive a greater proportion of the tax benefits for these accounts than they do for the 
other tax benefits discussed here. Still, Burman et al. estimate that 58 percent of the tax benefits 
for traditional and Roth IRAs accrue to the top income quintile, and 85 percent to the top two 
quintiles. 
Low-income, minority, and single-mother households have limited access to the federal 
subsidies related to long-term capital gains, life insurance and annuities, and capital gains 
transferred through estates. These groups tend to hold more conservative saving and investment 
products, and the tax-preferred products require greater financial sophistication and/or greater 
risk-tolerance than vehicles like savings accounts and certificates of deposit. And, these 
subgroups are much less likely than others to leave sizeable bequests. 
Institutional Supports Provided through Targeted Asset-Building Initiatives 
The previous paragraphs show that low-income households are much less likely than others to 
benefit from the policy bundles just described. The federal government, however, has a number 
of asset-building policies and programs that are targeted specifically to low-income households. 
The following sections describe some of these major targeted asset-building initiatives and 
discuss the extent to which these targeted programs provide institutional supports. Federal asset-
building initiatives for low-income households include both discretionary spending programs and 
                                                 
35 Only about 40 percent of all contributors to these accounts contributed the maximum amount, however (Burman 
et al. 2004, Table 6). This means, for example, that only about one percent of all tax units contributed the maximum 
amount to a traditional IRA. The figure for Roth IRAs is comparable. 
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tax expenditures. Targeted policies exist in at least four categories: homeownership, IDAs, small 
business development, and tax credits (see Exhibits 9 and 10).  
Homeownership.  
In recent years, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) has focused 
increasingly on promoting homeownership for lower-income households, spending about $2 
billion of HUD’s overall discretionary budget of $32 billion on targeted homeownership 
programs. By far, the largest HUD program promoting homeownership is the HOME Investment 
Partnership Program (HOME). HOME can be used to support homeownership and provide rental 
assistance. State and local officials have flexibility to determine how to best address their 
community’s low-income housing needs, and in recent years, the percentage of funds devoted to 
homeownership has increased. Support for homeownership includes down-payment and 
rehabilitation assistance. In 2003, a new set-aside within HOME, the American Dream 
Downpayment Initiative, was authorized. These funds provide grants of up to $10,000 to low-
income, first-time homebuyers for down payments and closing costs. Funds may also be used for 
some rehabilitation and home repair of housing acquired with assistance. 
Another source of federal assistance for low-income homebuyers is the Community 
Development Financial Institutions Fund (operating under the Treasury Department). This fund 
promotes economic revitalization and community development by investing in and providing 
assistance to community development financial institutions. These institutions, in turn, provide 
loans, investments, financial services, and technical assistance to underserved populations and 
communities. 
A third important source of federal assistance for low-income home buyers is the Federal 
Housing Administration (FHA). FHA has recently expanded its suite of products, but its primary 
mission is to provide mortgage insurance on loans made by FHA-approved lenders. A significant 
portion of low-income borrowers use FHA products when purchasing a home, and these products 
help reduce the barriers to homeownership. The FHA generates money for the federal 
government. 
Individual Development Accounts (IDAs) 
While IDA programs are relatively new, they have received some support from the federal 
government through the Assets for Independence Act (AFIA) and the Office of Refugee 
Resettlement. Enacted in 1998, AFIA created the first federally-funded national demonstration 
program for IDAs. Through AFIA, the Office of Community Services in the Administration for 
Children and Families (ACF) within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) 
awards five-year grants to nonprofit organizations and to government or financial institutions 
partnering with nonprofits. Grant recipients must provide an equal amount of funding from 
private sources. Federal funds may be used to administer programs and to provide matching 
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Exhibit 9. Funding Levels of Select Asset-Building Discretionary Spending Programs 
Targeted to Low-Income Households (in Millions of Dollars) 
 Actual 2004 
Estimated 
2005 
Requested
2006 
Department of Housing and Urban Development    
Self-Help Homeownership Program 25 52 30 
Housing Counseling 40 38 40 
American Dream Downpayment Fund 87 50 200 
Family Self-Sufficiency – Voucher Program 48 46 55 
HOME Investment Partnership Program 1,859 1,788 1,730  
Department of Treasury    
Community Development Financial Institutions 63 56 8 
Department of Health and Human Services    
Assets for Independence Demonstration Program 25 25 25 
Small Business Administration    
Microloan Program (loans) 23 10 0 
Microloan Program (technical assistance) 15 15 0 
Program for Investment in Microentrepreneurs 5 5 0 
Source: Office of Management and Budget 2005a 
Exhibit 10. Characteristics of Select Tax Expenditures Targeted to Low- and Moderate-
Income Households 
 
Earned Income 
Credit 
Child Tax Credit Saver’s 
Credit 
Phase-Out Range (2004)    
Married Filing Jointly $15K - $35.5K $110K - $170K $30K - $50K 
Head of Household/Single $14K - $34.5K $75K - $135K $15K - $25K 
Number of Claimants (2002) 21.9 million 25.7 million 5.4 million 
Total Value of Claimed Creditsa 
(Estimated, 2006) $39.5 billion $46.0 billion $1.2 billion 
Sources: Internal Revenue Service 2005; Office of Management and Budget 2005a 
a The total value equals the value of outlays (refunds) plus the value of tax expenditures (forgone tax payments). 
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funds for IDA deposits. IDA funds must be used to purchase a first home, pay for higher 
education, or capitalize a small business. As of 2005, 216 agencies and community-based groups 
across the nation had been awarded grants to implement 317 AFIA projects. There are more than 
1,100 subrecipient agencies and organizations active in these projects. In these AFIA projects, 
participants had established more than 34,000 IDAs and had saved a total of $24.8 million. 
In a separate program, the HHS/ACF Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) awards 
grants to nonprofit organizations providing IDAs to refugees. Since 1999, ORR has awarded 
approximately $78 million which has funded approximately 20,000 IDA participants. While 
there is no specific budget line to support refugee IDA programs, it has been funded through the 
ORR discretionary budget. This budget item has fluctuated in recent years; the most recent ORR 
IDA program announcement was issued in FY 2007. 36
Small Business Development  
The federal government offers a number of programs to support small business capitalization, 
mostly through activities of the U.S. Small Business Administration. Only a few of these 
programs—including the Microenterprise Development Initiative, Microloan program, and 
Program for Investment in Microentrepreneurs—are targeted to lower-income borrowers. Most 
of these programs are small and primarily provide loans and technical assistance to 
microenterprises.  
Tax Credits  
As noted above, several large tax expenditures support asset building for primarily middle- and 
upper-income households. Two tax expenditures, the Saver’s Credit and the Earned Income Tax 
Credit (EITC), are targeted to low-income households. A third, the Child Tax Credit (CTC), is 
available to a broader segment of the population but also benefits low-income households. These 
tax expenditures are described here.
The Saver's Credit was created in 2001 to encourage low-income people to save for 
retirement. It provides up to a 50-percent tax credit for up to $1,000 in contributions to 
retirement accounts, including 401(k) plans and IRAs. This credit, however, is nonrefundable, so 
it benefits only those with federal tax liability.  
The EITC is a federal income tax credit for low-income workers. In tax year 2004, 
working families with children were eligible for the EITC if they had incomes below about 
$30,000 to $36,000, depending on number of children in the family and filing status (Internal 
                                                 
36 The ORR IDA program is not included in Exhibit 9 because it does not have a discrete funding line in the federal 
budget. 
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Revenue Service n.d.). That same year, the average EITC claim was $1,834 (Kneebone 2007).37 
The EITC is refundable, so an individual receives a refund if the credit amount exceeds her tax 
liability.  
The EITC was not explicitly designed to encourage asset building.38 There is evidence, 
however, that it does facilitate asset accumulation, especially (perhaps) when linked to initiatives 
explicitly designed to encourage saving and asset accumulation. As discussed earlier, behavioral 
theory suggests, and some empirical evidence confirms, that people view lump-sum refunds 
differently than wage and salary income and may be more likely to save and/or purchase assets 
with refund payments. This has led both for-profit and not-for-profit organizations to offer a 
variety of saving products at the time of tax preparation, including low-fee bank accounts 
(Beverly, Romich, and Tescher 2003), IRAs (Duflo, Gale, Liebman, Orszag, and Saez 2005; 
Tufano and Schneider 2004) and IDAs. Another program encouraged EITC recipients to “split” 
their refunds, directing part to a savings account and receiving the rest in the form of a check for 
consumption (Beverly, Schneider, and Tufano 2006).39
The CTC is also a federal income tax credit, worth up to $1,000 to eligible tax filers for 
each qualifying child. In tax year 2004, eligibility began to phase out at $75,000 for single heads 
of household and $110,000 for couples filing jointly. The CTC is only partially refundable. Like 
the EITC, it is not explicitly an asset-building initiative, but it does affect the potential of a 
lower-income family to build assets by reducing its tax liability and perhaps increasing the size 
of its tax refund.  
Assessment of Targeted Asset-Building Initiatives  
It is not yet possible to say, with confidence, whether targeted asset-building programs described 
above substantially increase the assets of participants. This important question requires detailed 
information about a variety of assets and some reasonable estimate of how asset levels would 
                                                 
37 The maximum credit allowed varies according to number of qualifying children, $390 for no qualifying children, 
$2,604 for one, and $4,300 for two or more (IRS n.d.) 
38 Instead, it was created (in 1975) to offset the burden of Social Security and Medicare payroll taxes for low-income 
working people with children. In 1978, the advance-payment option was created, allowing EITC-eligible individuals 
to receive a portion of their credits through their paychecks. The vast majority of recipients continued to receive the 
credit as a lump-sum, after filing their taxes. Many advocates for low-income workers were initially disappointed 
that workers did not take advantage of the advance-payment option. In time, advocates learned that some families 
valued the opportunity to accumulate a lump-sum, either for savings, for special purchases, or for “catching up” on 
bills. 
39 Overall, evidence on the effectiveness of these programs is mixed. The programs have had low to moderate take-
up rates, ranging from about 3 percent for IRAs with no matching funds (Duflo et al., 2005) to about 20 to 25 
percent for programs that deposit funds in basic savings accounts (Beverly, Romich, and Tescher 2003; Beverly, 
Schneider, and Tufano 2006). There is some evidence that participants believe that these programs helped them 
save, spend more thoughtfully, and/or achieve specific saving or spending goals (Beverly, Romich, and Tescher 
2003; Beverly, Schneider, and Tufano 2006), but more rigorous studies are needed to determine whether these 
programs actually increase saving and wealth. 
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have changed in the absence of the programs. IDAs are probably the most-researched of all the 
initiatives listed here, and a small body of research suggests that some IDA saving is “new” 
saving (see discussion under “Incentives” in Section IV.C). In the absence of more information 
about impact, the scope of these targeted initiatives and the level of institutional support 
provided is described here.  
The low-income targeted initiatives described here may be assessed, in part, by the 
amount of appropriations designated for each. For fiscal year (FY) 2006, about $2 billion was 
requested for the HOME Investment Partnership Program and the American Dream 
Downpayment Fund (Exhibit 9). Expenditures for the Saver’s Credit were expected to be about 
$1.4 billion (Office of Management and Budget 2005a), and $25 million was requested for the 
Assets for Independence demonstration program. No funding was requested for the 
microenterprise programs under the Small Business Administration (Exhibit 9).40  
The targeted initiatives may also be assessed in regard to their accessibility. IDA 
programs often require that participants be employed, and the IDA programs funded by the 
Office of Refugee Resettlement are limited to refugees. The EITC is limited to individuals with 
earnings, and childless workers who are eligible for a small credit. Small business programs are 
available to those who have or are starting their own businesses. In addition, an application or a 
meeting with a case manager may be required for individuals who wish to participate in a 
homeownership, IDA, or small business programs. Such requirements may limit participation.  
With regard to information, it is difficult to say whether information needed to participate 
successfully in targeted programs is more available or less available than information related to 
homeownership and retirement saving benefits. One study suggests that less than two-thirds of 
low-income parents knew about the EITC in 1999 (Phillips 2001). The authors are aware of no 
empirical evidence about knowledge of the other targeted programs described here. Presumably, 
social service agencies provide information about these targeted programs to potential 
participants, but individuals who are not connected to these agencies may have no source of 
information about these programs.41 Moreover, the motives or incentives for providing 
information differ for targeted programs, compared to homeownership and retirement saving 
initiatives. For the targeted programs, the motivation to educate comes from the “good will” of 
nonprofit organizations and staff members, that is, from the desire to provide resources to 
disadvantaged families. For homeownership and retirement saving initiatives, there are 
                                                 
40 FY 2006 expenditures for the EITC and CTC are expected to be large—about $39.3 billion for the EITC and 
about $45.5 billion for the CTC (Office of Management and Budget, 2005a)—but these are not asset-building 
initiatives per se. In addition, in 2005, the 45 percent of tax units with cash incomes under $30,000 a year received 
less than 20 percent of total CTC benefits (authors’ calculations based on the data from Tax Policy Center 2005). 
41 Low-income filers who use a tax preparation service do not need to know about the EITC to receive it, but those 
who file their own returns must know to claim it. And, some households without tax liability may not file because 
they are unaware that they are eligible for the credit. 
 38
individuals and organizations—realtors, lenders, and investment companies, for example—that 
receive clear benefits when new “participants” are recruited. Also related to information is the 
fact that most of these targeted programs require some degree of financial sophistication. It takes 
financial knowledge and confidence, for example, to purchase a home or start a small business. 
Of the targeted programs described here, IDAs have the most obvious incentives for 
saving. These incentives are generous in percentage terms, but benefits are capped, and the dollar 
amount transferred can be far less generous than, say, retirement pension benefits. In addition, 
federally-funded IDA programs are small, in budgetary terms and in terms of people served, and 
do not have permanent funding streams. Also, to receive AFIA funds, nonprofit organizations 
must provide match money, a requirement that does not exist in the tax expenditure programs 
supporting homeownership and retirement savings. The Saver’s Credit also provides an incentive 
for saving, but this program is limited in scope because only filers with federal income tax 
liability benefit.42
With regard to facilitation, automatic enrollment is not often available for these targeted 
programs. For some, automatic transfers can be arranged, if the participant has a bank account 
or, in the case of the Saver’s Credit, access to a 401(k) plan. The EITC and CTC provide some 
facilitation, to the extent that income tax refunds are more “save-able” than more regular income. 
In some IDA programs, staff actively encourage and sometimes assist participants in making a 
monthly saving deposit. 
As discussed below (Section IV.C, under “Expectations”), there is some evidence that 
IDA programs create expectations for saving and asset accumulation. IDA program staff create 
these expectations, and some participants come to view the monthly IDA saving target itself as 
an expected saving amount. These expectations seem to help some participants save. In theory, 
the Saver’s Credit could create expectations for retirement saving, but there is no empirical 
evidence on this topic.  
Most of the targeted programs discussed here have restrictions. For example, financial 
assistance from homeownership programs may be used only for homeownership, support from 
microenterprise programs is restricted to small business efforts, matching funds for IDA deposits 
may be used only for approved purposes, and deposits that qualify for the Saver’s Credit go into 
restricted retirement accounts. There are no restrictions associated with the use of the EITC and 
the CTC (consistent with the fact that these are not explicitly designed as asset-building 
programs).  
                                                 
42 Gale, Iwry, and Orszag (2004) estimate that only about one out of every 1,000 returns that qualify for the Saver’s 
Credit based on income has enough tax liability to receive the maximum possible credit (if the maximum eligible 
contribution were made). 
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Very likely, for most participants, these targeted programs are perceived as secure. 
Although there are risks involved with investing in a small business, purchasing a home, and 
contributing to a retirement savings plan, receiving additional support for these activities through 
these targeted programs creates no additional risk. 
In sum, these targeted programs provide much less institutional support for saving and 
asset accumulation than the homeownership and retirement saving initiatives that operate 
through the tax system and through employers. In large part, this is due to substantial differences 
in size and scope. Targeted programs reach far fewer people, they are primarily available only to 
those with earnings, and the financial benefits provided are typically much lower in dollar terms. 
Like the “non-targeted” initiatives, targeted programs provide restrictions and security, and some 
provide incentives and expectations. But these institutional supports are available only to the 
small portion of the low-income population that applies for assistance and satisfies eligibility 
requirements. In the case of employment-based retirement pensions, institutionalization of saving 
can be almost total and continuous; that is, the participant does nothing month after month, year 
after year, and the savings continue to accumulate. Targeted programs do not lend themselves to 
such extensive institutionalization. For example, automatic enrollment is unlikely and even the 
opportunity to arrange for automatic deposits into saving products is somewhat limited. The end 
result is likely to be that targeted programs have modest effects, in the aggregate, on asset 
building. 
IV. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON THE DETERMINANTS OF ASSET BUILDING 
A discussion of empirical evidence related to the conceptual framework proposed above is in 
order. This section begins with an overview of the strengths and weaknesses of the data sources 
and methods in existing studies. Next, the report summarizes the empirical evidence (and/or 
notes the lack of evidence) for the major propositions suggested above (empirical studies that are 
directly related to the determinants of asset building are summarized in Appendix Exhibit 1). 
This section closes with suggestions for future research. 
A. Data Sources Used in the Literature 
Strengths and Limitations of Data Sources 
The studies cited here primarily use data from large national surveys such as the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics (PSID) and the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), data from a national 
demonstration of IDA programs (the American Dream Demonstration or ADD), or 
administrative data from employers offering defined contribution plans. The specific strengths 
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and weaknesses of the national data sets and of ADD data are covered in a separate report in the 
Poor Finances series.43 Strengths and weaknesses of administrative data are described here.  
Administrative data sets are useful because they contain objective data on actual behavior 
(e.g., actual participation and contribution decisions). In contrast, the surveys provide self-
reported data, which may be inaccurate for a variety of reasons. In addition, survey data 
sometimes refer to planned behavior or hypothetical behavior, which may differ substantially 
from actual behavior. One major weakness of the administrative data sets, however, is that they 
almost exclusively relate to retirement saving, and to saving in employer-sponsored retirement 
plans in particular. These data cannot indicate how low-income people would respond to saving 
programs that are not retirement-related. In fact, they provide quite limited information about 
low-income saving and investment action because many low-income households (especially the 
most disadvantaged) do not work for firms that sponsor these plans. One important exception is 
the administrative data from ADD, because IDAs are targeted to low-income households and 
IDA participants may save for homeownership, education, and small business capitalization.  
Still, all of these administrative data sets are tied to particular saving programs with 
particular institutional characteristics. This is both strength and weakness for research on 
institutional determinants of asset building. It is an important strength to be able to observe how 
people actually respond to a real bundle of institutional characteristics. On the other hand, it is 
not possible to observe how people would respond to a different set of institutional 
characteristics without altering the actual saving program, something that is not easily done. A 
few large administrative data sets combine data from people who are eligible for different saving 
plans and thus allow researchers to observe how behavior varies in response to different 
institutional characteristics, but these data sets are not usually in the public domain. 
B. Methods Used in the Literature 
Strengths and Limitations of Methods 
The research cited in this section on empirical evidence is diverse. It includes both qualitative 
and quantitative studies. It includes rigorous studies with findings that may have implications for 
policy, as well as less rigorous studies with findings that should be considered tentative.  
The most quantitatively rigorous studies cited here use experimental and quasi-
experimental methods or sophisticated multivariate analysis. From these more rigorous studies, 
                                                 
43 “Assessing Asset Data on Low-Income Households: Current Availability and Options for Improvement,” 
Ratcliffe et al. 2007. Available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/07/PoorFinances/data/index.htm
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there is fairly consistent evidence that precommitment constraints, automatic enrollment, 
restrictions, and the existence of a match increase saving (in the designated savings vehicle).44  
Many of the studies cited here do not use such rigorous methods, and this is a major 
weakness of the body of literature. Some of the research examines correlations. For example, the 
study by Hilgert, Hogarth, and Beverly (2003) finds a positive correlation between financial 
knowledge and financial behavior, but it is not possible to conclude with confidence that the 
knowledge shaped the behavior. And, some studies examine perceived relationships. For 
example, Moore et al. (2001) report the percentage of participants who believe that they save less 
in other accounts because they have IDAs.  
The samples used in the quantitative research cited here are quite diverse. A number of 
studies involve low-income IDA participants. A small number involve low-income households in 
developing countries. Many of the other studies use fairly “advantaged” samples, that is, middle- 
and upper-income households who are eligible for employment-based retirement plans. For 
general knowledge-building and policymaking, it would be useful to have studies that examine 
whether each of the proposed hypotheses holds for a broadly representative sample of 
households and for lower-income households. And, for the specific purpose of designing policy 
to facilitate asset building in low-income households, it would be especially useful to have more 
studies that involve this group. 
Another important weakness of the samples is vulnerability to selection bias. Many of the 
studies cited here use samples of volunteers, that is, people who chose to participate in a 
particular savings program. These volunteers are probably different from those who did not 
choose to participate. For example, those who enroll in an IDA or financial education program 
are probably more motivated to save or change their financial behavior than those who do not. 
These and other differences are likely to influence how much individuals save, how they respond 
to institutional characteristics, and so forth; therefore, the findings reported here may not hold in 
more diverse samples. 
A fair number of the studies cited here are qualitative. Qualitative studies are useful when 
little is known about a topic, a circumstance that certainly applies to some of the hypotheses of 
interest here. They can call attention to relationships and patterns that might have otherwise been 
unnoticed; they can also help explain observed relationships, from the perspective of the research 
participants, in ways that quantitative studies cannot. Most of the qualitative studies cited here 
have small samples, however, and their findings should be considered tentative. Like much 
                                                 
44 Of course, it would be valuable to confirm these findings with additional studies, and future research could build 
the body of policy-relevant knowledge by asking more refined research questions. We identify some of these follow-
up research questions in the section on future research. 
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qualitative research, these studies can be used to generate hypotheses that may later be tested in 
quantitative research.  
C. Findings from the Literature 
Effects of Saving and Investment Action on Asset Accumulation  
Above, this report proposed that deposit patterns affect asset accumulation, that withdrawal 
patterns affect asset accumulation, and that portfolio composition affects asset accumulation. The 
first two hypotheses, as noted earlier, are essentially truisms and the third hypothesis has nearly 
universal acceptance. The report identified a somewhat “controversial” question, whether 
homeownership increases the asset levels of low-income households and presented reasons that 
low-income, minority, and single-mother families might receive low and even negative rates of 
return on housing. This section discusses empirical evidence on this topic.  
Evidence clearly indicates that market conditions have a strong effect on rates of return 
on owner-occupied housing. Beyond this, however, it is difficult to draw a clear conclusion from 
the literature. To accurately compute the rate of return to homeownership, one might want to 
consider not only the difference between purchase price and selling price but also real estate 
transaction costs, foregone earnings from alternative investments, maintenance costs (in 
comparison to maintenance costs incurred by renters) (Belsky and Calder 2004), and even 
foregone rental assistance. Existing studies vary in their coverage of these factors, and this at 
least partly explains mixed findings. Just a few studies are described here, to illustrate the need 
for more research. 
Using PSID data, Reid (2004) examines the housing choices and outcomes over a 
several-year period for about 5,000 renters. She finds that many renters who purchased homes—
especially low-income and minority home buyers—returned to renting in a relatively short time. 
The financial returns to homeownership were very small for low- and middle-income minorities 
and low-income whites. Although some low-income and minority homeowners did experience 
appreciation, Reid concludes that white and middle- and upper-income households were much 
more likely to benefit financially from homeownership. 
Using data on purchase and sale price for homes that were both purchased and sold, 
Belsky and Duda (2002) compare the returns for individuals purchasing low-cost homes to other 
buyers. They find that returns from the sale of a home were strongly influenced by the timing of 
the sale and that many people experienced losses (i.e., after real estate transaction costs were 
considered, they sold their homes for less than the purchase price). Those who purchased low-
cost homes, however, were more likely to sell at a profit during market upswings and less likely 
to suffer losses when selling during market downturns. This study is limited to four metropolitan 
areas and examines repeat sales of short-term owners. It is not clear whether these authors 
consider the (foregone) cost of rental payments when computing return on the sale of a home. 
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Case and Marynchenko (2002) also use administrative data to examine the change in 
home value for homes in Boston, Los Angeles, and Chicago. To look at outcomes by income, 
they group homes according to the average income of the zip code. They find that rate of return 
is greatly influenced by the time of purchase and the supply of and demand for real estate at the 
local level. They note that borrowing to purchase a home can result in “serious losses” (p. 253) 
in some circumstances.  
In sum, more evidence is needed, but existing research seems to suggest that 
homeownership may be a risky investment for low-income and minority households. Learning 
more about rates of return for low-income and minority home buyers—and finding ways to help 
potential home buyers make informed choices—are very important research objectives because 
home equity is the primary asset for many low-income and minority households.  
Effects of Individual Constructs on Saving and Investment Action 
This section provides a summary of evidence related to the individual constructs identified in the 
conceptual framework presented in this report. 
Economic Resources and Needs  
The large body of evidence showing that low-income families have less wealth than middle- and 
upper-income families provides strong indirect support for the hypothesis that economic 
constraints shape saving action, but few studies have directly tested the hypothesis (probably 
because this relationship is viewed as a truism). Based on household budgets developed during 
in-depth interviews with almost 200 low-income mothers, Edin (2001) argues that, to accumulate 
assets, low-income households would have to give up expenditures that most Americans view as 
necessities. In one of the few quantitative studies on this topic (a survey of 298 IDA 
participants), Moore et al. (2001) find that 30 percent of IDA participants strongly agreed, and 52 
percent agreed, that it was difficult to save because most of their money went for necessities.  
There is also some limited evidence that the three specific types of expenses identified in 
Section III.C under “Economic Resources and Needs”—medical expenses, vehicle expenses, and 
debt payments—depress saving in many low-income households. In some qualitative studies, 
low-income individuals state explicitly that burdensome debt payments (Edin 2001), medical 
costs (Edin 2001; Hogan et al. 2004; Sherraden, McBride et al. 2005), and vehicle breakdowns 
(Finn, Zorita, and Coulton 1994; Hogan et al. 2004; Sherraden, McBride et al. 2005) make it 
difficult for them to save and maintain assets. Quantitative evidence directly linking these 
expenses to saving outcomes is quite limited. The most rigorous data known to the authors come 
from a study of 1,855 ADD participants (Banov 2005). Banov examines the effects of medical 
debt (whether or not an individual has overdue medical payments) on six indicators of IDA 
“success,” while controlling for numerous other variables (including health insurance). Medical 
debt has moderate and significant effects in the expected directions on all outcomes. For 
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example, the average monthly IDA deposit (net of unmatched withdrawals) for those with 
medical debt is about $3.50 (19 percent) less than the average monthly deposit for those without 
medical debt. And, those with medical debt are about five percentage points more likely to drop 
out of the IDA program (39 percent vs. 34 percent).45 One important limitation of this study is 
that the data set does not include indicators of health status, so medical debt may be a proxy for 
poor health status. 
Banov (2005) also examines the effects of health insurance (whether or not an individual 
has insurance) on the same indicators of IDA “success.” She finds that health insurance is 
significantly and positively related to average monthly net deposits and to gross deposits into 
IDAs over the duration of program but not to the other outcomes. These findings are somewhat 
difficult to interpret, however, because there is no indicator of out-of-pocket (OOP) medical 
expenses, and it is not clear that people with insurance have low OOP expenses. (Some insured 
individuals pay high very premiums, for example.) 
Informal Social Support  
This report posits that informal support from social network members makes saving easier and 
that demands from network members make saving and the maintenance of assets difficult. Thus, 
the nature of an individual’s social network (e.g., whether network members are “in need” and 
make demands, and/or whether they communicate that saving is feasible and desirable) affects 
saving action and asset accumulation. These hypotheses are intuitive, but empirical evidence is 
rare.  
As noted above, the hypothesis that demands from social network members make it 
difficult to save and maintain assets flows from ground-breaking qualitative research by Stack 
(1974). At least two more recent qualitative studies support this hypothesis. In a qualitative study 
of 30 Hispanic and black families in San Jose, California and rural Mississippi, Caskey (1997) 
reports findings similar to Stack (1974); some interviewees said they did not save because others 
would insist they share their savings.46 In quantitative, multivariate studies, Chiteji and Hamilton 
(2005) and Heflin and Patillo (2002) find that families are less likely to have bank accounts when 
they have poor siblings and parents. Heflin and Patillo also find that these kin characteristics 
decrease the likelihood of homeownership for whites, but not for blacks. Chiteji and Hamilton 
find that poverty in extended families decreases the likelihood of stock ownership. Both sets of 
researchers conclude that poverty in the extended family can constrain asset accumulation.  
                                                 
45 Other outcomes examined are the probability of saving at least $100 in IDAs; the amount of gross deposits into 
IDAs over the duration of program; the probability of finishing the program; and the probability of making an asset 
purchase. 
46 Reinforcing the importance of social context, some interviewees also said that any savings they managed to 
accumulate would be quickly depleted because network members would refuse to help during a financial crisis as 
long as the family had savings (Caskey 1997).  
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The authors are aware of even less empirical evidence related to the hypothesis that 
informal support increases saving. One qualitative study of 25 IDA participants in Minnesota 
finds that support from family, friends, and community organizations during times of crisis is an 
important facilitator of saving. In-depth interviews with IDA participants in ADD also suggests 
that encouragement and saving reminders from IDA staff help people save (Sherraden, McBride 
et al. 2005). 
Financial Literacy 
This report hypothesizes that financial literacy affects saving and investment action. As noted 
above, however, examining this relationship requires fairly sophisticated empirical tests. It is not 
enough to examine the effects of financial knowledge on attitudes or intended behavior, because 
these attitudes and intentions may not translate into action. When data on actual behavior are 
available, researchers must consider the possibility that financial behavior may shape literacy 
(reverse causality) and that other variables such as motivation and future orientation may explain 
an observed relationship between literacy and behavior.  
Empirical studies on this topic are rare. Using nationally representative data from the 
Survey of Consumers, Hilgert et al. (2003) find a positive association between overall financial 
knowledge and following recommended financial practices. They also find positive associations 
between specific types of financial knowledge and specific types of financial behavior. For 
example, those who scored high on knowledge of credit management also tended to follow 
recommended credit management practices. This study relies on self-reported data regarding 
financial behavior, however, and does not consider the possibility that financial behavior may 
affect financial knowledge. Another study uses two-stage least squares regression to control for 
reverse causality and finds that financial knowledge is positively associated with retirement 
savings (Kotlikoff and Bernheim 2001). The measure of financial knowledge used may not be a 
particularly valid indicator of practical financial knowledge, however.47 This study also relies on 
self-reported financial data. 
While more evidence is needed that increasing financial literacy leads to greater saving 
and smarter investment choices, it is certainly likely that those who lack basic financial 
knowledge and skills will have more trouble finding and using appropriate saving and 
investment vehicles. Americans in general are not very educated about financial matters, and 
evidence shows that low-income people are especially likely to score poorly on “tests” of 
financial knowledge (e.g., Bernheim 1998; Brobeck 2002; Consumer Federation of America 
1990). In one study of over 600 low-income people (Anderson, Zhan, and Scott 2004), the 
                                                 
47 The measure was created from only six knowledge questions, including, “What is the current Dow Jones 
Industrial average?”; “For people who pay federal income taxes, what is the lowest income tax bracket?”; and 
“What is the 30-year conventional mortgage rate right now?” 
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average participant answered only 56 percent of the 41 financial knowledge questions correctly. 
Knowledge of saving and investment strategies was especially low. For example, only 48 percent 
understood that “investments” are usually riskier than savings accounts.  
Few studies have examined the financial literacy of single parents in particular. Because 
they tend to have less income and wealth and because their households may have less access to 
financial education, single parents may have less financial knowledge, on average. Conversely, 
at least one study of participants in a financial management program for low-income people (90 
percent women) finds that single parents have greater financial knowledge than married 
participants (Zhan, Anderson, and Scott 2006). This may indicate, consistent with qualitative 
evidence in Sherraden, McBride, et al. (2005), that married women rely more on their husbands 
in financial matters, while single women make many financial decisions by themselves. 
Psychological Variables 
Future orientation. The willingness to trade-off benefits and costs at one time versus another 
derives from a combination of pure taste (time preference) and other factors such as returns on 
savings, uncertainty, and inflation. In their review, Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue 
(2003) find “spectacular disagreement” (p. 389) among estimates of time preference, mostly due 
to failure to distinguish between pure taste-based motives and other related (but distinct) factors. 
Most estimates reviewed by Frederick et al. imply that $100 today is more valuable to most 
people than $150 in one year, implying that costs and rewards three to five years in the future 
have almost no value from the perspective of today. Those authors argue, however, that existing 
estimates are biased and that a more realistic description is valuing current rewards almost 
equally with future ones. They conclude that people (on average) probably have much longer 
time horizons than the very short time horizons implied by existing estimates.  
At the same time, as noted above, a key assumption of behavioral theory is that many 
individuals lack the self-control to reduce current consumption in favor of future consumption. 
Behavioral economists call this the “self-control problem” (e.g., Thaler 1994). Anecdotal and 
indirect evidence is abundant. For example, the very existence of “Christmas club” accounts, 
which require regular deposits and do not allow withdrawals until the holiday season but which 
do not provide higher interest rates than basic saving accounts, suggest that people have self-
control problems. Still, the authors are aware of very few studies that attempt to document the 
prevalence of self-control problems quantitatively. One exception is a study by Ameriks, Caplin, 
Leahy and Tyler (2004). These scholars use survey data to identify individuals who tend to over-
consume and those who tend to under-consume.48 They find that under-consumption (too much 
                                                 
48 The survey asked questions about hypothetical free “dream dinners” available over two years. More specifically, 
respondents were asked how many of these dinners they would like to use in the first year. Then they were asked 
how many they would probably actually use in the first year. Those who said they would probably use more than 
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self-control) is more common than over-consumption (too little self-control). Their sample of 
about 1,400 TIAA-CREF participants is much more educated than the broader U.S. population, 
however,49 so these descriptive statistics provide limited insight. A more useful finding for the 
purposes of this report is that, in multivariate analysis, under-consumption is associated with 
higher net worth, and over-consumption is associated with lower net worth. The authors argue 
that this second finding is unlikely to be an artifact of the high levels of education in the sample, 
but more empirical research would be useful. In addition to this quantitative study, a few 
qualitative studies provide evidence that individuals—with both low incomes and high 
incomes—believe that they have trouble postponing consumption (Beverly, Romich, and 
Tescher 2003; Caskey 1997; Kennickell, Starr-McCluer, and Sunden 1997; Romich and Weisner 
2000). 
Motives for saving. As noted above, neoclassical economists typically emphasize four 
motives for saving: for long-term changes in income (retirement saving), for short-term changes 
in income (precautionary saving), for bequests, and for “big ticket” items (target saving). Simple 
descriptive evidence from the 2001 SCF shows that retirement and precautionary motives are the 
most common motives, followed by education and other types of target saving (Aizcorbe, 
Kennickell, and Moore 2003, Table 2).50 During the 1990s, retirement became an increasingly 
common most-important saving motive. 
In recent years, economists have given special attention to the role of precautionary 
saving in asset accumulation. Using the PSID, Carroll and Samwick (1997) find that U.S. 
households overall save mostly for precautionary reasons until about age 50. Of course, income 
uncertainty is higher for the poor, so—all else constant—they have an extra-strong precautionary 
motive. But if precautionary savings matter so much to the poor, why do they have low or no 
wealth? Simulated outcomes from the model in Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1995) “can 
replicate observed patterns in household wealth accumulation after accounting explicitly for 
precautionary saving and asset-based, means-tested social insurance” (p. 360). In particular, their 
model suggests that holding low (or no) wealth can make sense for low-educated, low-income 
households because they face what amounts to a 100-percent tax on savings, should their 
uncertain incomes fall so low that they qualify for asset-tested public assistance.  
                                                                                                                                                             
they would have liked in the first year are defined as over-consumers. Those who said they would probably use too 
few in the first year are defined as under-consumers. 
49 Over 70 percent of respondents have a graduate or professional degree. 
50 Just over 32 percent of respondents said retirement was their most important saving motive. Over 31 percent gave 
responses classified as “liquidity-related,” including saving for emergencies, for periods of unemployment, and for 
health care costs, and saving to have “ready money.” Almost 11 percent named education, and 9.5 percent named 
“purchases” as their most important saving motives. Just over 5 percent gave reasons Aizcorbe et al. (2003) 
classified as “for the family”; it is not clear what portion of these responses reflect a bequest motive. 
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Perceived ability to save. Above, this report hypothesized that those who expect saving 
attempts to be successful are more likely to save, while those who expect failure are less likely to 
save. Research has rarely examined these hypotheses directly. In-depth interviews with IDA 
participants provide some evidence that successes with saving make people feel more confident 
in their ability to save and increase their intentions to save (Sherraden, McBride et al. 2005). In 
the only quantitative study known to the authors, Moore et al. (2001) find that perceived inability 
to save is negatively related to saving in IDAs, but the relationship is not statistically significant 
(p=0.17). 51 A related variable, the perception that “saving takes too long” is also statistically 
insignificant (p=0.43). The sample for this regression is relatively small (N=166) and excludes 
people who had dropped out of IDA programs. If those who dropped out were those who felt the 
least able to save (as one would expect), the study may underestimate the effects of perceived 
inability to save. The study also uses self-reported data on IDA saving. 
Effects of Institutional Constructs on Saving and Investment Action  
This section summarizes existing evidence related to the institutional constructs identified in the 
conceptual framework. 
Access 
The hypotheses that access (eligibility and practicality) affects saving and investment action 
seem to be common sense but are difficult to test. As implied above in the discussion of bundles, 
“access” is almost inevitably combined with the other institutional constructs discussed here. The 
authors are not aware of any study that has attempted to identify the effects of access separate 
from the effects of other institutional characteristics. This may be an important task for future 
research. 
Information 
This report has hypothesized that information shapes saving and investment action. To some 
extent, this hypothesis is a truism: Without information about a particular product or program, an 
individual cannot purchase it or participate in it. Beyond this, however, whether or not 
information affects financial behavior is an empirical question. Almost all of the related 
empirical studies examine the effects of financial education (one method of providing financial 
information) on financial outcomes. One exception is a study that examines the effects of 
financial communication (e.g., paper and web-based education materials, projection tools, and 
plan statements) on 401(k) participation and contribution decisions of employees in 26 firms 
(Nyce 2005). The findings suggest that financial communication, especially web-based, has large 
positive effects on participation and contribution and that the effects may be strongest for low 
                                                 
51 Perceived inability to save is defined as agreeing or strongly agreeing with the following statement: “You could 
save a little, but not enough to make a difference.” 
 49
earners. An important strength of this study is the use of administrative data. However, the 
measures of financial communication are fairly crude,52 and the study examines participation in 
just a single saving product. More research on the effects of financial communication is needed. 
The remaining studies described here examine financial education. Many of these studies 
have an important limitation: Data on outcomes come from participants’ self-report. In order to 
please research or program personnel, participants may exaggerate their savings and/or their 
adherence to recommended financial practices. Or, they may make “honest” mistakes, due to 
faulty recall.53 Measures of financial knowledge that come from objective financial “tests” are 
not subject to this type of bias. Many existing studies are also subject to selection bias: When 
financial education is voluntary, those who choose to attend are probably more motivated than 
others to increase their financial literacy and financial well-being (Caskey 2001). Or, attendees 
may seek out financial information because they already have substantial assets (Lusardi 2002). 
For many adults in the United States, employers are an important source of information 
related to retirement saving. A few studies suggest that employer-sponsored financial education 
seminars increase pension-plan participation rates and contributions. For example, Bayer, 
Bernheim, and Scholz (1996) find that more frequent corporate-sponsored retirement seminars 
are associated with both higher participation and higher levels of contributions to 401(k) plans. 
Similarly, Bernheim and Garrett (2003) find that employees who work for companies that offer 
financial education are more likely to participate in pension plans and tend to have greater 
wealth. The effects on wealth are especially strong for those with little wealth. The results of 
these studies are probably not greatly affected by selection bias, as long as employees in the 
firms with and without education had similar motivations to save. Lusardi (2002) also finds that 
employer-sponsored retirement seminars have large effects on wealth in low-wealth and low-
education samples. This study does not use a comparison group but attempts to minimize 
selection bias by controlling for several variables that may proxy for motivation to save, future 
orientation, and other individual characteristics that might be correlated with saving. All three of 
these studies rely on self-reports of financial behavior and wealth.  
Some studies examine the effects of financial education that is specifically targeted to 
low-income households. A study by Hirad and Zorn (2002) evaluates the effects of pre-purchase 
                                                 
52 The variables describing firms’ 401(k) communication program measure: (1) how often plan information is 
provided to employees; (2) how often financial education materials are provided; (3) the proportion of employees 
with access to projection information; and (4) the percent of communication materials that are available on the 
internet. 
53 Some studies of financial education use a post-test to examine intended behavior of participants. As both 
psychology and behavioral economics emphasize, however, intentions often do not directly translate into action. In 
fact, one study finds that only 14 percent of those who said, after a one-hour employer-sponsored retirement 
seminar, that they planned to enroll in the 401(k) plan actually did so. About 30 percent of those who said they 
planned to increase their contribution rate actually did so (Choi et al. 2002). We do not discuss studies that use only 
measures of intended behavior as outcomes. 
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homeownership counseling and finds that counseling, especially individual and classroom 
counseling, is associated with a large reduction in the risk of 90-day mortgage delinquency. 
When using a statistical strategy to control for selection bias, the researchers confirm that 
counseling (broadly defined) and classroom counseling in particular significantly reduce 
delinquency rates. The effects of individual counseling become insignificant, however. In 
research on IDAs using ADD data, Clancy, Grinstein-Weiss and Schreiner (2001) find that up to 
12 hours of general financial education is associated with large increases in net IDA savings, but 
selection bias is a potential problem because the most motivated savers may have completed 
more financial education.  
Finally, a few studies look not at specific financial education programs but at state 
curriculum mandates related to financial education in public schools.54 There is evidence that 
curriculum mandates, especially mandates requiring coverage of personal finance in a specific 
course, increase financial knowledge and/or saving rates. For example, Tennyson and Nguyen 
(2001) use data on 1,600 high school students in 31 states to examine whether state curriculum 
mandates predict students’ scores on a 31-item test of financial knowledge. Controlling for other 
characteristics of the state, school size, and several individual characteristics, they find that 
students in states that required coverage of personal finance in a specific course scored 
significantly higher. Using data from a 1995 survey of about 2,000 respondents between the ages 
of 30 and 49, Bernheim, Garrett and Maki (2001) find evidence that curriculum mandates related 
to coverage of personal finance during high school increase self-reported saving rates in 
adulthood. These studies are probably not subject to selection bias because students did not 
choose to be exposed to financial education. However, it is impossible to assess the accuracy of 
the self-reported saving rates used by Bernheim et al. 
In sum, there is a fair amount of evidence that financial education improves financial 
outcomes, but more rigorous research is needed. Of particular interest are studies that minimize 
selection bias and examine financial outcomes that may be objectively verified. If additional 
research confirms that financial information can shape financial behavior, it will be important to 
determine whether low-income, minority, and single-mother households have access to 
appropriate financial information. Few studies have examined this question, but there are reasons 
for concern. Due to job instability and/or concentration in the low-wage service sector, these 
subpopulations probably have less access than others to employer-sponsored financial 
information. Those who did not complete high school are also less likely to have received 
school-based financial education. 
                                                 
54 In addition to the studies cited here, there is at least one study of a well-known financial education program for 
high school students, the National Endowment for Financial Education’s High School Financial Planning Program 
(Danes and Haberman n.d.). This study relies on a survey of students administered by teachers who had 
implemented the curriculum. We do not discuss these results because the response rates were very low and because 
we believe these data are particularly vulnerable to social desirability bias and other types of bias.  
T
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Incentives 
What is the evidence for the hypothesis that financial incentives shape saving and investment 
action? This section summarizes evidence related to the effects of matching contributions 
(incentives) followed by evidence related to the potential disincentives created by means-tested 
income transfer programs. 
Effects of matching contributions. A large number of studies examine the effects of 
matching contributions, but the evidence is mixed. In perhaps the only randomized experiment 
designed to test match rates,55 Duflo et al. (2005) examine the effects of matching contributions 
on IRA participation and contributions. Over 14,000 H&R Block clients in St. Louis were 
randomly assigned to one of three groups and then invited to deposit portions of their tax refund 
into Express IRAs. One group was eligible for a 20 percent match (on contributions up to 
$1,000), one group was eligible for a 50 percent match, and the control group received no match. 
Take-up rates were 17 percent for the 50-percent match group, 10 percent for the 20-percent 
match group, and 3 percent for the control group. For those who contributed, average 
contribution levels (excluding the match) were $1,310, $1,280, and $860, respectively. Although 
there is an important competing hypothesis—because there is evidence that tax professionals had 
a large influence on whether individuals chose to contribute to the Express IRA—the authors 
conclude that match rates affected both IRA participation and contributions. 
Most of the other evidence on the effects of match rates comes from research on defined 
contribution pension plans and IDAs. Because those who are eligible for DC plans tend to have 
higher-than-average income, the evidence from IDAs may be more directly relevant to efforts to 
facilitate asset building in low-income households. Below, this report considers whether the 
match structure seems to affect (1) participation and contributions, and (2) net saving.  
Evidence suggests that the existence of a match increases participation and that higher 
match rates are associated with higher participation. For example, Nyce (2005) examines 
administrative data on 401(k) participation for over 300,000 employees in 48 firms. In 
descriptive analysis, he finds that participation rates are higher in firms that have a match than in 
firms that do not and that participation increases as the match rate increases. Multivariate 
analysis also suggests that participation rises with the match rate. This pattern is consistent with 
the idea that match rates are “eye-catching.” Survey data from several hundred participants in a 
matched savings program in England support this conclusion: Over 90 percent said that the 1:1 
match was the primary reason they opened accounts (Kempson, McKay, and Collard 2005). 
Finally, some in-depth interviewees in ADD volunteered that the availability of a match was the 
                                                 
55 ADD included a randomized experiment, but random assignment was to either a group that was eligible for IDAs 
or a group that was not. The match rate varied for treatment group members, but not randomly. Withdrawals for 
home purchase received a 2:1 match; other approved withdrawals received a 1:1 match. 
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primary reason they enrolled in the IDA program. When asked, some people said that the high 
level of the match rate was critical (Sherraden, McBride et al. 2005).  
Evidence on 401(k) participation strongly suggests that the existence of a match 
(regardless of the match rate) increases the amount of contributions (see discussion in Schreiner 
and Sherraden 2007). Evidence about the effect of match rate on contributions is mixed, 
however. Examining this relationship is complicated because programs that offer matches almost 
always have match caps, and programs that provide high match rates tend to have low match 
caps (Schreiner and Sherraden 2007).56 When match caps exist, data on contributions are 
“censored” at the match cap, because some people want to make contributions beyond the match 
cap, but are not allowed. According to Schreiner and Sherraden:  
Failure to adjust for censoring at the match cap biases estimates of 
match-rate effects downward. Most studies of match rates in 
401(k) plans do not adjust for censoring, and they often find 
(perhaps spuriously) that higher match rates are associated with 
lower levels of savings as a share of income (Munnell, Sundén, 
and Taylor 2002; VanDerhei and Copeland 2001; Clark et al. 
2000; Papke 1995; Andrews 1992). This result could reflect two-
way causation in which employers—correctly—expect their 
employees to have difficulty saving and thus try—but do not 
completely succeed—to compensate by setting a higher match rate 
(Even and Macpherson 2003). In contrast, specifications that do 
adjust for censoring (Engelhardt and Kumar 2003; Cunningham 
and Engelhardt 2002) find that higher match rates are associated 
with higher savings. 
Choi, Laibson, and Madrian (2004, 289) conclude that “the widely divergent empirical results in 
the literature on matching appear to result from empirical analysis that does not carefully account 
for the effect of both the match rate and the match threshold on employee contribution rates.” 
Using ADD data, Schreiner and Sherraden (2007) examine the effects of match rates on 
IDA contributions. Their two-step regression controls for a large number of individual 
characteristics that might be correlated with saving outcomes. It accounts for the match cap. It 
does not control for censoring, but the authors state that the results of a regression that does 
control for censoring are very similar. Schreiner and Sherraden find that IDA participants who 
are eligible for higher match rates are more likely to have net IDA contributions of $100 or more. 
For these “savers,” however, a match rate of 2:1 is associated with lower monthly net IDA 
                                                 
56 A firm can limit the amount of matching funds it provides by offering a low match rate, or by combining a 
generous match rate with a low match cap. (For example, a 401(k) plan with a 1:1 match rate may have a $4,000 
match cap. A 401(k) with a 3:1 match rate may have a $1,500 match cap.) Thus, to examine the effects of match 
rates on contributions to 401(k) plans., researchers should also take into account match caps.  
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contributions than a match rate of 1:1. Schreiner and Sherraden conclude: (1) that higher match 
rates “improved inclusion by making more participants ‘savers’,” and (2) that many ADD 
participants were saving for fixed goals (and so saved less when eligible for larger matches 
because they could reach their goals with lower levels of saving). The analysis also reveals that 
higher match rates increased asset accumulation per participant when both effects of match rates 
are considered (the positive effect of higher match rates on “inclusion” and the negative effect of 
higher match rates on net contributions for “savers”). 
As noted above, neoclassical economic theory does not posit that incentives (including 
matches) will necessarily increase net saving (across all saving vehicles). On the one hand, 
incentives may cause people to save more by increasing the reward for saving. On the other 
hand, people may save less because match money allows them to reach a fixed savings goal with 
less of their own saving. In addition, people may simply reshuffle assets, that is, move existing 
assets from another savings vehicle into the match-eligible product instead of saving more.  
Empirical evidence about the effect of incentives on saving among the non-poor is mixed 
(see reviews in Engen, Gale, and Scholz 1996; Hubbard and Skinner 1996; Poterba, Venti, and 
Wise 1996). There is limited empirical evidence on the effects of matches for low-income 
households. Low-income households are probably less likely than others to reshuffle because 
they are less likely to have assets to reshuffle. Empirical analysis simulating the effects of private 
pension plans suggests that pensions do not offset personal saving among less-educated (and 
presumably lower-income) workers (Bernheim and Scholz 1993). Using ADD data to examine 
the sources of IDA deposits, Schreiner et al. (2001) observe that many IDA participants had no 
or very low liquid assets at enrollment and that most had too few liquid assets to fund all of their 
IDA deposits. Based partly on these observations, Schreiner et al. conclude that IDAs come from 
some mix of new savings and shifted assets, but they emphasize that ADD data do not allow 
them to quantify or even rank these two sources. 
Findings from a cross-sectional survey of about 300 IDA participants (Moore et al. 2001) 
are consistent with the conclusion that IDA deposits are a mix of new savings and reshuffled 
assets. Evidence of new savings includes the following: 29 percent of respondents said that, 
because of IDAs, they worked longer hours; 41 percent said they were more likely to work more; 
and 59 percent said they were more likely to work or stay employed. In response to questions 
about how they financed IDA deposits, many respondents said that they reduced consumption. 
For example, 70 percent said they shopped more carefully for food; 68 percent said they ate out 
less; and 64 percent said they spent less on leisure. Evidence of asset shifts includes the fact that 
35 percent of respondents said that, because of IDAs, they were less likely to save in other forms. 
In addition, 16 percent said that they financed IDA deposits by postponing the payment of bills, 
7 percent said they borrowed from family and friends, and 3 percent said they borrowed from 
credit. These findings may underestimate the extent of reshuffling, if survey respondents 
attempted to “please” interviewers with their responses (Moore et al. 2001).  
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In sum, there is limited evidence that IDA deposits are a mix of new savings and 
reshuffled assets, but no study attempts to estimate the percent of saving that is “new.” Because 
matches seem to be one of the most salient characteristics of IDA programs for participants, this 
research may suggest that matches increase net saving somewhat for low-income households. 
IDA programs have other important characteristics, however—such as financial education and 
staff support—and these studies do not separate the effects of matches from the rest of the IDA 
“bundle.”  
Effects of disincentives in income transfer programs. Above, this report described 
how means-tested income transfer programs such as TANF, Food Stamps, and Supplemental 
Security Income (SSI) may reduce saving through the consumption-floor effect (i.e., they 
provide a certain level of income at the time of economic emergencies) and because of asset 
means tests. Empirical evidence related to the consumption-floor effect is discussed below.  
Using PSID data, Hubbard et al. (1995) compare actual lifetime wealth accumulation 
patterns by income with two simulated wealth accumulation patterns. The first simulated pattern 
assumes a general consumption floor from all available means-tested transfer programs of 
$7,000; the second assumes a general consumption floor of $1,000, much lower than the average 
welfare-receiving household actually receives.57 Both simulations assume that a household’s 
wealth accumulation at a certain age is determined by cash on hand, earnings, and medical 
expenses, in addition to the total amount of transfer income available from means-tested welfare 
programs. For low-income groups, Hubbard et al. find that actual lifetime wealth accumulation 
patterns are much more similar to simulated patterns that assume a $7,000 consumption floor 
than those that assume a $1,000 consumption floor. For middle- and upper-income groups, both 
simulated patterns are very similar to actual lifetime wealth accumulation. In addition, for middle 
and upper-income groups, the two simulated wealth accumulation patterns do not differ from 
each other. Thus, there is evidence that the presence of a consumption floor has a greater effect 
on asset accumulation in low-income households than in other households. 
Other scholars reach similar conclusions when examining the consumption-floor effects 
of individual income transfer programs, such as Unemployment Insurance, SSI, Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children (AFDC)/TANF, and Food Stamps. These studies use data from the 
SIPP (Bird and Hagstrom 1999; Engen and Gruber 2001; Gruber and Yelowitz 1999; Neumark 
and Powers 1998), the Consumer Expenditure Survey (Gruber and Yelowitz 1999), and the PSID 
(Ziliak 2003). They estimate the impacts of transfer programs, using either expected benefit 
levels calculated from individual household characteristics or state-level data on maximum 
benefit levels (see Appendix Exhibit 1 for more information on data and methods). These studies 
show that a high likelihood of receiving income-transfer benefits, a high level of expected 
                                                 
57 Using PSID data, the authors estimate that the average non-elderly welfare-receiving household received $6,937 
in transfer income. The comparable figure for the average elderly welfare-receiving household was $6,893. 
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benefits, or living in a state with generous benefits tends to decrease household financial assets 
(Bird and Hagstrom 1999; Engen and Gruber 2001; Gruber and Yelowitz 1999; Neumark and 
Powers 1998; Ziliak 2003). 
Next, empirical evidence related to the effects of asset tests is discussed. Asset tests 
require applicants and recipients to show that their financial assets are below a certain level. For 
example, the asset limit is $2,000 for an individual and $3,000 for a couple receiving SSI. SSI 
households are allowed one vehicle, if this vehicle is used for employment and medical care. For 
households receiving Food Stamps, the financial asset limit is $3,000, and the vehicle asset limit 
is $4,650.  
Asset limits for AFDC/TANF have undergone dramatic changes during welfare reform. 
The asset limit for AFDC was $1,000 in all states before the Family Support Act of 1988 allowed 
states to request a waiver from the federal government to raise asset limits (Corporation for 
Enterprise Development 2002). The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act of 1996 abolished the federal asset limits for TANF, allowing states to create 
their own thresholds. Responding to changes in federal policy, state governments raised asset 
limits for AFDC/TANF during the 1990s. For example, in 1993, Iowa increased its countable 
asset limits58 for AFDC to $2,000 for applicants and $5,000 for current recipients and its vehicle 
equity limits to $3,000. In addition, some state governments introduced a new asset policy. They 
created separate and higher asset limits for funds in special accounts that restrict withdrawals to 
certain types of activities (e.g., financing education or buying a house or vehicle).59 In addition, 
money in IDAs is not counted at all toward asset limits if the program is funded with the Asset 
for Independence Act grant or state TANF money (Corporation for Enterprise Development 
2002). As of 2000, 44 states had relaxed their rules on countable asset limits to some degree, 27 
states had allowed welfare recipients to open special restricted accounts with higher asset limits, 
and all states had raised vehicle asset limits in TANF (Nam 2008).  
Empirical research suggests that asset tests have a stronger effect on the asset 
accumulation of low-income households than does the consumption floor (Gruber and Yelowitz 
1999; Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes 1995; Powers 1998; Ziliak 2003). Most existing studies use 
variance in state asset limits and welfare benefit levels as instruments in estimating the impacts 
of asset means test on financial assets and net wealth among likely welfare recipients (Gruber 
and Yelowitz 1999; Powers 1998; Ziliak 2003). Using individual-level data from the PSID 
merged with state-level data on welfare policies and economic conditions, Ziliak (2003) finds 
that both income from transfer programs with asset tests and income from transfer programs 
without asset tests are negatively related to asset holding. The effect of income from transfer 
                                                 
58 Countable assets include cash on hand, money in saving and checking accounts, bonds, stocks, and vehicle values 
that exceed the vehicle asset limit. 
59 These state special account programs are similar to IDA programs, but they do not provide matching funds.  
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programs with asset tests is twice as strong. He concludes that asset tests impose an additional 
barrier to asset accumulation, independent of the consumption-floor effect. Using data from the 
SIPP and the Consumer Expenditure Survey, Gruber and Yelowitz (1999) find that a $1,000 
increase in estimated benefits from Medicaid reduces financial assets by 4.4 percent in the 
presence of an asset test but reduces financial assets by only 1.8 percent in the absence of an 
asset test. Using data from the SIPP, Neumark and Powers (1998) find that likely SSI 
participants aged 63 to 64 have much lower liquid assets than likely SSI participants aged 60 to 
62. They conclude that elderly low-income households dissave their liquid assets as they 
approach the eligible age for SSI in order to pass the asset test. Finally, using data from the 
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, Powers (1998) estimates that an increase of $1 in asset 
limits for AFDC families increases a female head’s savings by 25 cents.  
A few studies empirically test whether increased asset limits for AFDC/TANF during 
welfare reform have facilitated saving and asset accumulation among likely welfare participants 
(Hurst and Ziliak 2006; McKernan, Ratcliffe, and Nam 2007; Nam 2008; Sullivan 2006). Using 
the PSID, Hurst and Ziliak (2006) find that gaps in financial assets between likely welfare 
participants (female heads with children) and unlikely welfare participants (male heads and 
female heads without children) do not significantly differ between states with and without 
generous asset rules. The only exception is that higher countable asset limits are significantly and 
positively associated with vehicle ownership among likely welfare participants. Using data from 
the SIPP, Sullivan (2006) reports somewhat different results. Like Hurst and Ziliak, he concludes 
that relaxed asset tests have promoted vehicle ownership, but he finds that changes in vehicle 
asset limits, not countable asset limits, are associated with vehicle ownership. The elimination of 
vehicle asset limits increases vehicle ownership by 20 percent among single mothers without a 
high school degree in an analysis using single women without children as a comparison group. 
He also finds that increased countable asset limits are not significantly associated with vehicle 
ownership or liquid assets.  
Compared to these two studies, Nam (2008) finds stronger evidence of positive effects of 
relaxed asset tests on asset accumulation in low-income households. Because it may take time 
for a target population to learn about and adapt to policy changes and because states did not 
introduce new asset means tests simultaneously, Nam creates policy variables that measure the 
length of time since new asset limits were adopted. Like Hurst and Ziliak (2006) and Sullivan 
(2006), they consider countable asset limits on general accounts and vehicle asset limits. In 
addition, they include state policies on special accounts in their analyses. Using PSID data, Nam 
shows that different types of policy variables produce distinct results. When the independent 
variable is the actual dollar amount of asset limits, these researchers find (like Hurst and Ziliak) 
that relaxed asset tests are not associated with greater liquid asset accumulation among likely 
welfare recipients. Results differ, however, when the independent variable is the number of years 
since new policies were introduced: The earlier a state raised its countable asset limit on general 
accounts, the more likely are female-headed households with children to accumulate liquid 
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assets. Among those who saved, the amount of saving is significantly higher for those living in 
states that introduced special accounts early.  
McKernan, Ratcliffe, and Nam (2007) report mixed results of the effectiveness of policy 
changes on low-education single mothers and families, based in findings from the SIPP data. 
They show that generous unrestricted asset limits, as measured in dollar amount, are not 
associated with increased liquid asset holdings for either low-education single mothers or low-
education families, consistent with Hurst and Ziliak (2006), Sullivan (2006), and Nam (2008). 
They, however, show that generous restricted account asset limits increases liquid asset holdings 
for low-education single mothers and families. This variable, “restricted account asset limit,” is 
unique in McKernan, Ratcliffe, and Nam (2007) and is not included in other previous studies. 
Similar to Nam (2008), they find that the number of years since unrestricted asset limits became 
more generous (greater than $1000) is associated with increased liquid asset holdings for low-
education single mothers and families. The number of years since the adoption of a new 
restricted account limit is not significantly associated with increased liquid asset holdings for 
either low-education single mothers or families. 
In sum, with regard to saving incentives, there is some evidence that matches increase 
participation in saving programs, and even more evidence that matches increase contributions to 
these programs. Evidence is mixed regarding the effect of matches on net saving (across all 
saving vehicles); contributions to incentivized saving programs are probably a mix of new 
savings and shifted assets. With regard to disincentives, evidence suggests that income transfer 
programs reduce asset accumulation by low-income households due to the consumption-floor 
effect and due to their restrictive asset means tests. The effects of asset means tests seem to be 
stronger than consumption-floor effects. Recent studies examining increases in asset limits 
associated with welfare reform show some inconsistent results, so it is not yet clear whether 
loosening asset restrictions will increase saving by low-income households. 
Facilitation 
A small but growing body of empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that facilitation shapes 
saving action. This section discusses evidence related to the effects of precommitment 
constraints, automatic enrollment, and the federal income tax system. 
Effects of precommitment constraints. In in-depth interviews, IDA participants 
commonly stated that direct deposit helped them save (Sherraden, McBride et al. 2005). Much 
more rigorous evidence that precommitment constraints increase deposits comes from a test of 
the Save More Tomorrow plan (SMarT) (Thaler and Benartzi 2004). In this study, 286 workers 
in a mid-sized manufacturing firm (out of 315 eligible workers) agreed to meet with an 
investment consultant hired by the firm to discuss saving in the company pension plan. Of these, 
79 immediately agreed to increase their contributions to the pension plan. The remaining 207 
were invited to enroll in the SMarT plan, which allowed workers to precommit to automatically 
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save their 3 percent annual raises in the company pension plan. More than three-fourths—162 
employees—enrolled in the SMarT plan. After four annual pay raises, these employees had 
increased their average saving rates from 3.5 percent to 13.6 percent of income. Those who had 
immediately agreed to increase their contributions to the pension plan—but who did not arrange 
for automatic annual saving increases—had increased their saving rates only from 4.4 percent to 
8.8 percent. 
Effects of automatic enrollment. Another rigorous study provides evidence that 
automatic enrollment affects saving and investment action. Madrian and Shea (2000) examine 
401(k) participation and contribution rates in a company that began automatically enrolling 
employees in their 401(k) plan. Before the change, employees had to sign up to participate in the 
401(k) plan. After the change, employees had to actively opt out of the plan if they did not want 
to participate. Although none of the economic features of the plan changed, participation was 
significantly higher under automatic enrollment. Participants were also likely to stay with the 
default contribution rate and fund allocation. 
Effects of the federal income tax system. There is some evidence that the federal 
income tax system facilitates saving and asset purchases. Three studies provide quantitative but 
largely indirect evidence. Using multivariate analysis and a nationally representative sample of 
consumer units from the Consumer Expenditure Survey, Barrow and McGranahan (2000) find an 
increase in expenditures on durable goods among EITC recipients in February, the modal month 
of refund receipt. Similarly, data from ADD show that net IDA deposits increase substantially in 
tax season (Schreiner and Sherraden 2007). In a survey of 650 Chicago households expecting to 
receive a federal refund and EITC benefits, Smeeding, Phillips, and O’Connor (2000) find that 
50 percent of respondents plan to save at least a portion of the tax refunds. Actual behavior may 
differ from planned behavior, of course, so quantitative data on actual refund use would be more 
informative. 
At least three qualitative studies provide additional evidence that federal refunds are used 
to purchase and maintain assets (in addition to purchasing goods and services for immediate 
consumption, paying bills, and paying down debt). In in-depth interviews with almost 200 low-
income single mothers in Chicago and Charleston, South Carolina, Edin (2001) finds that some 
mothers use refunds to make property tax and insurance payments; to finance car expenses; and 
even to make down payments on homes. In in-depth interviews with a random sample of 42 New 
Hope participants,60 Romich and Weisner (2000) find that some of their respondents use refunds 
to buy appliances and furniture, repair cars, or make down payments on cars and homes.  
                                                 
60 The New Hope demonstration program provided a variety of services to low-income working adults in 
Milwaukee. To create the group of New Hope participants, researchers randomly assigned eligible applicants to the 
New Hope program or to a control group. 
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Finally, some scholars have argued that people deliberately use the income tax system as 
a kind of saving plan. Millions of households withhold more than the taxes they owe. More 
evidence is needed to determine whether this is because they want a lump-sum refund and are 
willing to forego earnings on the money to receive one (Neumark 1995), whether they over-
withhold to avoid the penalties of under-withholding (Highfill, Thorson, and Weber 1998), or 
whether they over-withhold inadvertently. The only empirical evidence on this question known 
to the authors comes from three small qualitative studies (Edin 2001; Olson and Davis 1994; 
Romich and Weisner 2000), showing that some low-income households choose not to receive the 
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) in advance so that they can accumulate a lump sum for special 
purposes. 
Expectations 
A small but growing body of research supports the hypothesis that expectations shape saving 
action. Milligan (2003) finds that a $1 increase in the match cap in the Canadian Registered 
Retirement Savings Plan is associated with a 50-cent increase in saving. In ADD research, 
Schreiner and Sherraden (2007) find that a $1 increase in the IDA match cap is associated with a 
57-cent increase in net IDA savings. Both of these studies control for censoring at the match cap. 
Also in ADD, a number of in-depth interviewees said that they saved more or saved more 
regularly because they were expected to deposit a specific amount each month. There is also 
evidence that IDA participants viewed the match cap as a savings goal (Sherraden, McBride et 
al. 2005). On the other hand, very few eligible individuals maximize an IRA deduction or a 
401(k) match, and this suggests that many people do not view caps as expectations—or are 
unable or unwilling to conform to these expectations. 
Restrictions 
What is the evidence for the hypothesis that restrictions affect saving and investment action? 
Again, the very existence of simple restricted accounts that do not provide higher interest rates 
than basic savings accounts (e.g., Christmas club accounts) suggests that some people desire 
restrictions. In fact, people of all income levels talk about the benefits of restricted access.61 IDA 
participants have said that they like the restrictions on IDA withdrawals (Moore et al. 2001; 
Sherraden, McBride et al. 2005).62 In in-depth interviews with about 30 participants in a matched 
saving program for low-income individuals in England, Kempson et al. (2005) find that a 
                                                 
61 For example, in a focus group conducted as part of the pretest of the 1995 Survey of Consumer Finances, several 
high-income individuals mentioned the need to put money “out of reach” to avoid spending it (Kennickell, Starr-
McCluer, and Sunden 1997, p. 4). 
62 In ADD in-depth interviews, some said that, without restrictions, their IDA savings would have been drawn upon 
by family and friends. This finding is consistent with evidence from Chiteji and Hamilton (2005) and Stack (1974) 
that poor people and people of color may have difficulty accumulating assets due to social network demands. Thus 
restrictions on savings may have negative social consequences. We cannot evaluate this, except to report that some 
IDA participants express appreciation for the restrictions. 
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majority liked the fact that they could not access their savings immediately.63 Most of these 
individuals said, however, that they would not favor restrictions on the use of their money. Low 
participation rates in IRAs, 401(k)s, 529 plans, and other restricted saving vehicles probably 
indicate that a substantial proportion of American households are not comfortable with 
restrictions, at least as currently structured and as currently bundled with other institutional 
characteristics. More research is needed to determine what types of restrictions people are 
willing to accept.  
In one of the few rigorous studies of the effects of restrictions, Ashraf, Karlan, and Yin 
(2006) randomly assigned existing clients at a small rural bank in the Philippines to one of three 
groups. One group was invited to open an account with strong withdrawal restrictions.64 One 
group was encouraged to save using existing bank products but was not offered the new product. 
The control group received no further contact. The fact that 28 percent (about 200) of those who 
were eligible chose to open the restricted account, even though they were not compensated with 
higher interest rates, provides evidence that some people believe restrictions help them save. 
Additional evidence suggests that the restricted account increased savings. Over time, those who 
were eligible for the account increased their bank account balances more than those in the other 
groups, and this savings did not appear to have been moved from other accounts in the same 
bank. The increased savings is small in nominal terms, but substantial as a percentage of prior 
formal savings. 
Security 
At this point, the body of evidence related to the hypothesis that security affects saving and 
investment action is small and indirect.65 African Americans have much lower net worth than 
whites and hold smaller portions of their investments in financial securities and larger portions in 
real estate. As scholars ranging from W.E.B. Dubois (1935) to Melvin Oliver and Thomas 
Shapiro (1995) have noted, blacks historically have had reason not to trust financial institutions 
and security investments, preferring literally to keep their money closer to home.  
Rutherford (2000) gives examples of savers in developing countries who are willing to 
accept sharply negative rates of interest in exchange for the security of their savings. He 
describes, for example, a poor woman in India who saves informally through a deposit collector 
that comes daily to the client’s house to collect five rupees after earning the trust of clients over a 
period of years. After the client has made 220 deposits, the collector gives the accumulated 
                                                 
63 Participants could withdraw their money at any point, but this resulted in the loss of match money.  
64 Account-openers had to choose either a goal restriction or a date restriction. If they chose a goal restriction, they 
could not withdraw funds until they had accumulated the desired savings amount. If they chose the date restriction, 
they could not withdraw funds until the chosen date, but they were not required to deposit additional funds after 
opening the account. Deposits earned the same interest as regular savings accounts. 
65As noted above, however, there is much evidence that security affects asset accumulation, that is, that risk affects 
rate of return. 
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money back to the client, minus a 30 percent fee for her services. According to Rutherford, the 
client finds this fee reasonable because without the collector, she could not save enough to pay 
for clothing and school fees for her children. This willingness to pay for security may not be 
limited to developing countries, but the authors are not aware of empirical research on this topic. 
Effects of Intergenerational and Interhousehold Transfers on Investment Action and Asset 
Accumulation 
Existing evidence strongly suggests that inter vivos transfers and bequests, in the aggregate, are 
substantial. For example, using SCF data, Gale and Scholz (1994) estimate that the annual flow 
of intended intergenerational transfers (including inter vivos transfers, trust accumulations, and 
life insurance payments to children) equaled about $63 billion in 1986 (in 1986 dollars) and that 
the annual flow of bequests equaled an additional $105 billion. Using PSID data from the mid- to 
late-1980s, Wilhelm (2001) estimates that 22 percent of the U.S. population has ever received a 
bequest, with an average inheritance amount of over $140,000. Schoeni and Ross (2005) use 
1988 PSID data to look at transfers to young adults and consider the benefits of shared housing 
and help with college tuition and other educational expenses, as well as cash gifts. They find that 
young adults received substantial amounts of material support, perhaps as much as $38,000 (in 
2001 dollars) between the ages of 18 to 34. One important weakness of the latter two studies is 
that the authors report averages, not medians. Transfer amounts probably have a large positive 
skew, so information on medians would be useful. 
Although it seems plausible that these transfers affect saving action and asset 
accumulation (for the reasons cited in the discussion of the conceptual framework), researchers 
have rarely examined how transfers are used by recipient families, that is, whether transfers are 
saved and/or used in ways that free up other money for saving. There is some indirect evidence 
that interhousehold transfers make home purchase possible for some families: Data from the 
1986 SCF indicate that those who received an intergenerational transfer of $3,000 or more 
during a three-year period were more likely to have purchased their first home during this period 
than those who had neither received nor given a transfer (16 percent vs. 6 percent) (Gale and 
Scholz 1994). And data from the 1988 PSID show that receipt of money assistance is positively 
correlated with home purchase (Schoeni 1997). Some qualitative evidence also suggests that 
down-payment assistance sometimes makes the difference between becoming a homeowner or 
remaining a renter (Shapiro 2004). If home purchase in turn increases wealth for these families, 
then transfers have indirectly increased asset accumulation. More research on this topic is 
needed. 
Studies on interhousehold transfers also show that higher-income households and whites 
are much more likely than others to receive sizeable transfers of money and material assistance. 
For example, Gale and Scholz (1994) find that recipients of transfers of at least $3,000 had 
higher average income (and higher net worth), and were more likely to be white, than those who 
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neither gave nor received a transfer. Wilhelm (2001) also finds that 28 percent of those in the 
highest permanent income quintile had ever received a bequest, compared to 13 percent in the 
lowest quintile. Higher-income families also tended to receive much larger amounts. For inter 
vivos gifts, the likelihood of receiving a transfer did not vary much by income, but higher-
income recipients tended to receive larger gifts. In research on transfers to young adults, Schoeni 
and Ross (2005) find that youth in the top quartile of family income received almost three times 
as much assistance as youth in the bottom two quartiles. 
Other studies confirm that whites are more likely than blacks and Hispanics to expect and 
to receive inheritances (Gittleman and Wolff 2004; Menchik and Jianakoplos 1997; Wolff 2002). 
One study estimates that, for the period between 1984 and 1994, differences in the likelihood of 
receiving an inheritance raised the rate of wealth accumulation of whites relative to blacks more 
than differences in the rate of return to capital and more than differences in saving rates 
(Gittleman and Wolff 2004). Although some studies find that race differences in the likelihood 
of giving or receiving a transfer disappear once variables like income, wealth, and education are 
controlled (Jayakody 1998; Sarkisian and Gerstel 2004), as long as blacks and Hispanics tend to 
have lower income, wealth, and/or education, minorities will likely be at a disadvantage in 
wealth accumulation.  
Fewer studies have examined the likelihood of single mothers to receive interhousehold 
transfers. If unmarried mothers do not have partners, their extended families are likely to be 
smaller than those of married couples, so the probability of receiving interhousehold transfers is 
probably lower. And Hao (1996) suggests that never-married single mothers are unlikely to 
receive financial support from their parents for two reasons. First, if parents do not approve of 
out-of-wedlock births they may withdraw financial support. Second, many never-married 
mothers come from poor families who are unable to provide financial support. Using data from 
the National Survey of Families and Households, Hao (1996) finds that married families with 
children receive the most private transfers (including all loans and gifts from kin and non-kin), 
while never-married single mothers receive the least. Hao also finds that the positive association 
between private financial transfers and family wealth is stronger among married-couple families. 
On the other hand, Schmidt and Sevak (2004) find that inheritance does not explain the 
difference in net worth between single-mother households and married households. 
D. Suggestions for Future Research 
This summary of empirical evidence reveals a number of gaps in knowledge. Of special interest 
are gaps that limit ability to design programs and policies that facilitate saving and asset building 
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in low-income households. Some research questions that may provide additional policy-relevant 
knowledge include the following:66  
• Under what conditions is homeownership a good asset-building strategy for low-income 
households? What are effective strategies for helping potential homeowners make wise 
choices about ownership?  
• Does health insurance coverage facilitate saving and asset building for low-income 
households? 
• Does financial education change financial knowledge, attitudes, and behaviors in ways 
that lead to increased saving and asset accumulation in low-income households? Does 
well-targeted financial information that is delivered automatically to individuals (e.g., is 
not available just to those who choose to attend a financial seminar) produce these 
outcomes? 
• What match structure (i.e., match rate and match cap) maximizes participation in 
incentivized saving programs? What match structure maximizes contributions? What 
match structure maximizes net saving (across all saving vehicles)? Do these findings vary 
by income or education level?  
• Does loosening the asset tests in income transfer programs lead to increased saving and 
asset holding? 
• Under what circumstances do people want restrictions? Under what circumstances do 
they want liquidity? Do these patterns vary by income or education level? 
New or improved data sources may not be sufficient to answer all of these important 
research questions. Answering these research questions may require the development and 
implementation of new strategies. For example, there are two scenarios where new interventions 
may be indicated. First, if policymakers would like research that examines an institutional 
characteristic or bundle of characteristics that is not currently offered, such as a savings account 
for education, provided automatically to all children at birth, and with match money for low-
income households, then a new intervention would be needed. Second, if policymakers want 
rigorous research to examine, using random assignment or other experimental evaluation 
designs, how actual behavior responds to varying institutional characteristics, programs would 
have to be developed that have such systematically varying institutional characteristics. 
                                                 
66 While this report has focused on asset building, it might also be useful for scholars and policy-makers to focus 
more broadly on the economic decisions of low-income households. From this perspective, broad policy-oriented 
research questions might include: Where on the income/resource distribution can households save without giving up 
goods and services that most Americans view as necessities? How do families make inter-related decisions about 
consumption, savings, and debt? Are there differences by race or ethnicity? What are optimal decisions for 
particular economic and family circumstances? What are effective strategies for helping households make wise 
decisions? What policy changes (e.g., curtailing predatory lending) help families make wise decisions? 
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An important line of experimental or quasi-experimental research, for example, would 
involve match structure. This research focus is promising because existing studies suggest that 
people (across the income spectrum) respond to financial incentives, but these studies do not 
identify “optimal” match structures. Like questions about match structure, questions about the 
demand for restrictions and liquidity would be best answered with an intervention that included 
an experimental or quasi-experimental designed evaluation component. Questions about 
financial education and financial information could be answered with new interventions, or 
research plans might be carefully designed around existing interventions. In lieu of interventions 
with impact assessments, some insights could be gained from carefully constructed survey 
questions that ask individuals how they feel about, and whether they would save, in saving 
products with different restrictions.  
Other avenues for future research might require new data. For example, to identify 
conditions under which homeownership is a good asset-building strategy, researchers would 
probably require a new data set that combines: (1) information on neighborhood characteristics 
from existing Census data; (2) information about individual and household characteristics 
(including net worth) from survey data; and (3) information on real estate transactions from 
survey data or, preferably, from administrative records. Questions about effects of health 
insurance could probably be answered with existing data sets. 
In short, data requirements to answer research questions identified here vary substantially. 
For the purpose of designing programs and policies that facilitate asset building in low-income 
households, there is a particular imperative for research using low-income samples.  
V. CONCLUSIONS 
Policy and programs for asset accumulation cannot be effectively designed unless there is a 
policy-relevant theory, or at least a set of propositions, along with empirical evidence, on how 
saving and asset accumulation occur (Sherraden, Scanlon et al. 2005). The point about policy 
relevance is central. It is possible to develop a wide range of theory on any human activity, 
including saving and asset accumulation. But if the purpose is to inform policy, then theory must 
be more or less at the “middle range” (Merton 1957). Middle-range theory is not at the individual 
level (e.g., it is not about motivation), and it is not at a social structural level (e.g., it is not about 
class structure). Instead, it is at the level of individuals interacting with conditions and 
circumstances around them. The very essence of effective social policy research is to address 
this nexus of how individuals live and act in their surroundings.  
This report provides a framework of a middle-range theory, emphasizing individual 
interactions with institutions in the saving process. The conceptual framework includes 
individual constructs (economic resources and needs, informal support for saving, financial 
knowledge, and psychological variables, such as future orientation and saving-related attitudes). 
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These individual constructs (and probably others) are relevant because individual choices can 
affect asset accumulation, and because knowledge of individuals can lead to the design of 
institutions that more effectively encourage saving and asset accumulation. However, the 
framework places less emphasis on individuals than do the major economic, psychological, and 
behavioral perspectives on saving. 
The framework emphasizes institutional constructs that shape saving behavior and 
outcomes. These factors are external to the individual but present in daily life. An example of a 
highly institutionalized saving structure is a 401(k) retirement plan, wherein institutional features 
do most of the “acting” and the individual is largely passive. These institutional constructs—
which may be thought of as building blocks of an institutional theory—are access, information, 
incentives, facilitation, expectations, restrictions, and security. Access refers to eligibility and 
practicality. Information includes both general financial information and information that is 
specific to a particular financial product or program. Incentives include subsidies and rates of 
return. Facilitation refers to any form of assistance in saving, especially making saving 
“automatic.” Expectations are implicit or explicit suggestions about desirable saving, investment, 
or asset accumulation. Restrictions are rules that restrict access to or use of assets. And security 
is freedom from unreasonable risk in saving and asset holding. In the framework presented here, 
each of these constructs is expected to shape saving and investment action and, as a result, to 
affect asset accumulation. 
In the “real world,” these institutional constructs tend to exist in bundles rather than in 
isolation. These bundles, supported through public policy, tend to be delivered through 
employment settings and through the tax system. A 401(k) plan with an employer match, for 
example, provides several institutional supports for saving, especially incentives, facilitation, 
restrictions, and information. For the most part, those who have jobs with benefits, those who are 
homeowners, and those who are “investors” have access to these bundles of institutional 
supports. Low-income households benefit much less from these bundles than others. There are 
some asset-building policies and programs targeted specifically to low-income households, but 
these initiatives are small and, overall, provide much less support for saving and asset 
accumulation than the programs that largely benefit middle- and upper-income households. 
The assumption of this work is that better theory can build knowledge that will inform 
and improve policy. From this perspective, institutional features can be purposefully created and 
put in place by public policy. This is not a social scientific perspective that seeks only to 
understand social forces and behaviors, but rather it is an applied agenda that seeks to inform 
policy design and implementation. While a fully developed and integrated institutional theory of 
saving and assets does not yet exist, the identification of institutional constructs and related 
empirical evidence informs policy development and also lays the groundwork for future 
research.  
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Empirical support for the propositions offered here is mixed. There is fairly strong 
evidence that precommitment constraints, automatic enrollment, restrictions, and the existence of 
a match increase saving (in the designated savings vehicle), but most constructs remain 
understudied. Future research that examines the effects of a variety of match structures, the 
effects of financial education, the effects of health insurance, and the effects of loosening asset 
tests on saving and asset accumulation could be helpful for policymaking. Research on the 
demand for restricted accounts and the returns to homeownership could also be beneficial. There 
is a particular need for research using low-income samples.  
It may well be that the institutional constructs identified here are not the only relevant 
building blocks for an institutional theory on saving. Some of these may be precursors to others, 
or some other mediating variables may help determine effects on saving. Some of these 
constructs may be far more important than others (from a policy standpoint, this in particular 
would be essential to know). Particular combinations of these building blocks may create 
interactions that are synergistic. At this point, little is known about these issues and therefore 
more theoretical development and empirical testing lie ahead. 
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Aizcorbe, Kennickell, 
& Moore (2003)
1998, 2001 SCF. Full sample (About 4,000 
households in each year).
Descriptive. Motives for saving, 
ownership, value of various 
assets.
Income, education, race. (1) Most common saving motives are retirement, "liquidity" (i.e., 
precautionary), education, and purchases.  (2) Ownership  and 
value of assets increase with income.  (3) Most common reasons 
for not having a checking account were: "Don't write enough 
checks to make it worthwhile", "Don't like dealing with banks", and 
"Don't have enough money."
NA. 
Ameriks et al. (2004) 2003 Data from new 
survey, combined with data 
from 2000 Survey
of Participant Finances, 
2001 Survey of Financial 
Attitudes and Behaviors.
1,444 TIAA-CREF 
participants (Sample very 
highly educated).
Multivariate. Net worth, liquid assets, 
non-liquid assets.
Self-control (Survey had 
hypothetical questions 
about ideal and expected 
actual use of free "dream 
dinners" over two years;  
Overconsumption = using 
too many in year 1;  
Underconsumption = using 
too few in year 1).
Many had problem of under-consumption, not over-consumption.  
Over-consumption is associated with lower net worth, under-
consumption with higher net worth.  Effect of self-control is 
greater for liquid assets than for non-liquid.  "Conscientious" 
people have smaller self-control problems in either direction.
At least one broad personality 
characteristic, 
"conscientiousness" seems to 
affect asset accumulation.
Anderson, Zhan, & 
Scott (2004)
FLLIP in Illinois. Low-income people. Descriptive. Financial knowledge of
low-income individuals.
NA. (1) Financial knowledge levels of low-income people are low, 
especially on savings & investments, and public and work related 
benefits.  (2) Choices of financial training models can impact 
characteristics of participants. 
NA. 
Ashraf, Karlan, & Yin 
(2006)
Survey, administrative 
data, including account 
data.
About 900 existing 
customers of bank in 
Philippines. 
Descriptive. Take-up of restricted 
savings account, saving. 
NA. 28% of eligible opened a restricted account, even without a 
financial incentive.  Those who were eligible increased savings 
more than those who were not.
NA. 
Banov (2005) ADD. 1855 ADD participants with 
data on health insurance.
Multivariate. Six indicators of IDA 
"success".
Health insurance; medical 
debt.
Health insurance is significantly and positively related to average 
monthly net deposits and to cumulative gross deposits; Medical 
debt is significant related to all outcomes.
Health insurance facilitates 
saving.  Medical debt is a barrier 
to saving.
Barrow & 
McGranahan (2000)
1982-1996 CES. Nationally representative 
consumer units.
Multivariate. Expenditures on durable 
goods (Household 
furnishings and equipment, 
electronics, vehicles)
Calendar month. Among EITC recipients, there was an increase in expenditures on 
durable goods in February, the modal month of refund receipt.
EITC is often used to purchase 
durable goods.
Bayer, Berheim, & 
Scholz (1996) 
1993, 1994 KPMG Peat 
Marwick Retirement 
Benefits Survey.
Private and public 
employers with at least 200 
employees.
OLS. Participant rates and 
contribution rates of 
retirement savings.
Retirement seminars by 
employers.
(1) Both participation in and contributions to voluntary savings 
plans are significantly higher when employers offer retirement 
seminars.  (2) Effect is typically much stronger for non-highly 
compensated employees.  (3) Frequency of seminars is 
important.
NA. 
Belsky & Duda 
(2002)
Case-Schiller weighted 
repeat sales indexes 
(Information on purchase 
and sale of matchedpairs 
of single-family homes).
Matched pairs of housing 
transactions in Boston, 
Chicago, Denver, & 
Philadelphia (Homes both 
purchased and re-sold 
between 1982 -1999).
Descriptive. Gain/loss on resale of 
home.
Purchase price of home 
and years held.
Owners of low-cost homes more likely than owners of mid-cost 
and high-cost homes to sell at profit during market upswings and 
less likely to suffer losses when selling during market downturns.
Homeownership is risky, but it is 
less risky for low-income 
homebuyers.  Market conditions 
have a large impact on rate of 
return.
Bernheim (1998) 1993, 1994 Household 
surveys by Merrill Lynch, 
Inc. 
Individuals between the 
age of 29-47 (The "baby 
boom" cohort).
(1) Probit. 
(2) OLS. 
Economic knowledge, 
financial knowledge,  
retirement savings.
(1) For knowledge: 
demographic factors.  
(2) For retirement savings: 
financial knowledge and 
employer-based financial 
education.
(1) Higher earnings and education are positively related to 
economic and financial knowledge.  (2) Financial knowledge and 
financial education by employers are positively related to 
retirement savings.
NA. 
Bernheim & Garrett 
(2003)
1993, 1994 Household 
surveys by Merrill Lynch, 
Inc. 
Individuals between the 
age of 29-47 (The "baby 
boom" cohort).
(1) Probit.  
(2) Median regression 
analyses.
Household and retirement 
savings.
Employer-based retirement 
education.
Employer-based retirement education positively influences 
household financial behavior.  Effects are particularly pronounced 
among those least inclined to save.  
NA. 
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Bernheim & Scholz 
(1993)
SCF. 1300 married couples with 
working-aged and 
employed husband.
Multivariate. Wealth-to-wage ratio. Education (proxy for 
permanent income) and 
pension coverage.
Pension eligibility does not affect asset trajectories for households 
without a college education.
"Private pensions displace 
personal wealth accumulation 
only when the head of the 
household is college educated".
Bernheim, Garrett, & 
Maki (2001)
1995 Household surveys 
by Merrill Lynch, Inc. 
National representative 
sample of respondents 
between the ages of 30-49.
OLS. Rates of savings, net 
worth.
Whether exposed to high 
school financial curriculum 
mandates and years since 
mandates.
Mandates have raised subsequent asset accumulation when 
students reached adulthood these effects appear to be gradual 
rather than immediate.
NA. 
Bird & Hagstrom 
(1999)
1984-1986 SIPP. (1) Working-age (18-60) 
couples who were 
continuously married 
during the entire 24 month 
panel period and who had 
no imputed asset data.  
(2) Households with self-
employment income 
excluded.
OLS. Ln (total net worth), Ln 
(non-housing net worth), 
Ln (liquid wealth).
Expected transfer income 
[probability of becoming 
poor multiplied with the 
maximum possible welfare 
benefits (FS & AFDC) in 
the state of residence] , 
expected unemployment 
insurance benefit 
[probability of becoming 
unemployed multiplied with 
the maximum weekly state 
UI  benefit].
Expected transfer income has significantly negative coefficients 
on log non-housing wealth and log liquid wealth but not on log net 
wealth.  Expected UI benefit has significantly negative coefficients 
on all three types of wealth measures.
NA. 
Burman el al. (2004) 1999 tax returns and 
supplementary records
About 130,000 tax returns. (1) Microsimulation. 
(2) Descriptive.
Distribution of tax benefits 
for retirement savings.
Income. In 2004, the top 20% of tax filing units received 70% of the tax 
benefits for DC plans and 60% of benefits for IRAs. 
Tax benefits for retirement 
savings disproportionately benefit 
higher-income groups.
Carroll & Samwick 
(1997)
1981-1987 PSID. Full sample. (1) Cross-tabs between 
forms of wealth and 
estimates of income 
uncertainty.  
(2) Comparison of 
simulation results with 
cross-tabs.
Simulated distributions of 
age-wealth profiles.
Occupation, education, 
industry, & age.
Consumers who face greater income uncertainty hold greater 
wealth.  Both transitory and permanent shocks predict levels of 
household wealth.  The degree of precautionary savings depends 
on the assumed rate of time preference.
Until about age 50, households 
mostly do precautionary saving.  
After age 50, they mostly save for 
retirement.
Case & 
Maryanchenko 
(2002)
Case-Schiller weighted 
repeat sales indexes, 
American Housing Survey.
Matched pairs of single-
family homes in Boston, 
Chicago, L.A. (time period 
varies by MSA).
Descriptive. Change in home value 
over time, home equity 
accumulation.
Income. Change in equity varied substantially depending on location and  
time period examined.
Homeownership can be a good or 
bad investment depending on 
timing of purchase, local housing 
market, and conditions in the 
regional economy.  Cannot make 
blanket statement that 
homeownership is a good or bad 
strategy for helping low-income 
households accumulate wealth.
Caskey (1997) In-depth interviews. 30 low- to moderate-
income Black and Hispanic 
households in Mississippi 
and San Jose, CA
Inductive. Financial attitudes and 
behaviors.
NA. Some did not save because social network members would insist 
they share their savings.
NA.
Caskey (2001) SCF, survey conducted by 
author.
Unbanked Individuals. Descriptive. Characteristics of the 
unbanked, reasons for 
unbanking, an outreach 
strategy to bring the 
unbanked to the banking 
system.
NA. Special branch office, or "outlets" can help bring the unbanked to 
the banking system.
NA. 
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Charles & Hurst 
(2002)
1991-1996 PSID. Households between the 
ages of 20-60 who were 
renters in 1991 and 
present every year 
between 1991-1996.
(1) Descriptive.  
(2) Multivariate.
Differences in the likelihood 
that black and white 
families become 
homeowners.
Race, income, marginal tax 
rate, neighborhood 
location, parental 
assistance, & parental 
wealth.
Beginning with a sample of 1991 renters, whites were much more 
likely than blacks to become homeowners by 1996 (32% vs. 
13%).  Two reasons are; 1) black mortgage applications were 
more than 73% more likely to be rejected than whites, 2) blacks 
were also less likely to apply for mortgages in the first place.
Two possible sources of 
discouragement for black renters 
in the mortgage application 
process:  1) anticipated 
differential treatment, 2) less 
assistance from parents and 
family members.
Chiteji & Hamilton 
(2005)
1994 PSID. 1,700 to 3,000 middle-
class families.
(1) Descriptive.  
(2) Multivariate.
Bank account ownership, 
stock ownership, net worth.
Parental poverty, sibling 
poverty.
(1) Parental poverty reduces the probability of account and stock 
ownership.  (2) Sibling poverty reduces wealth and the probability 
of account ownership.  (3) Controlling for family poverty 
consistently reduces the effect of race on outcomes.
Poverty in the extended family 
may be a constraint on asset 
accumulation, and this may partly 
explain why blacks tend to have 
less wealth than whites.
Choi et al. (2002) Survey, administrative data 
on 401(k) participation.
Unspecified number of 
employees at one U.S. firm 
who attended a one-hour 
financial education 
seminar.
Descriptive. Planned and actual 
financial behavior.
NA. 14% of those who said they planned to enroll in the 401(k) plan 
actually did so.  30% of those who said they planned to increase 
their contribution rates actually did so.
Financial education does not 
substantially increase 401(k) 
savings.
Clancy, Grinstein-
Weiss, & Schreiner 
(2001)
Data from American Dream 
Demonstration.
Low-income people. Heckman two-step 
regression.
Frequency and average 
amount of deposits into 
IDAs.
Financial education, other 
program factors, participant 
characteristics.
Financial education was positively related to savings outcomes up 
to 12 hours.
NA. 
Consumer 
Federation of 
America (1990)
Survey. 1,139 from general U.S. 
population.
(1) Descriptive.  
(2) Bivariate.
Financial knowledge. Gender, age, ethnicity, 
education, & income. 
The average participant answered only 54% of the items 
correctly.  The average score for  participants with income under 
$15,000 was 45%.  The average score for those with income 
between $15,000 to 24,999 was 52%.
NA. 
Danes & Haberman 
(n.d.)
Survey. About 5,300 students who 
participated in NEFE High 
School Financial Planning 
Program.   Sample for 3-
month follow-up included 
324 students.
Retrospective pretest. Knowledge, behavior,  self-
efficacy.
NA. Students reported significant increases in financial knowledge, 
behavior, and confidence.  Almost all improvements were 
maintained at the 3-month follow-up.
NA. 
Duflo et al. (2005) Tax returns and other 
administrative records from 
H&R Block.
Over 14,000 tax prep 
clients in St. Louis.
(1) Experimental design.  
(2) Descriptive.   
(3) Multivariate. 
IRA take-up rates, 
contributions.
Match rate, tax preparer. Take-up rates and contributions varied by match rate.  Take-up 
rates varied by tax preparer.
Match rates can have large 
effects on IRA take-up rates and 
contributions.
Edin (2001) Qualitative data collected 
by the author. 
Low-income single mothers 
in Chicago and Charleston, 
South Carolina (N=198), 
non-custodial low-income 
fathers in Philadelphia 
(N=180). 
(1) Qualitative.  
(2) In-depth interview.
Types of assets held by 
single parents and the 
effects of these assets.
NA. (1) The accumulation of assets over the life course is largely 
dependent upon having an income surplus, along with the belief 
and faith that one's income will remain relatively stable from one 
month to next.  (2) Some low-income parents view refunds 
differently than wage income.  Some choose not to receive the 
EITC in advance in order to accumulate a lump sum.
NA. 
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Engen & Gruber 
(2001)
1984-1986, 1987, 1989 
SIPP.
Households whose heads 
were aged between 25-64 
with non-self-employment 
earnings in the wave prior 
to the wealth survey,  
whose heads' marital 
statuses did not change, 
and which had non-missing 
(non-imputed) values for 
wealth data (N=24,904).
Robust regression. Gross financial assets. Expected Unemployment 
Insurance (UI) benefit 
replacement rate (based 
on state-year variation in UI 
benefits).
Unemployment Insurance (UI) benefit replacement rate has a 
significantly negative association with gross financial assets.  
Reducing the UI benefit replacement rate by 50% is estimated to 
increase the average households' financial asset-to-income ratio 
by 14%. 
The precautionary motive is an 
important determinant of 
individual savings behavior.
Finn, Zorita, & 
Colton (1994)
In-depth interviews. 20 women living in extreme-
poverty neighborhoods.
Inductive. Perceptions of assets. NA. Cars were perceived as assets but also drained resources. NA. 
Gale & Scholz 
(1994)
1983, 1986 SCF. Full sample (2,822 
households including 359 
in the high-income 
sample).
Descriptive. Net worth. Inter vivos , inheritances. Intended family transfers and bequests are estimated to account 
for 51% of current U.S. wealth. Of that 51%, intended family 
transfers account for 20% and bequests account for 31%.  
Additional 12% was acquired through the payment of college 
expenses by parents. Consequently, approximately two-thirds of 
the net worth that individuals acquire comes through family 
transfers.
Intended transfers are an 
important source of wealth. 
Gittleman & Wolff 
(2004)
1984, 1989, 1994 PSID. Households where head 
stays the same, trimming 
the top and bottom 1% of 
wealth appreciation 
distribution.
(1) Descriptive.  
(2) Multivariate.  
(3) Simulation.
Inheritances, saving rates, 
rates of return (for blacks 
and whites).
Race. Savings and inheritances tend to raise the rate of wealth 
accumulation for Whites relative to Blacks.  For this period, rate of 
return to capital higher for Blacks.
Blacks would have gained more 
ground relative to Whites if they 
inherited similar amounts, had 
comparable income, and similar 
portfolio composition.  Controlling 
for income, no racial differences 
in savings behavior.  However, 
even with extreme changes to 
achieve parity with Whites in 
terms of rates of wealth 
accumulation, racial gaps in 
wealth would remain for long 
periods. 
Glaeser & Shapiro 
(2002) 
1998 SCF. Not described. Descriptive. Share of  itemizers by 
income, share of itemized 
income by income.
Income group. Low-income Americans rarely itemize.  Only 13% of homeowners 
in the bottom forty percent of the income distribution itemize.  
Almost 50% of people in the top decile itemize, whether they are 
home owners or not.
Home mortgage interest 
deduction is a poor instrument for 
encouraging homeownership 
because it benefits the wealthy, 
who are almost always 
homeowners.
Gruber & Yelowitz 
(1999)
1984-1993 SIPP, 1984-
1993 CES.
Households headed by 
those between ages of 18-
64 and without members 
over age 65.
Instrumental variables 
regressions.
SIPP: Ln (Net worth) 
Having positive net worth, 
CEX: Ln (total nondurable, 
nonmedical consumption).
Expected Medicaid eligible 
dollars (probability of 
becoming Medicaid eligible 
* area/age/sex-specific 
mean medical spending), 
Medicaid eligible dollar* 
existence of asset test.
(1)  Significantly negative coefficients of expected Medicaid 
dollars on probability of having positive net worth and amount of 
net worth; significantly positive coefficient of expected Medicaid 
dollars on consumption.  (2) Interaction term has a significant 
coefficients in all three regressions.  (3) Coefficient size of 
interaction term is twice expected Medicaid dollars in net worth 
regression, suggesting that an asset test" more than doubles the 
wealth reduction attributable to expanding Medicaid eligibility".
NA. 
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Hao (1996) NSFH. Black, white, Hispanic 
families with children 18 
years old or younger.
OLS. Net worth. Family structure, private 
transfers, interactions of 
family structure and private 
transfers.
(1) Marriage is a wealth-enhancing institution.  (2) Private 
transfers promote family net worth.  (3) Marriage reinforces the 
promoting effect of private transfer on family wealth.
NA. 
Heflin & Patillo 
(2002)
NLSY. 7,573 white or African 
American individuals aged 
14-21 in 1978.
(1) Descriptive.  
(2) Logistic regression.
Account ownership and 
homeownership in 1994.
Race, sibling poverty, 
parental poverty.
Families were less likely to have bank accounts when they had 
poor siblings and parents.  White families were less likely to own 
homes when they had poor siblings and parents.
Demands from disadvantaged 
network members may decrease 
resources (even to the point that 
households do not have enough 
to justify owning an account).
Hilgert, Hogarth, & 
Beverly (2003)
Supplement to Nov and 
Dec 2001 Survey of 
Consumers.
1,004 households, 
representative of 
contiguous U.S.
Descriptive.  4 indices of financial 
behavior (cash-flow 
management, credit 
management, saving, & 
investment).
Financial knowledge. There was a positive association between overall financial 
knowledge and following recommended financial practices.  
There were also positive associations between specific types of 
financial behavior and specific types of financial knowledge.
Financial education (combination 
of information, skill-building, 
motivation) may improve financial 
behavior.
Hirad & Zorn (2002) Freddie Mac's Affordable 
Gold Program.
Low-income (100% or less 
of area median income) 
borrowers for 
homeownership.
Comparisons of means 
between treatment and 
control groups.
Borrower's delinquency 
rates for low-income 
individuals.
Pre-purchase home 
ownership counseling, 
administrative and delivery 
mechanisms.
(1) Home ownership counseling can reduce the delinquency rates 
of borrowers.  (2) In particular, counseling conducted in a 
classroom or individual setting is effective, while home study or 
telephone counseling is not effective.
NA. 
Hogan et al. (2004) Qualitative data from in-
depth interviews.
25 working IDA holders in 
Minnesota.  All had income 
between 100% and 200% 
of poverty level and had at 
least one child.
Analytic induction. NA. NA. Financial crises make saving difficult.  Support from friends,
family, and organizations helped some cope with crises and so
helped them save.  Some families are very committed to saving,
very resourceful in efforts to save.
Financial vulnerability is a barrier, 
but decision-makers should not 
assume that LIH cannot save. 
Hogarth, Anguelov, 
& Lee (2005)
1989, 1992, 1995, 1998, 
2001 SCF. 
Sample sizes ranged from 
about 3,000 to about 4,500 
households.  
(1) Descriptive.  
(2) Logistic regression.
Whether or not household 
had transaction account.
Income group, net worth, 
education, & race/ethnicity.
Account ownership increased between 1989 and 2001.  All listed 
explanatory variables were significantly associated with banked 
status.  Largest effects were found for income, net worth, and 
education.
Policies that support employment, 
income, and asset accumulation 
will encourage participation in the 
mainstream financial system.
Hogarth & Lee 
(2000)
SCF. Low- to moderate-income 
households (with incomes 
at 80% of the regional 
median or less).
Descriptive. Financial portfolios of poor 
households, uses of 
various types of financial 
institutions.
NA. Compared to all U.S. households, low- to moderate-income 
households are less likely to hold financial products.
NA. 
Hubbard, Skinner & 
Zeldes (1995)
1984 PSID. Full sample. Model simulation with 
parameters derived from 
the PSID, comparing 
outcomes with PSID 
aggregates.
Simulated distributions of 
age-wealth profiles.
Minimum guaranteed 
consumption floor by 
government programs 
($1000 vs. $7000).
The simulated wealth pattern with a $7000 consumption floor 
assumption generally predicts wealth accumulation patterns 
across education groups.
Low wealth accumulation can be 
explained as a utility-maximizing 
response to asset-based, means-
tested welfare programs.
Hurst & Ziliak (2006) 1994-2001 PSID. Households where the 
head was between the 
ages of 18-44 in 1994, had 
less than 16 years of 
education, remained in the 
sample continuously 
between 1994-2001, did 
not change marital status 
between 1994-2001, and 
did not have missing 
values for wealth in either 
1994 and 2001.
 Difference-in difference 
(OLS, robust regressions).
Change in liquid asset 
between 1994-2001, 
change in net worth 
between 1994-2001, 
vehicle ownership, home 
ownership, & checking 
account.
State asset limits on liquid 
asset and vehicle asset in 
2001.
No significant effect of relaxed liquid asset limit on liquid assets.  
No significant effect of relaxed liquid asset limit on home 
ownership, checking account ownership, stock ownership, and 
business ownership.  Statistically positive effect of relaxed liquid 
assets.
NA. 
Appendix Exhibit.  Empirical Studies of Determinants of Asset Building (Continued)
84
Author Data Source
Sample/Study 
Population Method
Outcomes
Analyzed
Key Explanatory
Variables Findings
Author's
Principal Conclusions
Jayakody (1998) PSID, its 1988 Time and 
Money Transfers file 
supplement.
4,965 black and white 
families for which either the 
head or spouse has at 
least one living parent.
(1) Descriptive.  
(2) Multivariate regression.
Receipt of financial 
assistance from parents, 
amount of money received.
Income, race, family 
structure.
Overall, there is no race difference in the likelihood of receiving 
financial assistance when other variables are controlled.  In sub-
group analyses, Whites are more likely to receive assistance only 
in the low-income group (less than $15,000).
Black kin networks may be 
inadequate to mitigate the 
financial strain faced by low-
income households. Not all 
families can step in and provide 
assistance to less well off kin.  
Kennickell, Starr-
McCluer, and 
Sunden (1997)
Focus group. Eight Chicago residents 
with high income and/or 
high wealth.
Descriptive. NA. NA. Several participants mentioned the need to put money "out of 
reach" to avoid spending it.
Saving requires self-control.
Kempson, McKay, & 
Collard (2005)
Surveys and in-depth 
interviews of participants in 
Saving Gateway pilot 
project.
Low-income individuals in 
five areas of England who 
chose to participate in 
matched-savings program.  
1,030 completed baseline 
survey,  539 completed 
follow-up survey, about 30 
completed in-depth 
interviews.
Descriptive. Perceptions of saving 
program, sources of 
saving.
NA. 1:1 match was main reason many opened accounts.  Participants 
liked that they had to keep money in account for 18 months to 
maximize match.  They were not in favor of restrictions on use of 
match money.  It was uncommon for participants to borrow or 
transfer money from other accounts to make deposits.  However, 
the money used to make deposits may have been saved 
(formally or informally) even in the absence of this program.
NA. 
Kotlikoff & Bernheim 
(2001)
1993 survey of nationally, 
representative sample of 
individuals between 29-47 
years old.
1,209 individuals 
completed Wave 1, with 
questions about intended 
and actual saving and 
financial attitudes.  806 
completed Wave 2, with 
questions about financial 
knowledge.
(1) Multivariate.  
(2)  Instrumental variable 
regression. 
Ratio of retirement savings 
to earnings (variables self-
reported). 
Financial knowledge. Financial knowledge was positively associated with retirement 
savings. 
Increasing financial knowledge will
increase retirement savings.
Lusardi (2002) HRS. About 3,000 U.S. 
households with financial 
respondent aged 50 to 61.
(1) Multivariate.  
(2) Controls for several 
variables that may proxy 
for individual 
characteristics associated 
with greater saving.
Financial net worth, total 
net worth.
Attended employer-
sponsored retirement 
seminar.
Attending retirement seminars has large positive effect on wealth 
for low-wealth and low-educated groups, but not for higher wealth 
and higher-educated groups.
Providing information and 
reducing planning costs (e.g., 
through retirement seminars) may 
facilitate asset accumulation.
McKernan, Ratcliffe, 
and Nam (2007)
1990, 1992, 1993, 1996, 
and 2001 SIPP 
Low education single 
mother sample: female 
household heads 18-54 
years old  and high school 
degree or less education: 
Low-education families: 
families whose head and/or 
spouse are ages 18 
through 54 and with high 
school degree or less 
education
Fixed effect regressions (1) presence of  liquid 
assets, (2) value of liquid 
assets, (3) vehicle 
ownership, (4) vehicle 
equity, (5) net worth 
(excluding housing), and 
(6) net worth (including 
housing). 
AFDC/TANF asset limits, 
IDA program rules, Food 
Stamp asset limits
Generous asset limit on unrestricted account is not significantly 
associated with liquid asset holdings but generous restricted 
account asset limits increase liquid asset holdings.  The number 
of years since unrestricted asset limits became more generous 
(greater than $1000) is associated with increased liquid asset 
holdings. 
Madrian & Shea 
(2000)
Administrative data on 
401(k) participation.
Several thousand 
employees under age 65 in 
one large U.S. firm.
(1) Natural experiment.  
(2) Descriptive analysis. 
401(k) participation and 
allocation. 
Automatic enrollment in 
401(k) plan. 
Participation in 401(k) plan was significantly higher after the firm 
began automatic enrollment.  Participants were also likely to stay 
with the default contribution rate and allocation.
The "power of suggestion" can 
produce large changes in saving 
behavior. 
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Mayer & Engelhardt 
(1996)
1988, 1990, 1993 Chicago 
Title and Trust Company 
survey of recent home 
buyers. 
A random sample of about 
1300 first time home 
buyers, collected in 18 
major U.S. cities.
(1) Descriptive.  
(2) Multivariate
Gift amount as percent of 
down payment. 
Income, median home 
price in city. 
Between 1985 and 1993, the average number of years that 
households saved for down payments increased, the average 
down payment as a percent of purchase price decreased, and the 
percent of down payment coming from personal savings 
decreased.  For recipients, the average gift equaled 51% of total 
down payment.
Home ownership is becoming less 
affordable for first-time buyers. 
Menchik & 
Jianakoplos (1997)
1976 NLS of Mature Men,  
1989 SCF. 
(1) NLS: men ages 45-59 
in 1966 who remained in 
the sample in 1976.  
(2) SCF: Full sample. 
(1) Descriptive.  
(2) OLS.
Receipt of inheritance and 
the relevance of this factor 
in explaining racial 
differences in household 
wealth.
Race, income, age, 
inheritance, asset 
composition, rate of return 
on assets, & value of 
private pensions.
Whites in both samples were more likely to have received an 
inheritance and to expect to receive an inheritance in the future.  
In addition, inheritances are estimated to significantly increase 
household wealth.  Although differences in permanent income 
explain more variance, racial differences in inheritance can 
explain between 10% and 20% of the average racial differences 
in household wealth in 1989.
Racial differences in wealth 
among current households reflect 
in part the influence of prior 
generations.
Milligan (2003) Administrative data. Random sample of about 
42,000 Canadian tax filers. 
(1) Natural experiment.  
(2) Multivariate analysis. 
Contributions to Canadian 
tax-preferred retirement 
savings account. 
Contribution rules. Controlling for censoring of desired saving at the match cap, a $1 
increase in the match cap is associated with a 50-cent increase in 
saving.
NA. 
Moore et al. (2001) Survey. About 300 participants in 
six IDA programs. 
(1) Descriptive.  
(2) Bivariate.  
(3) Multivariate. 
Sources of savings. NA. 92% of IDA participants said they liked the restrictions on 
withdrawals.  Sizeable percentages said they had increased their 
work efforts and reduced consumption because they had IDAs.  
Smaller percentages said they financed deposits with debt or 
were less likely to save in other forms because they had IDAs.  
82% said it was difficult to save because most of their money 
went to necessities.
Economic resources affect saving 
outcomes.  IDA participants were 
willing to alter consumption 
patterns to save in IDAs.
Nam (2008) 1994, 2001 PSID. Household heads 18-57 
years old who had 15 or 
less years of education in 
1994, maintained the same 
marital status, lived in the 
same state, were not in 
school, and did not have 
work-limiting health 
conditions throughout the 
observation period (1994-
2001). 
Difference-in difference 
(median regression, robust 
logic regression).
Changes in liquid asset 
between 1994-2001, 
vehicle ownership in 2001.
State asset limits on 
general, special, and 
vehicle assets in 2000 and 
years since new asset 
limits were introduced.
The earlier a state raised its asset limit on general accounts, the 
more likely female-headed households with children were to 
accumulate liquid assets between 1994 and 2001.  Among those 
who were able to save, the amount of saving was significantly 
higher for those who lived in states that allowed special accounts 
with high asset limits early.  The longer new asset limits had been 
in place, the more likely female-headed households with children, 
relative to the non-target population, were to own a vehicle and to 
own a vehicle above the previous value limit of $1,500.
NA. 
Neumark & Powers 
(1998)
1983-1986 SIPP(1984 
panel).
Male householders aged 
60-64.
Difference-in difference 
(median regression).
Saving (change in net 
wealth excluding housing 
between waves 4 and 7).
Maximum state SSI benefit 
in 1985.
Significantly negative coefficient of SSI benefit level on saving. NA. 
Nyce (2005) Administrative data on 
401(k) participation, survey 
data describing financial 
communication of firm.
Over 306,000 employees 
of 48 firms that offer 
401(k)s.  (only 26 of these 
firms completed survey 
describing their 401k plan.)
(1) Descriptive.  
(2) Multivariate. 
401(k) participation and 
contributions.
Nature of financial 
communication.
Financial communication is significantly and positively related to 
401(k) participation, especially for low earners.  Financial 
communication is positively associated with contribution rates.
Firms can encourage 401(k) 
savings by improving financial 
communication.
Olson & Davis 
(1994)
In-depth interviews. 30 low-income women in 
Chicago.
Inductive. Perceptions of EITC. NA. Some women thought about refunds differently than wage 
income.  Some were not interested in the advance-payment 
option.  They wanted to accumulate a lump sum for special 
purposes.
NA. 
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Powers (1998) 1978-1983 NLS-YW. 229 female head of 
households whose marital 
status did not change 
between 1978-1983.
Robust regression. Change in total net wealth 
(excluding vehicle value) 
between 1978-1983.
Change in state asset limits 
between 1978-1983.
Significantly positive coefficient of asset limit (about 0.25) on 
assets.
NA. 
Reid (2004) PSID. 5,300 renters who had not 
owned a home in past five 
years.
(1) Descriptive.  
(2) Multivariate.
Home ownership status, 
value of home, home 
equity.
Income, race. (1) Among low-income renters, whites, married couples, 
professionals, and those with at least HS degree were more likely 
to buy homes.  (2) Many homeowners, especially low-income and 
minority, return to renting.  (3) Financial returns to home 
ownership  were very small for low-income minorities, low-income 
whites, and middle-income minorities. Still, housing wealth is 
essentially the only asset for many low-income minority home 
owners and some do experience appreciation.  (4) Experiencing 
a divorce is one of the most important factors in the transition 
from owing to renting, regardless of race or income.
(1) Homeownership 
disproportionately benefits white 
and middle- and upper-income 
households.  (2) Increasing 
homeownership among blacks will 
not substantially reduce the racial 
wealth gap.  (3) Homeownership 
is an incredibly fluid category, with 
many families moving in and out 
of homeownership several times 
over the course of their lives.
Romich & Weisner 
(2000)
In-depth interviews. 42 families randomly 
selected from families who 
volunteered for an anti-
poverty program in 
Wisconsin.
Inductive. Perceptions and use of 
EITC.
NA. Some view  and use refunds differently than wage income.  
Some prefer a lump-sum over the advance-payment option.
The preference for a lump-sum is 
consistent with behavioral 
economic theory.  
Sarkisian & Gerstel 
(2004)
1992-1994 NSFH. 9200 black and white 
households.
(1) Descriptive.  
(2) Multinomial logistic 
regression.
Gender and class 
differences in kin support 
among blacks and whites.
Race, income, wealth, 
education, employment 
status, employment hours, 
occupation, & public 
assistance (structural 
variables).
Whites report greater financial and emotional kin support while 
blacks are involved in more practical help (transportation, 
household work, and child care).  Black men and white men are 
very similar while significant differences exist between women. 
Many racial differences in kin 
support can be explained by 
structural and class differences.
Schmidt & Sevak 
(2004)
PSID. A national representative 
sample of households.
(1) OLS.  
(2) Quantile regression.
Net worth. Family structure, gender, 
other demographic and 
socioeconomic variables.
After controlling for other demographic and socioeconomic 
factors, the net worth of married couples is higher than other 
family types, and single females have the least wealth holdings.  
However, the wealth gaps by gender and family types may 
emerge later in life.
NA. 
Schoeni(1997) 1988 PSID with 
supplement on private 
interhousehold transfers.
About 6,000 individuals 
aged 20 to 80.
(1) Descriptive.  
(2) Multivariate.
Interhousehold transfers of 
money and time in 1987.
Age, income, home 
purchase.
Home purchase in the past year was positively associated with 
the receipt of money and time help.
NA.
Schoeni & Ross 
(2005) 
PSID (1988 with Special 
Time and Money Transfers 
Supplement).
6,661 young adults 
between 18-34 years old, 
including 4,848 who were 
heads of household or 
spouses in 1988.
(1) Descriptive.  
(2) Synthetic cohort 
approach.
Total amount of material 
assistance (housing, food, 
educational expense or 
cash) received by young 
adults during transition to 
adulthood.
Parents' economic status 
when they were 10-15 
years old.
(1) Young adults receive about $38,000 in material assistance 
(housing, food, support for educational expenses, or cash) 
throughout transition to adulthood (from 18 to 34 years old), 
annual average = $2,200.  (2) Young adults in top quartile of 
family income receive three times more material assistance than 
those in bottom quartile.
More research needed to 
determine if material assistance, 
or some other family mechanism, 
leads to more successful 
transition for children of affluent 
parents.
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Schreiner & 
Sherraden (2007)
Administrative data from 
ADD.
Over 2,000 participants in 
14 IDA programs.
(1) Descriptive.  
(2) Multivariate. 
IDA saving. Match rate, match cap. Participants who were eligible for higher match rates were more 
likely to be "savers" but had lower monthly net savings.  When 
both of these effects are considered, higher match rates 
increased average saving.  Higher match caps were associated 
with greater saving.  Net IDA deposits increased substantially 
during tax season.
Higher match rates increase 
inclusion.  Many IDA participants 
were saving for fixed goals.
Schreiner et al. 
(2001) 
Administrative data from 
ADD. 
Over 2,000 participants in 
14 IDA programs.
(1) Descriptive.  
(2) Multivariate.
Sources of IDA deposits.     NA. Many participants had no or very low liquid assets at enrollment.  
Most had too few liquid assets to fund all of their IDA deposits.
IDA deposit comes from both new 
savings and shifted assets. 
Shapiro (2004) Qualitative data from in-
depth interviews, SIPP, 
PSID.
In-depth interview sample 
of 200 poor to middle-class 
families with school-age 
children in Boston, LA, and 
St. Louis.
Descriptive. Receipt of transfer or 
financial assistance, effects 
of transfer/financial 
assistance.
Race. (1) Sizable inheritances and inter vivos  gifts can give young 
families a "head start" (e.g., Allows home purchase in 
neighborhood with good schools).  (2) Whites are more likely than 
blacks to receive sizable transfers.  (3) Families with assets are 
able to acquire high-quality education for their children, and their 
education can transfer their economic advantages to their 
children. 
Transfer of "transformative 
assets" perpetuates inequality.
Sherraden, McBride 
et al. (2005)
In-depth interviews. 59 IDA participants in OK, 
plus 25 non-IDA 
participants.
Inductive. Perceptions of saving and 
IDA program, sources of 
saving.
NA. The match was a primary reason for opening IDAs.  Some 
participants like restrictions on withdrawals, and restrictions may 
be translated into goals.  Direct deposit and encouragement from 
IDA staff helped some participants save.  Medical expenses and 
vehicle breakdowns made saving difficult.
NA. 
Smeeding, Phillips, 
& O'Connor (2000)
Survey. 650 tax units with children, 
living in Chicago and 
expecting to receive a 
federal refund and EITC 
benefits.
(1) Descriptive.  
(2) Bivariate.
Planned use of tax refund. NA. Paying bills was the most common planned refund use.  One-half 
said they planned to save some or all.  22% planned to purchase 
or repair a car.
Families plan to use EITC refunds 
for immediate consumption and 
for investments in longer-term 
well-being.
Stack (1974) Observation, in-depth 
interviews. 
Individuals and families in 
one Midwestern, urban, low-
income, black community 
in the 1970s.
(1) Descriptive.  
(2) Inductive.
"Survival strategies". NA. Frequent demands from social network members made it difficult 
for blacks to accumulate assets. 
Sullivan (2006) 1992-1999 SIPP (1992, 
1993, 1996 panels).
Single mothers with a high 
school degree or less, 
single mothers and single 
women without children 
(comparison group) with a 
high school degree or less. 
(1) Probit.  
(2) OLS.  
(3) Difference-in-difference.
Vehicle ownership, vehicle 
equity, liquid assets.
Vehicle asset limit, liquid 
asset limit.
Relaxed vehicle limit significantly increase vehicle ownership 
among single mothers.  Increased asset limit has negligible effect 
on vehicle ownership and liquid assets.
NA. 
Tennyson & Nguyen 
(2001)
1997 survey of high school 
students conducted by 
Jumpstart Coalition for 
Personal Financial 
Literacy.
High school students and 
teachers.
OLS. Personal financial literacy. Curriculum mandates and 
required specific financial 
education course work.
(1) Curriculum mandates, broadly defined, are not generally 
associated with financial literacy.  (2) Students in states that 
required specific financial education course work scored higher.
NA. 
Thaler & Benartzi 
(2004)
Administrative data. 315 employees at midsize 
manufacturing company 
who were eligible for 
retirement savings plan.
Descriptive. Contribution rates. Participation in SMarT plan 
(precommitment plan). 
Those who precommitted to save most of their pay raises 
increased their average saving rate much more than those who 
agreed to try to increase their saving but did not arrange for 
automatic saving increases.
Inertia is powerful.  Carefully 
constructed saving programs can 
increase saving.
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Author Data Source
Sample/Study 
Population Method
Outcomes
Analyzed
Key Explanatory
Variables Findings
Author's
Principal Conclusions
Wilhelm (2001) Mid- to late-1980s PSID. Unweighted samples vary 
from about 4,000 to about 
6,000.
Direct estimation. Inheritance, inter vivos 
gifts.
Income, race, age, 
education, & occupation.
(1) Household in highest permanent income quintile is much more 
likely to have received inheritance than a household in lowest 
quintile (28% vs 13%).  Average inheritance amount (conditional 
on receipt varies dramatically by income (e.g., Average for 
highest permanent income quintile is almost 5 times as high as 
average for lowest quintile).  
(2) Likelihood of receiving inter vivos  gift doesn't vary that much 
by income.  However, amount of gift (conditional on receipt) does 
increase with income.
A large share of wealth is 
traceable to intergenerational 
transfers.  These transfers 
disproportionately go to higher-
income families.  However, a non-
negligible number of low- to 
moderate-income households 
receive sizeable transfers.
Wolff (2002) 1989, 1992, 1995, 1998 
SCF.
Full sample (both core and 
high-income supplement).
Descriptive. Receipt of financial 
transfers, amount of 
transfers, present net value 
of all transfers in 1998 
dollars.
Race, income. Twenty percent of all households received a transfer in 1998.  
The proportion of non-Hispanic whites receiving a transfer was 
more than twice that of other groups (23.8% for whites, 10.8% for 
blacks, 4.2% for Hispanics, and 9.1% for Asian and other races).
Although poor households 
receive less in inheritances than 
non-poor households, wealth 
transfers may reduce wealth 
inequality.  This is because even 
a small gift to the poor may make 
up a huge portion of their wealth 
portfolio.  Even though wealth 
inequality rose between 1983 and 
1998, it might have been  worse 
without the mitigating effects of 
gifts and inheritances.
Woo, Schweke & 
Buchholz (2004)
Microsimulation by Institute 
on Taxation and Economic 
Policy.
Database of almost 
750,000 tax returns and 
supplementary records.
Simulation, using existing 
tax returns and 
government or other 
respected projections.
Distribution of tax 
expenditures for mortgage 
interest and property tax 
deductions.
Income group. Most benefits of mortgage interest and property tax deductions 
accrue to high-income taxpayers.
Federal policies disproportionately 
benefit those who highest 
incomes and most assets.
Zhan, Anderson, & 
Scott (2006)
Pretest and posttest survey 
of financial education 
(FLLIP) participants.
163 low-income (below or 
at 200% poverty line) 
people in Illinois.
(1) Descriptive.  
(2) Multivariate.
Pre-training financial 
knowledge, knowledge 
gains. 
(1) For pre-training 
knowledge: participant 
characteristics.  (2) For 
knowledge gains: financial 
training program and 
participant characteristics. 
Single participants had better financial knowledge than married 
participants.
NA.
Ziliak (2003) 1980-1991 PSID. 1,210 male and female 
household heads between 
the ages of 25 - 52 in 1980 
who did not change marital 
status over the sample 
period (14,520 person-
year).
(1) Generalized method-of-
moments (GMM).  
(2) Decomposition.
Ln(liquid-wealth-to-
permanent-income ratio), 
Ln(net-wealth-to-
permanent-income ratio).
Permanent asset-tested 
transfer income (12 year 
average over observation 
period), permanent non-
asset tested transfer 
income.
(1) Permanent asset-tested transfer income and permanent non-
asset-tested transfer income have significantly negative 
associations with liquid-asset-to-income-ratio.  The former has 
much larger effect on liquid asset accumulation.  (2) Both asset-
tested and non-asset tested transfer income have negative but 
not statistically significant effect on net-wealth-to-income ratio.  (3)
Decomposition results indicate that virtually all rich-poor liquid 
asset gap is attributable to differences in average characteristics, 
not differences in coefficients.
NA.
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